Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4]Yes, by most standard metrics, political polarization in the United States—particularly affective (emotional/partisan dislike), elite/congressional, and issue-based polarization—is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly post-World War II through the early 2000s) and stands out as high by broader historical and international standards, though it does not match the intensity of the Civil War era.[2]

Polarization is multifaceted. It includes ideological differences (policy positions), affective hostility (dislike of the other side as people or a threat), sorting (alignment of identities like race, religion, and ideology with party), elite vs. mass levels, and geographic/residential sorting. Data consistently show rises across several of these, with acceleration in the 21st century.

Elite and Congressional Polarization

Members of Congress from the two parties are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, according to DW-NOMINATE scores based on roll-call votes. Both parties have become more internally cohesive (far fewer moderates: roughly two dozen today vs. over 160 in the early 1970s), with the zone of ideological overlap between the least liberal Democrat and least conservative Republican disappearing (none in the House since around 2002).[1]

Republicans have shifted further right on average than Democrats have left, though both moved away from the center. This tracks long-term trends from party realignment (e.g., Southern Democrats becoming Republicans post-civil rights era, demographic shifts in party bases). Bipartisan collaboration has declined markedly compared to the mid-20th century, when cross-party coalitions were more common. Some analyses place current congressional polarization among the highest since Reconstruction.[5]

Mass/Public Issue Polarization

A University of Cambridge study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024, over 35,000 responses) found that divisions on social and political issues increased by about 64% since 1988, with nearly all the rise after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and smartphone/social media expansion). Polarization was relatively flat in the 1990s–early 2000s.[2]

Much of the shift came from the left-leaning cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (about 31.5% more so by 2024 vs. 1988 on surveyed issues), while the right shifted only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Clusters of roughly equal size (unusual internationally) moved farther apart, with increased “sorting” into party/ideological labels. Gaps widened on issues like abortion, family values, health insurance, and discrimination, though opinions within clusters did not become dramatically more extreme or diverse, and polarization may have leveled somewhat recently. Other studies confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more ideologically distant over ~30 years.[6]

Affective Polarization and Hostility

Emotional dislike of the opposing party has risen sharply. ANES “feeling thermometer” data show out-party ratings falling substantially over decades (e.g., from near-neutral levels in earlier periods toward much colder views), while in-party warmth has been more stable. Partisan gaps in presidential approval are at or near record highs stretching back to Eisenhower (e.g., gaps of ~78–80 points in recent Trump terms vs. much smaller historically, like Eisenhower’s ~39-point gap).[3]

Pew and other data show large majorities viewing the other party as more immoral, a threat to the country’s well-being, or unable to agree even on basic facts. Social distance has grown (e.g., far higher shares uncomfortable with a child marrying someone from the other party). Political tolerance has declined in some measures, and like-minded discussion networks have expanded.[7]

Historical and Comparative Context

The U.S. has experienced intense divisions before: the Civil War era (secession, massive violence/death toll unmatched since), the early republic (Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans), late 19th/early 20th centuries, and the 1960s–1970s (civil rights struggles, Vietnam, assassinations, riots, cultural upheaval, and some political violence). Some historians argue today’s divides are not as deep as the Civil War or even parts of the 1960s in terms of violence or existential stakes like slavery, while others note current partisan and regional tensions rival intense past conflicts short of civil war, amplified by modern media and identity sorting.[4]

Internationally, the U.S. is an outlier among wealthy liberal democracies for “pernicious” (us-vs-them, democracy-threatening) levels of polarization in recent decades. Affective polarization rose more in the U.S. than in most other OECD countries studied. Polarization has also increased in parts of Western Europe but often differently (e.g., via challenger parties).[8]

Nuances and Caveats

In short, measurable political polarization—especially the combination of ideological distance, affective hostility, sorting, and elite cohesion—is higher than in the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century and elevated historically outside of the most extreme crises. It contributes to gridlock, declining trust, and heightened tensions, though the country has navigated deep divisions before without collapse. Trends can shift with institutions, leadership, media, and events.