Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse now than it has been in recent decades (roughly since the mid-20th century), and in some respects it approaches or exceeds levels seen in earlier highly divided periods—though direct comparisons to extremes like the Civil War era require caveats.[1]

Polarization is multi-dimensional: ideological (policy/issue positions), affective (emotional dislike of the other side), partisan sorting (alignment of identities, demographics, and geography with party), and elite/congressional (voting and behavior of politicians). Data consistently show increases across these since the 1970s–1990s, with acceleration in the 21st century (especially post-2008 in some public opinion measures). The U.S. stands out internationally as an outlier among wealthy democracies.[2]

Congressional and Elite Polarization

DW-NOMINATE scores (which scale legislators based on roll-call votes on a liberal-conservative dimension, comparable over time) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically today than at any point in the past 50 years. Overlap between the parties has essentially vanished: there used to be substantial numbers of moderate-to-liberal Republicans and moderate-to-conservative Democrats who could find common ground; by the early 2000s in the House (and shortly after in the Senate), the least conservative Republican was more conservative than the least liberal Democrat.[3]

Geographic and demographic realignment (e.g., more Southern Republicans, more diverse Democrats) has reinforced this.

Public Opinion and Ideological Polarization

Pew Research and other surveys show widening gaps between Democrats/Republicans (and liberals/conservatives) on values and issues since the 1990s. The average partisan gap on political values has more than doubled. Consistent liberals and conservatives have grown as shares of the public, the ideological "middle" has shrunk, and there is far less overlap: the median Republican is now more conservative than nearly all Democrats (and vice versa).[4]

A 2024–2026 Cambridge University analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found issue polarization rose ~64% since 1988, with almost all the increase after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and rise of smartphones/social media). It was driven primarily by the left/socially liberal cluster moving further left (~31.5% more progressive on surveyed issues), while the right moved only slightly more conservative (~2.8%). Sorting into parties/ideologies also increased, and gaps widened on issues like abortion, race, health insurance, and equality. Polarization may have leveled somewhat recently but remains much higher than pre-2008. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, intensifying the sense of division.[5]

Other Pew data confirm growing divides on climate, guns, abortion, and basic facts.

Affective Polarization (Emotional Hostility)

This has risen substantially. Feeling thermometer ratings (warmth toward own party vs. coldness toward the other) show the gap roughly doubling since the 1970s–1980s (from ~20–30 points to ~40–50+), driven more by rising out-party animus than increased in-party love. Dislike of the other party as a threat, closed-minded, etc., is common. Willingness to have a child marry someone from the other party has plummeted (from single digits in the 1960s to majorities in some recent surveys expressing displeasure).[6]

Cross-national studies find the U.S. had the largest increase in affective polarization among several OECD countries since the 1980s. "Pernicious" (us-vs-them) polarization is high and rising, making the U.S. an outlier among stable democracies.[2]

Sorting, Geography, and Other Factors

Historical Context and Caveats

The U.S. has experienced intense divisions before: the early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians), Civil War/Reconstruction (existential and violent), late 19th-century Gilded Age/populism, and the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval, assassinations, riots). Some historians argue substantive disagreements today are not as fundamental as slavery or as disruptive as the 1960s in terms of street violence/social upheaval, and that the country is not "split into entirely opposing tribes" on every issue—clusters remain fuzzy with internal variation.[8]

However:

Polarization is not inevitable or ever-rising forever—it has ebbed historically (e.g., mid-20th century)—and some recent data hint at possible stabilization on certain metrics, though levels remain elevated and many expect further widening. Causes include realignment after the civil rights era, economic/cultural changes, media fragmentation, and elite incentives, interacting in complex ways (asymmetric shifts appear in some elite and some public measures depending on the study and timeframe).

In short, relative to the living memory of most Americans and the relatively consensus-oriented post-WWII era, yes—it is worse. Absolute historical peaks (Civil War) involved far greater violence and institutional breakdown, but the current combination of affective hostility, sorted identities, and institutional gridlock is unusually severe and dysfunctional for a modern democracy.