Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, in several key measurable ways—particularly among political elites, in partisan sorting, and in affective (emotional) dislike of the other side—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for much of the past century, and it ranks among the highest levels in U.S. history outside of extreme periods like the Civil War era. However, it is not unprecedented, absolute levels of political violence have been higher in other periods (such as the 1960s–1970s), and the picture is more nuanced depending on the specific dimension measured (elite vs. mass, ideological vs. affective) and the historical baseline.[1]

Polarization is multifaceted: ideological (differences in policy views), affective (dislike or distrust of the opposing side), elite (politicians and parties), and mass (the public). Sorting (alignment of ideology, identity, and party) amplifies it. Data come primarily from U.S. sources like Pew Research, American National Election Studies (ANES), DW-NOMINATE congressional scores, and academic studies; the U.S. is often an outlier compared to other democracies.[2]

Elite/Congressional Polarization

Congress is more polarized than at any point in the modern era (roughly post-World War II) and approaches or exceeds late-19th-century (Gilded Age/post-Reconstruction) peaks on standard metrics.

DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative dimension based on roll-call votes) show the parties pulling apart since the 1970s. The ideological distance between the average Democrat and Republican has grown substantially; party overlap has collapsed nearly to zero (few remaining conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans after the Southern realignment); and parties are more internally homogeneous. This trend accelerated in recent decades and is often described as somewhat asymmetric (Republicans shifting further right on average, though Democrats have also moved left).[3][4]

Bipartisan cooperation has declined sharply, contributing to gridlock. This is higher than mid-20th-century levels (when cross-party coalitions were common) but comparable to earlier high-polarization eras in the First Party System (1790s–1820s) or post-Civil War period.[5]

Mass Public: Issue/Ideological Polarization and Sorting

Among the public, clear trends show rising polarization and especially sorting since the late 20th century, with acceleration after ~2008 in some measures.

Not all Americans are highly polarized—many remain moderate or cross-pressured—but the politically engaged, partisans, and those sorted by multiple identities (party + race/religion/geography/culture) drive the intensity. Geographic and social sorting (e.g., like-minded communities, media) reinforces this.

Affective Polarization

This has risen markedly and is a major reason polarization “feels” worse. People increasingly view the opposing party and its supporters negatively—as immoral, dishonest, closed-minded, a threat, etc.—rather than just disagreeing on policy.

This “us vs. them” dynamic is linked to identity alignment and media environments.

Historical Context and Caveats

Drivers (not exhaustive): Party realignment (especially South), primary systems/gerrymandering favoring extremes, rising inequality and cultural/identity changes, nationalized media and social media (echo chambers, outrage algorithms), elite cues, and equal-sized coalitions making competition zero-sum. Polarization can be a byproduct of progress (e.g., civil rights realigning parties).[17]

In short, current U.S. polarization is severe by post-WWII standards and high historically on elite, sorting, and affective metrics, contributing to dysfunction, distrust, and risks to norms. It is not unique in American history, and past high-polarization periods have depolarized (often via one-party dominance or realignments). Trends can shift with leadership, institutions, media, or events, though many factors are structural. International comparisons show the U.S. as an outlier in the intensity of recent rises among peer democracies.