Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
No, the United States is not fully prepared for another pandemic or major widespread health crisis, though it has made meaningful improvements in some technical areas since COVID-19. Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH), CDC testimony, independent experts, and administration reports consistently highlight progress alongside persistent structural gaps, incomplete implementation of lessons learned, funding instability, coordination challenges, and recent setbacks that leave the nation vulnerable.[1][2]
Post-COVID Improvements
The U.S. response to COVID-19 exposed major weaknesses (e.g., depleted stockpiles, slow testing scale-up, data silos, supply chain failures, and fragmented leadership), but it also drove investments and reforms:
These changes mean the U.S. starts from a stronger technical baseline than in early 2020 for certain threats.
Persistent and Emerging Gaps
Independent reviews emphasize that progress is incomplete and uneven:
Recent Developments and Ongoing Risks (2025–2026 Context)
Policy shifts under the subsequent administration have raised alarms among many experts about backsliding:
Experts (e.g., former OPPR leaders, virologists, public health groups) frequently state the U.S. is “not ready,” lags on lessons implementation, and faces higher risks from natural, accidental, or deliberate biological threats. Probability estimates of another major pandemic remain elevated (e.g., significant chance within decades). Global efforts (Pandemic Fund, IHR, etc.) help but depend on strong national capacities.[15][16]
Bottom Line and Path Forward
The U.S. has better tools, stockpiles, and experience than pre-2020 and can handle many localized or moderate threats more effectively. However, it lacks the sustained leadership, fully implemented coordination frameworks, resilient funding, robust workforce/infrastructure at all levels, modern detection, and societal cohesion needed for a high-impact, nationwide (or worse) crisis comparable to or exceeding COVID-19. Boom-bust cycles, incomplete reforms, and recent disruptions compound risks from evolving threats (zoonoses, AMR, biotech/AI-enabled risks, climate-amplified events).
Full preparedness would require sustained bipartisan investment, implementing open GAO/Bipartisan Commission recommendations, stabilizing OPPR and core agencies, strengthening state/local capacity and equity, modernizing detection/manufacturing, rebuilding trust through transparent communication, and treating biodefense as continuous national security priority rather than crisis-driven. Without these, another major event would likely again reveal costly gaps in lives, economy, and confidence. Official roadmaps and playbooks exist as starting points, but execution and political will remain the decisive factors.
Citations (16)
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH), CDC testimony, independent experts, and administration reports consistently highlight progress alongside persistent structural gaps, incomplete implementation of lessons learned,…”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH), CDC testimony, independent experts, and administration reports consistently highlight progress alongside persistent structural gaps, incomplete implementation of lessons learned,…”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “Sustainment includes quality assurance, shelf-life management, and efforts to preposition assets closer to states/localities.”
- https://www.aspr.gov/news-updates/blog/2025-12/stand-ready-move-fast-save-lives
Backs: “Sustainment includes quality assurance, shelf-life management, and efforts to preposition assets closer to states/localities.”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “Wastewater surveillance, traveler genomic surveillance, and near-real-time hospital data improved early warning for threats like H5N1 and variants. CDC created “warm base” lab partnerships for surge testing.”
- https://center-forward.org/basic/pandemic-preparedness-strengthening-the-u-s-response-framework-2/
Backs: “Project BioShield and PHEMCE frameworks advanced readiness, though funding shortfalls persist.”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report
Backs: “CDC reorganized around lessons learned; global health security investments exceeded $3 billion since 2020, aiding partner countries and outbreak responses (Ebola, mpox, etc.).”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/
Backs: “Expanded nurse licensure compact (for surge staffing), some accreditation gains in public health/emergency management, and playbooks/roadmaps left by the prior administration.”
- https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/biodefense-buildup-urged-exclusive-report
Backs: “Had earlier recommendations been fully implemented, COVID impacts would have been less severe.”
- https://www.notus.org/health-science/white-house-pandemic-preparedness
Backs: “OPPR was largely emptied (staff departures, leadership gaps) before partial restaffing with minimal personnel—far short of prior capacity—drawing criticism that it exists “in name only” or is inadequate for coordination.”
- https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/17/health/pandemic-preparedness-office-trump-bird-flu
Backs: “OPPR was largely emptied (staff departures, leadership gaps) before partial restaffing with minimal personnel—far short of prior capacity—drawing criticism that it exists “in name only” or is inadequate for coordination.”
- https://www.science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic
Backs: “Reports of cuts or freezes to NIH/CDC biodefense/pandemic R&D (including mRNA-related work), databases, surveillance elements, and staffing have been described by former officials and scientists as damaging core capabilities and leaving “huge gaps.” Some biosecurity rebuilding has been noted amid AI-related biothreat…”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “Other outbreaks (measles resurgence, hantavirus, etc.) highlight ongoing stresses.”
- https://apnews.com/article/pandemic-preparedness-trump-biden-192518a8e1414cf40bafefdc2bf1f5ca
Backs: “Other outbreaks (measles resurgence, hantavirus, etc.) highlight ongoing stresses.”
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “Global efforts (Pandemic Fund, IHR, etc.) help but depend on strong national capacities.”
- https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/17/pandemic-preparedness-after-covid
Backs: “Global efforts (Pandemic Fund, IHR, etc.) help but depend on strong national capacities.”