Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by several key modern metrics—especially in the United States—political polarization is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly post-World War II through the 1980s/1990s), though it is not unprecedented in all of U.S. history and does not match the intensity of crises like the Civil War era in terms of violence or existential stakes. Polarization has multiple dimensions (ideological/issue-based, affective/emotional dislike, elite vs. mass, partisan sorting), and trends vary by measure and country. The U.S. stands out internationally for sharp recent rises in some forms.[1]

Elite and Congressional Polarization

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, based on DW-NOMINATE scores (which analyze roll-call votes on a liberal-conservative scale comparable over time). Both parties have grown more internally cohesive, with far fewer moderates (only about two dozen left vs. over 160 in the early 1970s). Ideological overlap between the parties has essentially vanished since the early 2000s.[2]

This elite polarization contributes to gridlock, fewer bipartisan bills, and more party-line voting.

Mass Ideological and Issue Polarization

Among the public, issue-based polarization (differences in policy preferences) has risen substantially. A 2026 University of Cambridge study using machine-learning clustering on American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found that divisions on social and political issues increased by 64% since 1988, with nearly all the rise occurring after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the rise of smartphones/social media). It may have begun leveling off recently but remains far higher than prior decades.[4]

Geographic sorting (people living in more politically homogeneous areas) has also risen.

Affective Polarization (Emotional Dislike)

This has risen especially sharply in the U.S. Partisans increasingly view the other side not just as wrong on policy but as a threat, immoral, or unlikable. Feeling thermometer scores (warmth toward parties) show growing gaps, driven mainly by cooler feelings toward the out-party. Disapproval of interparty marriage rose dramatically (from ~5% in 1960 to around 50% by 2010 in some data).[6]

Historical Context: Not the Worst Ever

Current polarization feels acute due to 24/7 media, social media amplification, cultural issues, and close elections in a roughly 50/50 system. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, which can intensify perceptions of conflict.[4] Globally, issue polarization does not show a clear universal rise.

Drivers and Caveats

Contributors include party realignment (especially post-civil rights), media fragmentation/cable news/social media, elite cues, demographic sorting, and events like the 2000 election, financial crisis, and cultural shifts. Some studies note asymmetric elements (e.g., elite rightward move more pronounced in Congress; mass leftward on social issues in recent clustering analyses). Polarization is not uniform—many Americans remain moderate or cross-pressured, and clusters are not totally tribal.[4]

In short, for measurable partisan dislike, congressional voting patterns, and issue sorting in the contemporary U.S., yes—it is worse than the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century. Compared to the deepest historical crises, it is serious but not equivalent in stakes or bloodshed. Trends can reverse or stabilize, as some recent data hint at plateauing in certain measures.