Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2]Yes, by most quantitative measures of modern U.S. politics, political polarization is worse than it has been for much of the past century—particularly compared to the mid-20th century—and stands out as high even among peer democracies, though it does not match the intensity of the Civil War era.[1]

Polarization has multiple dimensions: ideological/issue-based (policy differences), affective (emotional dislike or distrust of the other side), elite/congressional (voting and behavior of politicians), and social/geographic sorting. Trends show clear increases in recent decades across these.

Congressional and Elite Polarization

Roll-call voting data using DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative scale based on votes) show the two parties farther apart than at any point in the past 50 years, and by many accounts since the late 19th century/Reconstruction period. The mid-20th century featured substantial overlap (e.g., conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans enabling bipartisan coalitions). That overlap has largely vanished; parties are more homogeneous and the distance between party means has grown steadily since the 1970s, with acceleration later.[2]

Bill co-sponsorship and other collaboration metrics show similar rises in both “weak” (avoiding the other party) and “strong” (tighter within-party clustering) polarization.

Public Issue and Ideological Polarization

Pew Research data tracking political values (role of government, race, immigration, environment, etc.) show the average partisan gap roughly doubling from about 15 percentage points in 1994 to 36+ points by the late 2010s, with further widening in places. The median Republican is now more conservative than nearly all Democrats (and vice versa), with far less overlap than decades ago.[3]

A Cambridge University analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found issue divisions rose about 64% since the late 1980s, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and rise of smartphones/social media). Much of the shift came from the left/cluster of more socially liberal views moving further left (e.g., ~31.5% more liberal on surveyed issues), while the right shifted only modestly more conservative. Polarization may have begun leveling recently but remains elevated.[1]

Parties have also sorted more cleanly by ideology, demographics, and values, reducing cross-cutting cleavages.

Affective Polarization

This has risen sharply. ANES “feeling thermometer” scores (0–100 warmth ratings) show ratings of the opposing party dropping from near-neutral (~48 in the late 1970s) to much colder levels (mid-20s or lower in recent years), while in-party ratings stayed relatively stable/positive. The gap (affective polarization) has roughly doubled in recent decades.[4]

Surveys show majorities in both parties increasingly view the other as immoral, a threat to the country, or fundamentally different in values. Shares reporting stressful political conversations, ending friendships over politics, or pessimism about bridging divides have risen (e.g., friendships ending over politics from ~7% in one 2012 survey to 28% in 2024). Partisan gaps on the country’s direction have hit records.[5]

Cross-nationally, the U.S. has shown one of the largest increases in affective polarization among OECD countries and is an outlier among wealthy liberal democracies for reaching “pernicious” levels (high hostility risking democratic norms).[6]

Historical Comparisons and Nuance

Other factors: Geographic partisan sorting has increased (more homogeneous communities). Social media, cable news, primary systems, and elite cues amplify perceptions and sorting. Some studies find masses less extreme than elites/media portray, with misperceptions of the other side’s views fueling hostility. Polarization can be asymmetric depending on the measure/issue (e.g., left movement on social/cultural issues in some data). Trust in institutions is low. Recent events (elections, COVID, etc.) have often widened rather than narrowed gaps.

In short, relative to the post-WWII baseline that many remember or idealize, yes—polarization (especially partisan affective and elite) is substantially worse and has risen notably since the 1990s/2000s. It is a defining feature of contemporary U.S. politics, with real costs for governance, trust, and social cohesion, even if historical extremes were bloodier. Trends are not inevitable or irreversible, but they have proven persistent.