Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Is Political Polarization Worse Than It's Been in the Past?

The answer is nuanced: yes, by many measures polarization is at or near historic highs in recent decades—but it's not unprecedented in American history, and the picture differs depending on what exactly you're measuring.

Congressional/Elite Polarization: At a Modern Record

By the metrics political scientists use most often (DW-NOMINATE scores based on congressional voting records), the data is fairly unambiguous: on average, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years. This divide has deep roots—both parties have grown more ideologically cohesive, and both parties have moved further away from the ideological center since the early 1970s. The overlap between the parties has vanished entirely: five decades ago, 144 House Republicans were less conservative than the most conservative Democrat, and 52 House Democrats were less liberal than the most liberal Republican, but that zone of ideological overlap began to shrink as conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans either retired, lost reelection, or switched parties.

Extending the timeline further back, following a period of a much more balanced Congress during the middle of the 20th century, ideological distance between the parties began to grow during the 1970s to the extent that Congress is now more polarized than at any time since the late 1870s Reconstruction Era.

Affective Polarization (How Much We Dislike the Other Side): Clearly Worsening

This is where the data is most striking. Americans' emotional hostility toward the opposing party has grown dramatically: in 1978, the average American rated members of their own political party 27 points higher than members of the other major party, but by 2016 that gap had grown to 45.9 points. Crucially, this growth has happened faster in the U.S. than in Canada, the UK, Australia, or Germany. In fact, in the UK, Australia, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, polarization has actually decreased over the same period—so this isn't a universal global trend.

Partisan hostility has continued to intensify into the 2020s: in 2022, 72% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats viewed the opposing party as more immoral than other Americans—up dramatically from 47% and 35% in 2016.

But Here's the Important Caveat: Historical Context Matters

Despite these alarming modern trends, scholars caution against viewing current polarization as unprecedented. Some political scientists have pointed out that viewed within the context of data from the last two centuries, today's levels of polarization are not such an alarming anomaly compared to those occurring during the time of slavery and similar points along the historical continuum. America has weathered severe divisions before: the Gilded Age of the late 19th century (c. 1870–1900) is considered one of the most politically polarized periods in American history, with open political violence and highly polarized political discourse. And of course, although there is a case to be made that America's most divided days came during the Civil War, polarization has no doubt reached striking levels in the present moment.

A Surprising Wrinkle: Public Opinion Gap vs. Perceived Gap

Interestingly, some research suggests ordinary Americans aren't as ideologically divided as it feels. Other research suggests that Americans are less polarized than they think, with significant ideological overlap on policies—ideological polarization is felt most strongly among the most politically engaged, and while Americans are less ideologically polarized than they believe, they are very emotionally polarized, meaning "they do not like members of the other party." A Cambridge study reinforces this: "political groups have moved further apart in recent years, but these divisions are still fuzzy, and Americans are not split into entirely opposing tribes when it comes to the issues." That same study found divisions within the US population on social and political issues have increased by 64% since 1988, with almost all this coming after 2008, after polarization had almost flatlined during the nineties and noughties.

Globally, Too

This isn't a uniquely American phenomenon. In the past decade, political scientists have uncovered a similar trend across the globe, not just in countries with two dominant parties but in nations with diverse societal compositions, including Switzerland, Denmark, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Global data trackers confirm this: the global population-weighted V-Dem Political Polarization Index reached its highest level since 1946 in 2025.

Bottom Line

By most contemporary metrics—congressional voting patterns, partisan animosity, and ideological sorting—polarization genuinely is worse than it's been in living memory (roughly the past 50-70 years), and the U.S. is polarizing faster than peer democracies. However, it's not historically unprecedented when you zoom out far enough to include the Civil War era or the violent political conflicts of the Gilded Age. The most honest summary is: current polarization is severe and rising by modern standards, but America has survived—and eventually reduced—worse divisions before.