Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
No, the US is not fully prepared for another pandemic or widespread health crisis, though it has made meaningful improvements in some areas since COVID-19. Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding, leadership, public health infrastructure, trust, and equity, and recent policy shifts appear to have weakened defenses further.[1][2]
Assessments from nonpartisan and bipartisan sources paint a mixed but concerning picture. The US ranked highly on paper pre-COVID (e.g., Global Health Security Index) yet performed poorly in practice due to testing failures, supply shortages, fragmented response, inequities, and eroded trust. Lessons from that experience have driven some progress, but implementation is incomplete, and vulnerabilities persist—or have grown.
Key Improvements Since COVID-19
Biden administration reports (e.g., 2025 roadmap) highlighted these as transforming readiness, alongside equitable access efforts and global contributions.[3]
Persistent and Ongoing Gaps
Recent Developments and Expert Concerns (Post-2024)
Under the subsequent administration, experts and reports describe setbacks: significant CDC staffing reductions (reports of ~25%/thousands of positions, including key expertise); NIH/NIAID strategic shifts away from biodefense, emerging infectious diseases, and pandemic preparedness research (with some funds redirected); US withdrawal from WHO; cuts or wind-downs to mRNA and other countermeasure projects; understaffing or unclear status of OPPR; and reduced global health security engagement/funding. Critics (including former officials and researchers) argue this leaves the US “much less prepared” than during or just after COVID, or even 2020 levels in key areas, at a time of ongoing threats like H5N1.[15][16][17][18]
ASPR continues operational work (stockpile use, training, some MCM progress, responses to outbreaks/disasters), but broader capacity is strained.[19][20]
Bottom Line and What Would Help
The US has better tools in specific domains (detection tech, stockpiles, rapid-response platforms) than in 2019 and demonstrated capacity to innovate under pressure. However, it lacks the sustained political will, unified leadership, stable funding, resilient workforce/infrastructure, high public trust, and fully implemented reforms needed for a high-confidence response to a novel, highly transmissible/severe pathogen—or a deliberate attack. State variation means some areas would fare better than others. Concurrent threats (climate-driven disasters, AMR, etc.) compound risks.
Experts consistently call for: sustained/flexible public health funding (domestic + global); clear White House-led coordination and authorities; PAHPA modernization/reauthorization with adequate appropriations; investment in workforce, labs, surveillance, and MCM R&D/manufacturing (including domestic capacity); equity-focused community resilience; and rebuilding trust through transparent communication. Without these, the next crisis risks repeating or exceeding COVID-scale impacts.[2][21]
Preparedness is a continuous process, not a one-time achievement. Current trajectory, per multiple independent reviews, falls short of what is required.
Citations (21)
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding, leadership, public health infrastructure, trust, and equity, and recent policy shifts appear to have weakened defenses further.”
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “Significant gaps remain in coordination, funding, leadership, public health infrastructure, trust, and equity, and recent policy shifts appear to have weakened defenses further.”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “The SNS has supported responses to H5N1, mpox, and other threats.”
- https://apnews.com/article/pandemic-preparedness-trump-biden-192518a8e1414cf40bafefdc2bf1f5ca
Backs: “The SNS has supported responses to H5N1, mpox, and other threats.”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “CDC created “warm base” lab partnerships and improved forecasting.”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report
Backs: “Creation of the White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR) in 2023; updates to biodefense strategies and policies (including dual-use research oversight); investments in global health security (billions since 2020, though later impacted).”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response
Backs: “Creation of the White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR) in 2023; updates to biodefense strategies and policies (including dual-use research oversight); investments in global health security (billions since 2020, though later impacted).”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/
Backs: “Faster vaccine/treatment scale-up demonstrated (mRNA platforms, etc.); some state-level gains like expanded nurse licensure compacts for surge staffing; ASPR/BARDA continued MCM approvals and deployments.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “Lessons span advanced planning, partner collaboration, clear communications, program integrity, data, leveraging infrastructure, and flexibilities.”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Blueprint-for-Biodefense-2024_final_.pdf
Backs: “It offered 36 recommendations and 185 action items; some prior ones were adopted, but far from enough.”
- https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/biodefense-buildup-urged-exclusive-report
Backs: “It offered 36 recommendations and 185 action items; some prior ones were adopted, but far from enough.”
- https://www.tfah.org/report-details/ready-or-not-2026/
Backs: “All states have room to improve; compounding threats (infectious disease + extreme weather) strain systems. Similar patterns held in later updates.”
- https://center-forward.org/basic/pandemic-preparedness-strengthening-the-u-s-response-framework-2/
Backs: “PAHPA reauthorization/modernization delays or lapses; workforce shortages and burnout; supply chain vulnerabilities; antimicrobial resistance; and healthcare access/equity issues that amplify crises.”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “Ambiguous federal-state authorities/turf issues; eroded public trust in institutions/guidance (a major COVID failure factor); incomplete implementation of recommendations on testing strategies, MCM manufacturing, and indoor air/pathogen reduction; and challenges with concurrent disasters.”
- https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/is-the-us-prepared-for-the-next-pandemic-how-trumps-policies-have-weakened-defences
Backs: “Critics (including former officials and researchers) argue this leaves the US “much less prepared” than during or just after COVID, or even 2020 levels in key areas, at a time of ongoing threats like H5N1.”
- https://www.the-scientist.com/niaid-moves-away-from-biodefense-experts-are-worried-75109
Backs: “Critics (including former officials and researchers) argue this leaves the US “much less prepared” than during or just after COVID, or even 2020 levels in key areas, at a time of ongoing threats like H5N1.”
- https://www.science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic
Backs: “Critics (including former officials and researchers) argue this leaves the US “much less prepared” than during or just after COVID, or even 2020 levels in key areas, at a time of ongoing threats like H5N1.”
- https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/view/opinion-us-biodefense-policy-scrutiny-nih-cdc-pandemic-preparedness-programs-face-cuts
Backs: “Critics (including former officials and researchers) argue this leaves the US “much less prepared” than during or just after COVID, or even 2020 levels in key areas, at a time of ongoing threats like H5N1.”
- https://www.aspr.gov/
Backs: “ASPR continues operational work (stockpile use, training, some MCM progress, responses to outbreaks/disasters), but broader capacity is strained.”
- https://www.aspr.gov/news-updates/blog/2025-12/stand-ready-move-fast-save-lives
Backs: “ASPR continues operational work (stockpile use, training, some MCM progress, responses to outbreaks/disasters), but broader capacity is strained.”
- https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2023/lessons-covid-19-can-help-us-prepare-next-pandemic
Backs: “Without these, the next crisis risks repeating or exceeding COVID-scale impacts.”