Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
No, the US is not fully prepared for another pandemic or major widespread health crisis, though it has improved in some technical areas since COVID-19. Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding sustainability, public health infrastructure, research priorities, international engagement, and state-level readiness, and recent policy shifts have weakened key defenses according to multiple expert assessments.[1][2]
Progress Made Post-COVID
After COVID-19 (which caused over 1 million US deaths), the US took steps to address some failures:
ASPR continues active operations for all-hazards preparedness.[7]
Persistent and Growing Gaps
Experts, GAO, bipartisan commissions, and reports like Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) “Ready or Not” series highlight unfinished business and new risks:
COVID exposed weaknesses despite the US ranking highly on pre-2020 Global Health Security Index metrics; outcomes were poor relative to peers in excess deaths and other measures.[11]
Recent Developments (2025 onward) Have Raised Concerns
Multiple sources (including expert commentary in Science, Bloomberg, The Scientist, and others) report that second-term Trump administration policies—under HHS Secretary RFK Jr. and others—have dismantled or sidelined elements of preparedness:
Global context is also challenging: pandemic risk is rising (climate, spillover, etc.), while international reforms lag.[20]
Bottom Line
The US has stronger stockpiles, better data tools, and advanced MCM platforms than in early 2020, plus experience from COVID and ongoing responses to avian flu and other threats. However, it is not adequately prepared for a severe, novel pandemic due to incomplete implementation of lessons, uneven state readiness, fragile funding/workforce, coordination shortfalls, declining public trust, and recent erosions in research, leadership structures, and global partnerships.[21][22]
Preparedness is dynamic—a future crisis’s impact would depend on the pathogen, timing, leadership decisions, and public compliance. Sustained, bipartisan investment in core public health, resilient supply chains, surveillance, R&D (with appropriate biosafety), surge capacity, equity, and trust-building would close gaps. Without it, the pattern of “forget then scramble” risks repeating at high human and economic cost. Assessments from GAO, TFAH, biodefense commissions, and independent experts consistently urge stronger, more consistent action.
Citations (22)
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding sustainability, public health infrastructure, research priorities, international engagement, and state-level readiness, and recent policy shifts have weakened key defenses according to multiple expert assessments.”
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-11/is-the-us-prepared-for-the-next-pandemic-how-trump-s-policies-weakened-defenses
Backs: “Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding sustainability, public health infrastructure, research priorities, international engagement, and state-level readiness, and recent policy shifts have weakened key defenses according to multiple expert assessments.”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “Agencies like BARDA and ASPR advanced medical countermeasures (MCMs), with ongoing responses to threats like H5N1 bird flu (stockpiling vaccines, PPE distribution) and other outbreaks (mpox, Ebola/Marburg support).”
- https://www.aspr.gov/news-updates/blog/2025-12/stand-ready-move-fast-save-lives
Backs: “Agencies like BARDA and ASPR advanced medical countermeasures (MCMs), with ongoing responses to threats like H5N1 bird flu (stockpiling vaccines, PPE distribution) and other outbreaks (mpox, Ebola/Marburg support).”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “Major upgrades in electronic case reporting (from under 200 healthcare facilities pre-COVID to over 45,000+) and syndromic surveillance. Wastewater monitoring and other tools expanded.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “GAO and others noted successes in rapid vaccine development/distribution once scaled.”
- https://www.aspr.gov/
Backs: “ASPR continues active operations for all-hazards preparedness.”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/
Backs: “TFAH’s 2025/2026 reports place only about 20–21 states (+DC) in the high-performance tier for emergency preparedness (indicators include funding, vaccination rates, hospital safety, labs, paid leave, water systems, etc.); many are middle or low. Flu vaccination rates lag goals.”
- https://www.tfah.org/report-details/ready-or-not-2026/
Backs: “TFAH’s 2025/2026 reports place only about 20–21 states (+DC) in the high-performance tier for emergency preparedness (indicators include funding, vaccination rates, hospital safety, labs, paid leave, water systems, etc.); many are middle or low. Flu vaccination rates lag goals.”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-at-risk-amid-federal-funding-and-workforce-instability/
Backs: “TFAH’s 2025/2026 reports place only about 20–21 states (+DC) in the high-performance tier for emergency preparedness (indicators include funding, vaccination rates, hospital safety, labs, paid leave, water systems, etc.); many are middle or low. Flu vaccination rates lag goals.”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “Supply chains remain vulnerable; hospital surge capacity and chronic disease burdens weaken resilience.”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Emphasized growing biological threats (natural, accidental, deliberate) and the need for stronger leadership, intelligence, S&T, detection, and response—calling for immediate action.”
- https://www.notus.org/health-science/white-house-pandemic-preparedness
Backs: “OPPR was largely emptied/understaffed for extended periods (staff departures; minimal or no leadership at times), though limited restaffing has been noted.”
- https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/17/health/pandemic-preparedness-office-trump-bird-flu
Backs: “OPPR was largely emptied/understaffed for extended periods (staff departures; minimal or no leadership at times), though limited restaffing has been noted.”
- https://www.the-scientist.com/niaid-moves-away-from-biodefense-experts-are-worried-75109
Backs: “CDC faced workforce reductions and discontinuation of numerous databases (many vaccine/respiratory-focused).”
- https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/view/opinion-us-biodefense-policy-scrutiny-nih-cdc-pandemic-preparedness-programs-face-cuts
Backs: “CDC faced workforce reductions and discontinuation of numerous databases (many vaccine/respiratory-focused).”
- https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/view/can-we-prepare-next-pandemic-without-studying-dangerous-pathogens-experts-question-new-gain-function-policy
Backs: “Restrictions on certain high-risk pathogen research (e.g., gain-of-function), reduced global health security engagement (WHO withdrawal completed; funding cuts/suspensions for related programs like CEPI/Pandemic Fund elements; USAID impacts), and concerns over mRNA research.”
- https://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-the-trump-administrations-foreign-aid-review-status-of-global-health-security-pandemic-preparedness.pdf
Backs: “Restrictions on certain high-risk pathogen research (e.g., gain-of-function), reduced global health security engagement (WHO withdrawal completed; funding cuts/suspensions for related programs like CEPI/Pandemic Fund elements; USAID impacts), and concerns over mRNA research.”
- https://science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic
Backs: “ASPR and some core functions continue, but overall capacity for early detection, innovation, and coordinated response is viewed as diminished.”
- https://healthpolicy-watch.news/pandemic-risk-global-monitoring-board/
Backs: “Global context is also challenging: pandemic risk is rising (climate, spillover, etc.), while international reforms lag.”
- https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-12/the-united-states-isnt-prepared-for-another-pandemic-heres-what-should-happen/
Backs: “However, it is not adequately prepared for a severe, novel pandemic due to incomplete implementation of lessons, uneven state readiness, fragile funding/workforce, coordination shortfalls, declining public trust, and recent erosions in research, leadership structures, and global partnerships.”
- https://www.bmj.com/content/384/bmj.q332
Backs: “However, it is not adequately prepared for a severe, novel pandemic due to incomplete implementation of lessons, uneven state readiness, fragile funding/workforce, coordination shortfalls, declining public trust, and recent erosions in research, leadership structures, and global partnerships.”