Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most standard measures, political polarization in the United States—particularly affective (emotional dislike of the other side) and elite/congressional polarization—is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly post-World War II or the mid-20th century), and it rivals or exceeds peaks from the late 19th century in some quantitative metrics of Congress. It is not worse than the Civil War era in terms of existential stakes or violence, and historians debate comparisons to periods like the early republic (1790s–1810s) or the 1960s. The U.S. also stands out as more polarized than most peer wealthy democracies.[1][2]

Polarization is multifaceted: ideological/issue (disagreement on policies), affective (dislike or animosity toward the out-group), elite (politicians/parties), and mass (public). Sorting (people aligning ideology, party, identity, and geography more tightly) amplifies it. Data is strongest for the U.S. post-WWII; longer historical comparisons rely more on congressional voting records.

Elite/Congressional Polarization

Using DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative dimension based on roll-call votes, comparable over time), the ideological gap between the average Democrat and Republican in the House and Senate is wider today than at any point in the past 50 years and approaches or matches late-19th-century highs (post-Reconstruction/Gilded Age).[3][4]

Bipartisan bill co-sponsorship and cross-party collaboration have also declined. Geographic and demographic sorting of the parties (e.g., more Southern Republicans, more diverse Democrats) has reinforced this.[4]

Mass Issue Polarization

Public opinion on issues has diverged more since the late 1980s, with a sharp acceleration after 2008. A 2026 Cambridge University study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data and clustering methods found divisions on social/political issues rose ~64% from 1988 to 2024, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (financial crisis, Obama election, rise of smartphones/social media). It may have leveled somewhat after 2020 but remains much higher than earlier decades.[6][7]

Geographic sorting (people living in more politically homogeneous areas) has also risen sharply since the 1970s, correlating tightly with congressional polarization. Split-ticket voting has collapsed to historic lows.[4]

Affective Polarization

This has risen dramatically and is often what makes polarization “feel” worse. Americans’ feelings toward the opposing party (measured via ANES “feeling thermometers,” 0–100 cold-to-warm) show a growing gap, driven mainly by colder out-party views rather than warmer in-party ones.[10][11]

Views of the other side as closed-minded, immoral, dishonest, or a threat have intensified.[15]

Historical and Comparative Context

Drivers and Caveats

Contributors include partisan realignment (especially Southern), primary systems rewarding extremes, gerrymandering/safe seats, cable news and social media (amplifying culture-war content), declining trust in institutions, and identity sorting. Economic inequality and cultural changes play roles. Some argue it can feel worse than issue distances warrant due to media and elite cues.[16]

Caveats: “Polarization” is not uniform—many Americans remain moderate or cross-pressured; issue positions are not always extremely bimodal. Data quality and measurement (e.g., what “liberal/conservative” meant historically) have limits for deep history. Trends can reverse (past high-polarization eras depolarized via party dominance or realignment). Recent data sometimes shows plateaus or slight dips.[6]

In short, yes—it is worse than the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century on key metrics, at historically high levels for peacetime U.S. democracy short of the Civil War, and distinctively intense among peer nations today. This contributes to gridlock, declining trust, and risks to democratic norms, though the country has weathered intense divisions before.