Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most measurable standards—especially since the mid-to-late 20th century—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been in recent decades, though it is not unprecedented in the full sweep of American history, and the public is not always as divided on issues as elites or perceptions suggest.[1]

Polarization has multiple dimensions: elite/congressional (voting and ideology of politicians), ideological/issue (policy positions of the public), affective (emotional dislike or hostility toward the other side), and sorting (alignment of identities, geography, and partisanship). Trends vary somewhat by measure, but the overall picture shows a clear rise.

Elite and Congressional Polarization

Using DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative spectrum based on roll-call votes), the ideological gap between the average Democrat and Republican in Congress has widened substantially since the 1970s. It is now wider than at any point in the past 50 years and comparable to or exceeding levels from the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction era). Overlap between the parties has nearly disappeared—moderates who once crossed party lines are rare, and bipartisan coalitions on major votes are far less common.[2]

Affective Polarization (Hostility and Dislike)

This has risen sharply and is particularly concerning. Americans’ “feeling thermometer” ratings of the opposing party have dropped dramatically since the late 1970s/1980s, while in-party ratings stayed relatively stable or improved slightly. The gap roughly doubled in many datasets.[4]

Pew Research data shows:

Cross-nationally, the U.S. has experienced one of the largest (or the largest) increases in affective polarization among OECD countries studied over recent decades. Some analyses using V-Dem data describe U.S. levels as reaching “pernicious” territory uncommon among long-standing wealthy democracies.[6]

Related social effects include rising reports of stressful political conversations, friendships ending over politics, and geographic/social sorting.

Issue Positions, Ideological Consistency, and Sorting

Gaps have widened on many hot-button issues (abortion, immigration, climate, race/equality, government power), per Gallup and others, though not uniformly on every topic.[10]

Historical and Comparative Context

The U.S. has endured deeper divisions: the Civil War and 1850s sectional crisis, Reconstruction violence, the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, assassinations, urban riots), and intense early-republic factionalism (Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans). Some historians argue today’s splits, while severe and permeating daily life/media/culture, do not yet match those in intensity of violence or existential stakes for the regime.[11]

What stands out now is the combination of high elite polarization, intense affective hostility, media fragmentation, geographic sorting, and near-parity of the two camps in a two-party system—making conflict feel constant and zero-sum. The mid-20th-century low-polarization period was the outlier. Polarization can also be a byproduct of progress (e.g., civil rights realignment ending the old bipartisan consensus that preserved discriminatory orders).[12]

Caveats and Nuances

In short, relative to the postwar era and especially the last 30–40 years, polarization is worse across key dimensions (congressional ideology, affective hostility, and sorting/consistency). It feels acute because it is high, persistent, and amplified by modern media and close electoral competition. It is not the absolute worst in U.S. history, but it is unusually high for a stable peacetime democracy and distinctive internationally. Data from sources like Pew, ANES, DW-NOMINATE/Voteview, Gallup, and academic clustering studies consistently support this assessment.