Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3]Yes, in several key measurable ways—especially in the United States over the past several decades—political polarization is worse than it has been in the recent past (roughly the post-World War II era or the last 50 years), though it is not unprecedented in deeper American history and varies by type and metric.[2]

Polarization is typically measured in distinct but related forms:

Evidence of Increased Polarization in the Modern US

Congressional/elite polarization has risen substantially. A Pew Research Center analysis of DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes) finds that Democrats and Republicans in Congress are farther apart ideologically today than at any point in the past 50 years. Both parties have become more internally cohesive, with far fewer moderates (only about two dozen left versus more than 160 in the early 1970s). There has been no ideological overlap between the least liberal Democrats and least conservative Republicans in the House since around 2002 (and shortly after in the Senate). Republicans have shifted more strongly conservative on average, while Democrats have moved modestly more liberal. Geographic and demographic shifts (e.g., more Southern Republicans, more diverse Democrats) have reinforced this.[2][2]

Mass/public issue polarization has also increased. A 2026 University of Cambridge study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) and clustering algorithms found that divisions on social and political issues rose by about 64% since 1988, with nearly all the increase occurring after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the rise of smartphones/social media). It remained relatively flat in the 1990s and early 2000s. Much of the shift came from the left-leaning cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (about 31.5% more so by 2024), while the right-leaning cluster moved only slightly more conservative (about 2.8%). Sorting into parties and ideological labels also increased markedly. Polarization may have begun leveling off somewhat in recent years but remains far higher than in prior decades. Other analyses similarly show Democrats and Republicans becoming more ideologically distant, with both moving away from the center (at different rates) and greater alignment on issues like climate, guns, and abortion.[1][4][1]

Affective polarization (partisan animosity) has grown dramatically and is often cited as particularly concerning. ANES feeling thermometer data (0–100 scale of warmth toward parties) shows the gap between in-party and out-party ratings roughly doubling since the late 1970s/early 1980s—from around 20–25 points to around 50 or more recently. In-party warmth has stayed relatively stable (around 70), while out-party ratings have plummeted (from near-neutral ~48–50 in the late 1970s to the low 20s or below). Pew data shows sharp rises in viewing the other party as more immoral, dishonest, closed-minded, etc. (e.g., majorities now hold these views, up substantially since 2016). Unfavorable views of both parties have also grown over decades.[3][3][5][6]

Partisan sorting by demographics, geography, religion, education, and identity has intensified, making parties more like social tribes. This contributes to affective divides even when pure issue disagreements are more nuanced. Some research notes that “latent” value clusters (e.g., on moral/religious issues) have been relatively stable for decades, but parties have increasingly aligned with them.[7]

Historical Perspective

In the mid-20th century (roughly 1940s–1970s), there was more bipartisanship, ideological overlap in Congress (conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans), and less sorted public opinion. Today’s levels exceed those of recent decades on standard metrics.[2]

However, the US has experienced deeper divisions before:

Polarization has sometimes accompanied progress (e.g., civil rights realignment broke old coalitions and increased sorting).[12]

Global Context

Polarization (especially affective) has risen in many countries over recent decades per Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and other data, across regions, often linked to economic crises, populism, identity politics, or media changes. The US stands out for rapid increases across multiple types (affective, ideological, elite) simultaneously, and for having relatively equal-sized left and right clusters, which can intensify the sense of division. It is not unique, however.[13][14]

Caveats and Nuances