Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Leans yesSays it is contested

Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse (higher) than it has been for much of the recent past—particularly since the mid-20th century—and in some respects reaches levels not seen in decades or longer, though it is not entirely without historical precedent. Polarization is multi-dimensional (ideological positions on issues, partisan sorting, elite vs. mass behavior, and affective/emotional hostility), and trends differ somewhat by type. Data is strongest for the US; global patterns show rises in many places but the US often stands out among wealthy democracies.[1]

Congressional/Elite Ideological Polarization

Using DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative scale based on roll-call votes, comparable over time), the average ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans in Congress has grown substantially since the 1970s. Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center (Republicans more so on average in some analyses), with the zone of ideological overlap between the parties essentially disappearing by the early 2000s.[2]

•In the early 1970s, there were over 160 moderate Democrats and Republicans in Congress; recently, only about two dozen remain.[2]

•Party-mean differences and gaps have risen to levels among the highest in the modern (post-Civil War) era, exceeding mid-20th-century lows and rivaling or surpassing late-19th-century/Gilded Age peaks in some visualizations of the long series. The mid-20th century (roughly Great Depression through ~1980) was an unusually low-polarization period.[3]

•Geographic realignment (e.g., Southern Democrats becoming more liberal and declining in number; Southern Republicans becoming more conservative and more numerous) has reinforced this.[2]

This elite polarization contributes to gridlock, party-line voting (now extremely high), and reduced bipartisanship.

Mass/Public Ideological Polarization and Sorting

Public opinion on issues has also diverged, though less extremely than among elites, and with important nuances:

•A Cambridge University analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found divisions on social and political issues rose ~64% overall, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (a turning point linked to the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and rising social media/smartphones). It has remained elevated (with possible recent leveling). The shift was asymmetric: the left/cluster became substantially more socially liberal (~31.5%), while the right moved only modestly more conservative (~2.8%).[4]

•Partisan and ideological sorting has increased: people with left-leaning views are more likely to identify as Democrats/liberals (and vice versa), and issue positions have become more consistently bundled. Overlap in attitudes across party lines has declined.[4]

•Other work confirms Democrats and Republicans have become more ideologically distant over ~30 years, with parties moving from the center (at different rates). Latent value clusters (e.g., moral/religious) may have been stable longer, with rising partisan alignment to them.[5]

Americans are not fully split into non-overlapping tribes on every issue—divisions remain “fuzzy”—but average positions have separated and consistency within sides has grown.[4]

Affective Polarization (Emotional Hostility)

This has risen sharply and is often what makes polarization “feel” worse. ANES feeling thermometers (0–100 warm/cold ratings of parties) show:

•The gap between in-party warmth and out-party coldness grew from roughly 20–25 points in the late 1970s/early 1980s to 40+ by the 2010s and ~50–55 more recently. In-party ratings stayed relatively stable (warm); out-party ratings dropped dramatically (from near-neutral ~45–50 toward the mid-20s or lower).[6]

•Related attitudes have hardened: large shares of partisans view the other side as more immoral, a threat, etc., and willingness to have family members marry across parties has fallen.[1]

Survey mode and question wording can affect exact levels (e.g., people may express more hostility toward politicians/elites than ordinary voters of the other party), but the upward trend is robust and real.[7]

Broader Historical and Comparative Context

•US history: Intense divisions occurred in the early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians), antebellum/Civil War era (far more extreme, with actual secession and war), Gilded Age, and 1960s (Vietnam, civil rights, assassinations, riots). Some historians and analysts argue today’s substantive policy divides are not as deep as those of the 1790s–1800s or late 1960s in certain ways, and the country is not on the brink of civil war. However, today’s polarization is more cleanly partisan (aligned with the two major parties rather than cross-cutting factions or regions in the same way), more nationalized, and amplified by media/social media. Party systems have sorted more completely (fewer conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans).[8]

•Comparative: V-Dem and other data show polarization rising in many countries since ~2005, but the US has climbed to “pernicious” levels (high antagonistic camps affecting social relations) that are rare among long-standing wealthy Western liberal democracies. It scores high on measures of partisan dislike.[9]

•Contributing factors often cited include party realignment/sorting (especially post-civil rights and Southern Strategy eras), rising economic inequality, cultural/identity shifts, media fragmentation and social media algorithms, declining social capital/cross-cutting ties (“bowling alone” and atomization), and elite incentives.[10]

Caveats and Nuances

•Polarization is not uniform: local communities and some issues show more resilience or common ground; many Americans are moderate or “tuned-out”; and some measures (e.g., issue positions) can overstate tribalism.[4]

•It can have upsides in clarifying choices but downsides in gridlock, eroded norms/trust, reduced compromise, and risks of democratic backsliding or violence when opponents are seen as existential threats.

•Trends can reverse or plateau (some recent data hints at possible slowing on issues), and history shows depolarization is possible (e.g., post-Civil War, mid-20th century).

•“Worse” depends on the baseline and metric. Compared to the unusually consensual mid-20th century, yes. Compared to the Civil War, no (in terms of violence/scale). Affective and elite measures show particularly clear recent deterioration.

In short, for the post-WWII or post-1970s period that most people use as a reference, political polarization—especially affective dislike and elite divergence—is markedly worse, with a notable acceleration after ~2008 on public issues. It is high by longer historical standards in key respects and distinctive in its partisan character and intensity among peer democracies.

Citations (10)

1deseret.comNews and mediaquality 0.76
https://www.deseret.com/2024/1/15/24002302/dangerously-divided-united-states/
Backs: “Data is strongest for the US; global patterns show rises in many places but the US often stands out among wealthy democracies.”
background, article, points to yes. Claim: US polarization is higher than much of the recent past; global patterns show rises in many places, with the US standing out among wealthy democracies.
2pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center (Republicans more so on average in some analyses), with the zone of ideological overlap between the parties essentially disappearing by the early 2000s.”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: Congressional ideological distance between parties has grown since the 1970s; moderates fell from over 160 to about two dozen.
3substack.comBlogs and newsletters
https://kylesaunders.substack.com/p/watch-congress-evolve-in-two-and
Backs: “The mid-20th century (roughly Great Depression through ~1980) was an unusually low-polarization period.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Party-mean differences in Congress are among the highest of the modern era, and the mid-20th century was unusually low-polarization.
4cam.ac.ukAcademic
https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “The shift was asymmetric: the left/cluster became substantially more socially liberal (~31.5%), while the right moved only modestly more conservative (~2.8%).”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: ANES data show issue divisions rose about 64% from 1988 to 2024, mostly after 2008, with sorting increasing and the left shifting more.
5stanford.eduAcademic
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/polarization-united-states-reconsidered
Backs: “Latent value clusters (e.g., moral/religious) may have been stable longer, with rising partisan alignment to them.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Democrats and Republicans have become more ideologically distant over about 30 years, with partisan alignment to stable value clusters rising.
6bigthink.comNews and mediaquality 0.88
https://bigthink.com/the-present/political-polarization-increase/
Backs: “In-party ratings stayed relatively stable (warm); out-party ratings dropped dramatically (from near-neutral ~45–50 toward the mid-20s or lower).”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: The ANES thermometer gap between in-party and out-party ratings grew from about 20-25 points to roughly 50 or more.
7cambridge.orgAcademic
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/testing-the-robustness-of-the-anes-feeling-thermometer-indicators-of-affective-polarization/A08F7F68F4DF4F80020EAB1D9440C02E
Backs: “Survey mode and question wording can affect exact levels (e.g., people may express more hostility toward politicians/elites than ordinary voters of the other party), but the upward trend is robust and real.”
evidence, article, neutral. Claim: Survey mode and question wording affect exact affective polarization levels, though the upward trend is robust.
8archive.isData and tools
https://archive.is/2026.07.05-104443/https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Party systems have sorted more completely (fewer conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans).”
evidence, article, neutral. Claim: Past eras like the Civil War and 1960s were intensely divided, but today's polarization is more cleanly partisan and nationalized.
9carnegieendowment.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/McCoy_et_al_-_Polarization_final_3.pdf
Backs: “V-Dem and other data show polarization rising in many countries since ~2005, but the US has climbed to “pernicious” levels (high antagonistic camps affecting social relations) that are rare among long-standing wealthy Western liberal democracies. It scores high on measures of partisan dislike.”
evidence, official document, points to yes. Claim: V-Dem data show polarization rising in many countries since 2005, with the US at pernicious levels rare among wealthy democracies.
10nytimes.comNews and mediaquality 0.86
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/10/style/america-is-atomizing.html
Backs: “Contributing factors often cited include party realignment/sorting (especially post-civil rights and Southern Strategy eras), rising economic inequality, cultural/identity shifts, media fragmentation and social media algorithms, declining social capital/cross-cutting ties (“bowling alone” and atomization), and elite…”
background, article, neutral. Claim: Contributing factors include declining social capital, atomization, and cross-cutting ties.