Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by several key modern metrics (especially over the past 40–70 years), political polarization in the United States is worse than in the recent past, though it is not unprecedented in American history when compared to eras like the Civil War or the turbulent 1960s. The picture depends on the type of polarization measured (ideological/issue-based, affective/emotional dislike, elite/congressional, or sorting), the time frame, and whether one focuses on the mass public or elites. Data come primarily from U.S. sources like the American National Election Studies (ANES), Pew Research Center, and academic studies; global comparisons show the U.S. as an outlier among wealthy democracies.[1]

Recent Trends (Post-WWII/1980s Onward)

Pew Research data show a similar long-term pattern: the share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled from the 1990s to the 2010s (from ~10% to ~21%), ideological overlap between parties shrank dramatically (e.g., by the mid-2010s, ~92–94% of partisans were on their side of the median opposite partisan), and gaps on issues like guns, climate, abortion, and immigration widened substantially. Partisan gaps on many values more than doubled since the 1980s–1990s.[3][4]

Polarization is higher among the politically engaged than the broader public, and “moderates” still exist in self-identification, but sorting means average partisans differ more. Some recent data hint at possible plateauing on issues, but affective divides and perceptions of the other side as existential threats remain elevated. Most Americans in both parties expect divisions to worsen.

Longer Historical Comparisons

It is not the absolute worst ever. The Civil War era (and lead-up) involved secession, a shooting war with ~620,000+ military deaths (equivalent to millions today), slavery as a fundamental cleavage, and post-war violence/Reconstruction conflicts—far exceeding today’s levels of actual violence or institutional breakdown.[11][12]

The 1960s featured intense unrest: civil rights struggles, Vietnam protests, assassinations (JFK, RFK, MLK), urban riots, campus violence, far-left/right extremism, a sharp generation gap, and cultural upheaval. Parties were less sorted then (Southern conservative Democrats, etc.), allowing some bipartisanship even amid turmoil. Historians note today’s divides rival intense past periods short of civil war in partisan/regional intensity and cultural permeation, but differ in nature (less mass street violence so far; more nationalized, media-amplified tribalism and institutional distrust).[12]

Other high points include the Gilded Age (late 19th century) with sharp partisan and economic conflicts, and earlier periods like the 1790s–1800s (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians). The mid-20th century post-WWII era was relatively less polarized, with more bipartisan consensus and ideological diversity within parties.[13]

Broader Context and Caveats

In short, relative to the post-WWII baseline and the period of available systematic polling/data (roughly 1950s–present), polarization—particularly affective dislike, partisan sorting, issue consistency, and elite divides—is substantially worse and has accelerated in the 21st century (notably post-2008). It does not match the existential violence of the Civil War or the peak street-level chaos of the 1960s, but its modern form (tribal, identity-linked, media-fueled, with equal camps) poses distinct risks to democratic functioning and social cohesion. Trends can reverse with institutional, cultural, or leadership changes, as history shows cycles of polarization and depolarization.