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Grok 4.5Oct 17, 2026x-ai/grok-4.5-20260708

Will stopping immigration cause labor shortages?

Yes, stopping immigration (especially a sudden or near-total halt) would very likely cause or worsen labor shortages in many sectors, slow overall labor force and economic growth, and fail to reliably boost native employment or wages on net—particularly amid declining native-born fertility and an aging population. Evidence from economics research, recent U.S. trends, historical episodes, and international cases supports this, though effects depend on the scale/speed of the stoppage, skill levels involved, sector, time horizon, and complementary policies (e.g., training, automation incentives, or wage adjustments). Immigrants and natives are often complements rather than pure substitutes, and immigrants also add to labor demand through consumption and entrepreneurship.[1][2]

Demographic and Macro Context

Native-born working-age populations in the U.S. (and many developed countries) have stagnated or begun shrinking due to fertility rates below replacement for decades. Immigration has been the primary driver of labor force growth. Without it, the U.S. working-age population would likely have started contracting years earlier; recent sharp drops in net migration (e.g., estimates falling toward or below zero in some 2025 analyses) raise risks of low or negative labor force growth.[3][2]

Foreign-born workers comprise roughly 18–19% of the U.S. labor force, with higher overall participation rates than natives (especially men). They are overrepresented in agriculture/forestry/fishing, construction/extraction, building/grounds cleaning, food service, production/transportation, and certain skilled trades and healthcare roles. Native-born workers dominate management/professional and sales/office jobs.[4][5]

Economists (e.g., Barclays, Fed analyses) project that near-zero net immigration, combined with aging, could slash “potential” monthly private payroll growth from ~100k+ toward tens of thousands or lower, weighing on GDP growth. Recent U.S. immigration slowdowns have already coincided with weaker job growth in immigrant-heavy sectors and reports of acute shortages (e.g., construction delays, skilled trades). Native unemployment has not clearly fallen in response; in some data it has risen while businesses struggle to fill roles.[6][7][8]

Empirical Evidence from Sudden Stops and Restrictions

•South Korea guest worker program (COVID border closures): A ~22% drop in low-skilled Employment Permit System (EPS) workers (concentrated in manufacturing) led to higher firm closure rates (especially low-productivity ones), revenue/production losses, and no significant rise in new native hiring. Surviving firms retained some natives but reassigned them to lower-skilled tasks (occupational downgrading), with native wage declines. Firms demanded more guest workers rather than substituting natives. Immigrants and natives performed complementary roles.[1][1]
•Chinese Exclusion Act (1882): This sharply reduced Chinese labor supply (by ~64% in affected analyses). It also reduced white/native labor supply and earnings in Western U.S. counties, cut manufacturing output (~62%) and establishments, and slowed economic growth through at least 1940. Effects were stronger in remote areas with harder replacement. Skilled Chinese and white workers showed complementarities; the Act did not deliver the intended broad gains for natives.[9][10]
•1920s U.S. quotas: These cut immigration dramatically. Results are mixed: some evidence of faster wage growth for low-skilled labor in more-exposed markets and accelerated shifts toward automation (rural) or higher-skilled manufacturing (urban), plus internal migration (including contributions to the Great Black Migration, with gains for some Black workers filling roles). Other studies find no overall wage gains (or declines) for U.S.-born workers, lower occupational standing for some whites/incumbents, and uneven local effects with capital/labor substitution. Economies adapted, but it was not a straightforward boon.[11][12]
•Recent high-immigration periods (e.g., post-2021 U.S.): Inflows correlated with reduced vacancy growth and eased shortages in tight markets, consistent with immigrants filling jobs and dampening wage pressures without broadly harming natives. Models incorporating complementarities and production rigidities better match this than simple supply-shock models.[13][14]

Broader research finds immigration boosts firm growth/formation in tight markets, with limited or no negative wage/employment effects on natives overall (and positives via productivity and demand). Reducing unauthorized or low-skilled flows has been linked to lower employment growth in construction/manufacturing. Mass deportation scenarios project large GDP and employment hits.[8][15]

Nuances, Caveats, and Adaptations

•Not uniform: High-skilled immigration often shows clearer complementarities and innovation benefits. Low-skilled roles (ag, construction, care, hospitality) face bigger immediate gaps because natives may prefer other work, face location/skill mismatches, or require higher wages that raise costs/prices. Some short-run competition can pressure wages for directly substitutable low-skilled natives/teens.
•Adaptation happens but imperfectly/slowly: Higher wages can draw natives or spur participation/automation/offshoring. Training and better conditions help. However, evidence (Korea, historical) shows incomplete substitution, firm exits, production shortfalls, and higher costs (e.g., food, housing construction, healthcare). Aging populations amplify care and service needs.
•Demand side: Immigrants consume goods/services and start businesses, creating jobs. A pure labor-supply cut reduces both supply and demand.
•“Stopping” is extreme: Managed legal pathways (skilled, temporary/guest, shortage lists) can target gaps without open borders. Complete stops ignore that labor markets are dynamic; enforcement alone does not magically create willing/qualified native workers for every role. Europe and East Asia face similar aging/shortage pressures and debate immigration as a response.
•Other factors matter more for native outcomes: Macro policy (demand management), education/training, housing/regulation, and technology drive employment and wages far more than immigration levels alone. Claims of large native job displacement are often overstated; the “lump of labor” fallacy does not hold.

In short, labor shortages are already emerging or projected in immigrant-reliant sectors and overall due to demographics. Abruptly stopping immigration would intensify them in the short-to-medium term, raise costs, slow growth, and not reliably “free up” jobs for natives in a one-for-one way—consistent with multiple natural experiments. Sustainable approaches typically combine selective immigration, domestic workforce development, and productivity-enhancing reforms rather than pure restriction.

Citations (15)

  1. 1nber.orgAcademic
    https://www.nber.org/digest/202606/what-happens-when-flow-immigrant-workers-suddenly-stops

    Backs: “Immigrants and natives are often complements rather than pure substitutes, and immigrants also add to labor demand through consumption and entrepreneurship.”

  2. 2econofact.orgAcademic
    https://econofact.org/immigration-and-waning-us-labor-force-growth

    Backs: “Immigrants and natives are often complements rather than pure substitutes, and immigrants also add to labor demand through consumption and entrepreneurship.”

  3. 3business-standard.comNews and mediaquality 0.62
    https://www.business-standard.com/amp/immigration/immigration-fall-from-2-million-to-515-000-may-shrink-us-labour-force-fed-125112000258_1.html

    Backs: “Without it, the U.S. working-age population would likely have started contracting years earlier; recent sharp drops in net migration (e.g., estimates falling toward or below zero in some 2025 analyses) raise risks of low or negative labor force growth.”

  4. 4bls.govGovernment
    https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm

    Backs: “Native-born workers dominate management/professional and sales/office jobs.”

  5. 5amtec.coNot yet classified
    https://www.amtec.co/blog/immigrant-labor-force-statistics-2024

    Backs: “Native-born workers dominate management/professional and sales/office jobs.”

  6. 6reuters.comNews and mediaquality 1.00
    https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/us-migrant-halt-may-wipe-potential-job-growth-2025-06-24/

    Backs: “Native unemployment has not clearly fallen in response; in some data it has risen while businesses struggle to fill roles.”

  7. 7bloomberglaw.comNews and media
    https://news.bloomberglaw.com/immigration/immigration-crackdown-fails-to-deliver-jobs-for-us-born-workers

    Backs: “Native unemployment has not clearly fallen in response; in some data it has risen while businesses struggle to fill roles.”

  8. 8forbes.comNews and mediaquality 0.83
    https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2026/02/22/new-research-finds-reducing-immigration-does-not-help-us-workers/

    Backs: “Native unemployment has not clearly fallen in response; in some data it has risen while businesses struggle to fill roles.”

  9. 9hbs.eduAcademic
    https://www.library.hbs.edu/working-knowledge/history-check-how-barring-immigrants-backfired-in-1880s-america

    Backs: “Skilled Chinese and white workers showed complementarities; the Act did not deliver the intended broad gains for natives.”

  10. 10cato.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/impact-chinese-exclusion-act-economic-development-western-united

    Backs: “Skilled Chinese and white workers showed complementarities; the Act did not deliver the intended broad gains for natives.”

  11. 11princeton.eduAcademic
    https://economics.princeton.edu/working-papers/the-effects-of-immigration-on-the-economy-lessons-from-the-1920s-border-closure/

    Backs: “Other studies find no overall wage gains (or declines) for U.S.-born workers, lower occupational standing for some whites/incumbents, and uneven local effects with capital/labor substitution. Economies adapted, but it was not a straightforward boon.”

  12. 12kansascityfed.orgGovernment
    https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/research-working-papers/immigration-disruptions-and-the-wages-of-unskilled-labor-in-the-1920s/

    Backs: “Other studies find no overall wage gains (or declines) for U.S.-born workers, lower occupational standing for some whites/incumbents, and uneven local effects with capital/labor substitution. Economies adapted, but it was not a straightforward boon.”

  13. 13lse.ac.ukAcademic
    https://www.lse.ac.uk/CFM/assets/pdf/CFM-Discussion-Papers-2026/CFMDP2026-04-Paper.pdf

    Backs: “Models incorporating complementarities and production rigidities better match this than simple supply-shock models.”

  14. 14kansascityfed.orgGovernment
    https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/economic-bulletin/rising-immigration-has-helped-cool-an-overheated-labor-market

    Backs: “Models incorporating complementarities and production rigidities better match this than simple supply-shock models.”

  15. 15frbsf.orgGovernment
    https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/working-papers/2026/10/impacts-unauthorized-immigration-us-labor-housing-markets-new-evidence-administrative-microdata/

    Backs: “Mass deportation scenarios project large GDP and employment hits.”