Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, in the United States—where the phenomenon is most intensively studied—political polarization is worse by many standard measures than it has been in recent decades (roughly since the mid-20th century), though it does not match the extreme divisions of the Civil War era, and comparisons to other historical peaks like the 1960s are more nuanced.[1][2]

Polarization takes several forms: ideological (diverging issue positions or consistency of views), affective (emotional dislike or distrust of the opposing side), elite (among politicians and parties), and mass (among the public), plus related processes like partisan sorting (aligning demographics, geography, and identities more tightly with parties).

Elite and Congressional Polarization

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, based on DW-NOMINATE scores of roll-call votes. Both parties have grown more cohesive internally (far fewer moderates), with little to no ideological overlap remaining. Republicans have shifted further rightward on average than Democrats have leftward.[3][3]

This level is higher than the bipartisan mid-20th century era and rivals or exceeds polarization since the late 1800s/Reconstruction period after the Civil War. Geographic and demographic shifts (e.g., more Southern conservatives in the GOP, more diverse liberals in the Democratic caucus) have reinforced this.[4][1]

Public Ideological Polarization and Sorting

Among the public, the gap between Democrats/Republicans (or liberals/conservatives) on political values has widened substantially since the 1990s. Pew Research data show ideological consistency rising (more people holding uniformly liberal or conservative views), the center shrinking, and near-total sorting: by the mid-2010s, ~92-94% of partisans were on their side of the opposing median (up from much higher overlap in 1994). Partisan divides on issues have grown.[5][6]

A 2020s Cambridge University study using American National Election Studies data (1988–2024) and clustering algorithms found issue-based polarization rose 64% overall, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (a turning point tied to the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and rising smartphone/social media use). It was driven more by the left becoming substantially more socially liberal (~31.5% shift) than the right becoming more conservative (~2.8%). Sorting into parties/ideologies also increased, and gaps widened on issues like abortion, race, and health insurance. Levels remain high but may have leveled somewhat recently. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, amplifying the sense of conflict.[7][7]

Other studies confirm Democrats and Republicans have moved away from the center over ~30 years, though some find nuances like increased heterogeneity within Democrats post-2010.[8]

Affective Polarization

Emotional dislike of the other side has risen sharply. Feeling thermometer gaps (warmth toward own party minus other) grew from the late 1970s/1980s onward, driven mainly by cooler feelings toward the out-party. By the 2010s, large majorities of partisans viewed the other party unfavorably (often “very”), saw its policies as a threat to the nation, and expressed discomfort with interparty marriage or social ties (up dramatically from low single digits in 1960).[9][10][11]

Cross-national data show the U.S. had the largest increase in affective polarization among a dozen OECD countries over recent decades; some nations saw declines or smaller rises. The U.S. stands out as an outlier among stable Western democracies for “pernicious” levels.[12][13][14]

Historical Context

America has always had divisions (Founding era, etc.), but they are not always dominant in politics. Current polarization is high, persistent, and felt intensely partly because the parties are roughly balanced and identities have sorted more completely.[16]

Broader Notes and Caveats

Most Americans are not at the extremes; a sizable (if shrinking/less engaged) center exists, and divisions on issues are often “fuzzy” rather than total tribal opposition. Polarization can feel worse due to media incentives (cable news, social media amplifying culture-war content), elite cues, and geographic sorting.[17][7]

Trends are not universal globally—some countries have stable or declining affective polarization—and U.S. increases have multiple drivers (realignment after civil rights, media fragmentation, sorting by education/race/geography/religion, etc.). Recent data sometimes show plateaus or slight dips, but levels remain elevated.[18]

In short, by quantitative metrics of elite cohesion, public issue gaps, consistency, and especially mutual dislike, U.S. polarization is worse than in the relatively recent past and high by longer historical standards (short of Civil War extremes). This contributes to gridlock, eroded norms, and social tension, though history shows the country has navigated deep divisions before.