Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple rigorous measures—particularly of elite (congressional) and mass (public) ideological/issue polarization, as well as affective (emotional) polarization—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly the mid-20th century through the 1990s/early 2000s), and it stands out among peer democracies. However, the U.S. has experienced intense divisions before (e.g., the early republic, the lead-up to the Civil War, and the 1960s), and today’s levels do not match the existential stakes or violence of the Civil War era. Comparisons depend on the type of polarization, the time frame, and whether one focuses on elites, the public, or both.[1]

Recent Trends in Public/Mass Polarization

Studies tracking public opinion show clear increases:

Other research confirms multidimensional ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans has grown over the past 30 years (both moving from the center, at different rates), with partisan sorting and issue alignment increasing, though not always uniformly across demographics or all topics.[3]

Social media, cable news, geographic sorting (people living in more like-minded areas), and elite cueing contribute. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly balanced left and right clusters, intensifying the sense of conflict. Globally, the same methods did not show clear rising polarization everywhere.[1]

Elite/Congressional Polarization

Using DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes, comparable over time on a liberal-conservative dimension), Democrats and Republicans in Congress are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years. Overlap between the parties has essentially vanished since the early 2000s (from substantial numbers of moderates/cross-pressured members in the early 1970s). Both parties became more cohesive and moved from the center (Republicans more sharply rightward on average; Democrats modestly leftward, partly due to the decline of conservative Southern Democrats). This trend has roots in the 1970s (post-civil rights realignment, primary changes, etc.) and accelerated later. Geographic/demographic shifts (e.g., more Southern Republicans, more diverse Democrats) reinforced it.[4]

Historically, congressional polarization was high in the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction Gilded Age), declined through the mid-20th century (the “consensus” era with more bipartisan overlap), and has risen since the 1970s to levels rivaling or exceeding earlier peaks in the modern party system.

Historical Comparisons

America has never been free of deep divisions—regional, racial, economic, cultural, and partisan conflicts date to the founding:

Historians differ on exact rankings. Some (e.g., Yuval Levin) argue today’s divisions are not as deep as the early 1800s or late 1960s in substantive terms, noting the long 50/50 stalemate limits either side’s ability to fully dominate. Others highlight unique modern features: high affective polarization, media fragmentation enabling separate information ecosystems, red/blue state policy divergence (on abortion, guns, education, immigration, etc., approaching levels not seen since Jim Crow in some views), identity-based sorting, and leaders who deliberately inflame divides. Trust in institutions is very low. Political violence has risen from low bases but remains far below historical peaks. Most experts reject imminent “civil war” analogies because there is no single existential issue equivalent to slavery, and institutional/military unity differs.[5]

The U.S. currently shows “pernicious” polarization levels rare among wealthy Western liberal democracies (few peers have sustained it).[6]

Important Nuances

In short, relative to the post-WWII to ~2000 period of greater elite bipartisanship and public overlap, yes—polarization is markedly worse on key metrics and feels more encompassing due to media and sorting. Absolute historical highs (Civil War) were worse in consequences. Trends are well-documented by sources like Pew, ANES-based academic studies, and DW-NOMINATE analyses, though measurement debates continue (e.g., agenda changes over time). Polarization is not inevitable or irreversible, but reversing it has proven difficult in democracies that reach high levels.