Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Polarization today feels worse than ever—I'll dig into historical evidence to see how it actually compares.

Yes, by most measurable modern metrics - but with important historical nuance.

The answer depends on what type of polarization you mean and what "past" you compare it to.

1. Compared to the recent past (last 50-80 years), yes - it is worse

Elite / Congressional polarization is at a 150-year high:

Political scientists measure congressional voting with DW-NOMINATE scores - a measure of a legislator's ideological position on a left-right dimension based on their votes.

Multiple studies conclude:

> The results from DW-NOMINATE indicate that the level of polarization in Congress is now the highest since the end of the Civil War and shows no sign that it will abate

> Current data shows the ideological gap has reached levels not seen since the post-Civil War Reconstruction era, with very few members occupying the ideological center that once facilitated compromise

That trend began in the mid-1970s. After decades of relatively little polarization, the parties began pulling apart. During the mid-20th century, significant policy overlap existed between moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats, enabling substantial bipartisan legislation. Current ideological polarization levels match or exceed those seen during Reconstruction.

Mass public polarization has also risen sharply since the 1990s:

The Pew Research Center finds:

> Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines – and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last two decades

Specifically:

> The overall share of Americans who express consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions has doubled over the past two decades from 10% to 21%

> ideological overlap between the two parties has diminished: Today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican

> Partisan animosity has increased substantially over the same period. In each party, the share with a highly negative view of the opposing party has more than doubled since 1994

To chart progression, Pew combined responses to 10 political values questions asked since 1994. The center has shrunk: 39% take a roughly equal number of liberal and conservative positions, down from about half (49%) in 1994 and 2004.

2. The biggest change is affective polarization - disliking the other side

Scholars distinguish ideological polarization (disagreeing on issues) from affective polarization - "the gap between individuals' positive feelings toward their own political party and negative feelings toward the opposing party" which has increased markedly in the past two decades.

This is now considered indisputable:

> There is much more agreement that affective polarization [...] is occurring

> Average feeling thermometer scores toward out partisans have dropped from 48º in the 1970's to 20º today. The feeling thermometer differential averaged about 20º in the 1970s and 1980s, and is now roughly -10º

Pew found this intensified very recently:

> What has risen sharply is "affective polarization" — ... By 2022, 72 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of Democrats viewed the opposing party as "more immoral" than other Americans, up significantly from 47 percent and 35 percent respectively in 2016

Majorities in both parties now view the opposition as immoral, dishonest, close-minded and unintelligent — judgements that grew even more adverse, by 13 to 28 points from 2016 to 2022.

Historians also note the zeitgeist during earlier anniversaries diverged notably in degree of partisan polarization, which is generally considered much higher today.

The rates of affective polarization have more than doubled since the 1990s.

3. Nuance: Not worse in every way or than every past period

a) The mass public is less polarized than elites and than it feels.
Some scholars argue the public as a whole is largely moderate, indicating little ideological divergence over time. Lelkes finds ideological divergence and consistency have not increased over time, although both have increased among strong partisans.

One researcher argues polarization can feel much worse than it is: "Political groups have moved further apart in recent years, but these divisions are still fuzzy, and Americans are not split into entirely opposing tribes when it comes to the issues".

For example, a study noted we see more polarization than the 1960s, with Vietnam and culture wars or the 1950s with segregation and McCarthyism, but they weren't the apex - polarization has grown more pronounced with each passing decade.

b) It is not worse than the Civil War era in terms of violence and institutional collapse.
While congressional polarization is the highest since the Civil War, the Civil War itself represents a higher level of hostility - actual secession and war. As one historian assessment put it, compared to the Civil War's body count or the 1960s' turbulence, today's challenges, while serious, have not reached those catastrophic levels.

Even analysts who say we are in a "danger zone" caution:

> Maybe we’re not at the level of hostility that we were leading up to the Civil War, but what’s happened over the last few decades is that there has been a sorting of ideological parties

In other words: Modern polarization is historically high for the post-Reconstruction, post-WWII era - the last ~80-150 years - especially in its affective, identity-based form and in its elimination of the ideological center in Congress. It is more sorted, more consistent, and more personally hostile than in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. It is not necessarily more violently divided than the 1860s, and much of the mass public still holds mixed views, but those moderates are less politically engaged while the most polarized are most active.