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Grok 4.5Oct 17, 2026x-ai/grok-4.5-20260708

Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, in several key measurable ways—particularly over the past several decades—political polarization in the United States is worse (or at least higher) than it has been in the recent past, though comparisons to deeper history are more nuanced and it is not uniformly “worse than ever” across all dimensions or eras. Polarization is multi-faceted (ideological/issue-based, affective/emotional, elite vs. mass public, geographic sorting), and trends differ by measure. Data are strongest for the modern period (post-WWII or post-1970s/1980s).[1]

Congressional/Elite Polarization

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with virtually no ideological overlap remaining. This is tracked via DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes), which place lawmakers on a liberal-conservative spectrum.[2]

•Both parties have become more internally cohesive (far fewer moderates: only about two dozen left vs. over 160 in the early 1970s).
•Parties have moved away from the center, with Republicans shifting more conservatively on average in many analyses, while Democrats have moved modestly left (partly due to the decline of conservative Southern Democrats).
•Geographic and demographic shifts reinforce this (e.g., more Southern Republicans who are more conservative; more diverse House Democrats).
•Party mean differences are at modern highs and approach or match levels last seen in the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction/Gilded Age era), when parties were also highly distinct. The mid-20th century was an outlier of greater bipartisanship and overlap.[3]

This contributes to gridlock, as cross-party coalitions are rarer.

Public Issue/Ideological Polarization

Among the mass public, divisions on social and political issues have increased substantially since the late 1980s. A 2026 University of Cambridge study (using machine learning clustering on American National Election Studies/ANES data from 1988–2024, covering ~35,000 responses on issues like abortion, equality, race, economics, and traditional values) found that the separation between left- and right-leaning opinion clusters grew by 64%. Nearly all of this rise occurred after 2008 (flat in the 1990s–early 2000s), with a possible slight leveling off after 2020, though levels remain far higher than earlier decades.[1]

•The shift was driven primarily by the left becoming more socially liberal (~31.5% more progressive by 2024 vs. 1988), while the right shifted only slightly more conservative (~2.8%).
•Polarization increased on every issue examined; some (e.g., abortion, health insurance, discrimination) showed especially large gaps. Sorting (aligning issue positions with party/ideological labels) has also risen sharply.
•The U.S. is unusual globally in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, which may intensify the feeling of division. The same methods found no clear equivalent rise in issue polarization worldwide.[4]

Pew Research and other studies similarly document growing ideological consistency (more people holding consistently liberal or conservative views) and less overlap between the parties’ supporters since the 1990s.[5]

Affective Polarization (Emotional Dislike)

This has risen markedly: partisans feel much colder toward the opposing party. ANES feeling thermometer data (0–100 scale, warm to cold) show the gap between in-party and out-party ratings roughly doubling since the late 1970s/1980s (from around 20–25 points to ~50 or higher recently). In-party warmth has been relatively stable or declined modestly, while out-party ratings have plummeted (e.g., average out-party ratings dropping toward the mid-20s or lower in recent data).[6]

•“Very unfavorable” views of the other party have more than doubled in Pew data since the 1990s; many partisans now see the other side’s policies as a threat to the nation’s well-being, and negative stereotypes (immoral, unpatriotic, etc.) have intensified.[7]
•Trends continue into the 2020s. Some of the measured rise may be mildly inflated by survey mode changes (e.g., online vs. in-person), but the underlying increase in out-party animus is robust.[8]

This “us vs. them” dynamic extends to social distance (e.g., reluctance for inter-party marriage or friendships) and is linked to geographic sorting (people living in more politically homogeneous areas).

Historical Context and Caveats

•Not worse than all of U.S. history: The Civil War era involved secession and massive violence. The 1960s–1970s featured deep divides over civil rights (MLK was highly unpopular at times), Vietnam, assassinations, widespread riots, and hundreds of domestic bombings per year in some periods—far more physical political violence than today, even with recent upticks in threats and incidents. Some historians and commentators argue current divisions, while intense and partisan-sorted, are not uniquely severe in substance or potential for breakdown.[9]
•Asymmetry and drivers: Elite and some mass shifts are often asymmetric (e.g., rightward elite movement on some metrics; leftward mass social views). Causes include realigning parties (Southern realignment), rising inequality, cultural changes, media fragmentation/social media (echo chambers, affective cues post-~2008/iPhone era), and elite cues that consolidate issue packages.
•Feelings vs. reality: Polarization can “feel” worse due to national media focus, sorting, and affective intensity, even if issue clusters remain somewhat fuzzy or local communities more resilient (though recent local official surveys show rising concern). Americans still share many values, and latent (non-partisan) value divides have been more stable in some analyses.[10]
•Other trends: Partisan geographic sorting has increased; trust in institutions is low and polarized; expectations of further division are high.

In short, for the post-1970s/1980s era that most people experience and for which we have rich data, yes—polarization (especially affective and elite, plus recent issue divides) is worse than it was. It rivals high historical points in Congress and has unique modern features (media, balanced coalitions, personalization). However, the U.S. has endured (and recovered from) worse periods of division and violence. Trends are not inevitable and can stabilize or reverse, as some post-2020 data hint. Cross-national comparisons show the U.S. pattern is distinctive rather than universal.

Citations (10)

  1. 1cam.ac.ukAcademic
    https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states

    Backs: “Data are strongest for the modern period (post-WWII or post-1970s/1980s).”

  2. 2pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/

    Backs: “This is tracked via DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes), which place lawmakers on a liberal-conservative spectrum.”

  3. 3scienceinsights.orgLow provenance
    https://scienceinsights.org/how-political-polarization-has-changed-over-time/

    Backs: “The mid-20th century was an outlier of greater bipartisanship and overlap.”

  4. 4psypost.orgNews and mediaquality 0.84
    https://www.psypost.org/american-issue-polarization-surged-after-2008-as-the-left-moved-further-left/

    Backs: “The same methods found no clear equivalent rise in issue polarization worldwide.”

  5. 5pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/

    Backs: “Pew Research and other studies similarly document growing ideological consistency (more people holding consistently liberal or conservative views) and less overlap between the parties’ supporters since the 1990s.”

  6. 6substack.comBlogs and newsletters
    https://newsamaritans.substack.com/p/feeling-thermometers-a-national-cooling

    Backs: “In-party warmth has been relatively stable or declined modestly, while out-party ratings have plummeted (e.g., average out-party ratings dropping toward the mid-20s or lower in recent data).”

  7. 7pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/rising-partisan-antipathy-widening-party-gap-in-presidential-job-approval/

    Backs: ““Very unfavorable” views of the other party have more than doubled in Pew data since the 1990s; many partisans now see the other side’s policies as a threat to the nation’s well-being, and negative stereotypes (immoral, unpatriotic, etc.) have intensified.”

  8. 8cambridge.orgAcademic
    https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/testing-the-robustness-of-the-anes-feeling-thermometer-indicators-of-affective-polarization/A08F7F68F4DF4F80020EAB1D9440C02E

    Backs: “Some of the measured rise may be mildly inflated by survey mode changes (e.g., online vs. in-person), but the underlying increase in out-party animus is robust.”

  9. 9nytimes.comNews and mediaquality 0.86
    https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/07/31/opinion/political-violence-history-division.html

    Backs: “Some historians and commentators argue current divisions, while intense and partisan-sorted, are not uniquely severe in substance or potential for breakdown.”

  10. 10stanford.eduAcademic
    https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/polarization-united-states-reconsidered

    Backs: “Americans still share many values, and latent (non-partisan) value divides have been more stable in some analyses.”