Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?
Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for most of the past several decades (particularly since the mid-20th century), though it is not unprecedented in American history and does not match the intensity of the Civil War era. Polarization has multiple dimensions—ideological/issue-based, partisan sorting, elite (congressional) behavior, and affective (emotional dislike of the other side)—and trends vary somewhat by measure, but the overall picture shows clear increases in recent decades.[1]
Congressional and Elite Polarization
In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years (and by some metrics, since the late 19th century/Reconstruction era). DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes) show both parties becoming more internally cohesive and moving away from the center, with Republicans shifting further right on average than Democrats have left. Ideological overlap between the parties has essentially vanished since the early 2000s (no remaining moderate “crossover” members in the House after ~2002 or Senate after ~2004).[2]
Voteview data tracking party mean differences confirm rising partisan polarization over long periods, with high levels in the late 1800s that later declined before rising again in recent decades.[4]
Public Opinion and Issue Polarization
Among the public, issue-based polarization has risen substantially. A 2026 University of Cambridge study using machine learning clustering on American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024, >35,000 responses) found that divisions on social and political issues increased by 64% since 1988, with nearly all the rise occurring after 2008 (flat through the 1990s/early 2000s). Separation between left- and right-leaning clusters grew from 0.22 to 0.36 scale points, peaking around 2020 before a possible slight leveling.[1][5]
Pew Research data similarly show widening partisan gaps on values (e.g., government role, race, immigration, guns, climate, abortion) since the 1990s. Ideological consistency has grown: the share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled, and median partisans now sit further apart with far less overlap (e.g., median Republican more conservative than ~95%+ of Democrats).[6][7]
Affective Polarization
Emotional dislike and distrust of the opposing party (“us vs. them”) has risen sharply. Feeling thermometer gaps (warmth toward own party minus opposing party) have roughly doubled since the 1980s/1990s in ANES data. People increasingly view the other side as a threat to the country’s well-being, are reluctant about interparty marriage, and see opponents as lacking basic shared facts or values.[8][9]
This “pernicious” polarization is higher in the US than in most other wealthy democracies and has accelerated more sharply there. Social media, partisan media, and elite cues contribute.[8]
Historical Context and Caveats
America has experienced deep divisions before: the early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians), the lead-up to and aftermath of the Civil War (by far the most severe, involving slavery as an existential sectional conflict that sundered institutions and led to war), Reconstruction, the late 19th/early 20th century, and the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval). Some historians argue today’s divisions do not match the 1850s–1860s or even certain earlier periods in substantive stakes or violence risk, though they permeate daily life more via media and sorting. Congressional polarization today rivals or exceeds post-Civil War levels in some metrics but occurs in a very different (non-slavery, non-sectional war) context.[10][11]
Key nuances:
In short, relative to the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century (when parties had more internal diversity and bipartisan overlap), today’s polarization—especially affective and elite forms, plus post-2008 issue divides—is worse and more entrenched. It is a serious challenge to governance and social cohesion but has historical precedents, and the public is not as irreconcilably tribalized on every issue as rhetoric sometimes suggests. Trends are not inevitable and can ebb with institutional, cultural, or leadership changes.
Citations (12)
- https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “Polarization has multiple dimensions—ideological/issue-based, partisan sorting, elite (congressional) behavior, and affective (emotional dislike of the other side)—and trends vary somewhat by measure, but the overall picture shows clear increases in recent decades.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Overall picture shows clear increases in polarization in recent decades; Cambridge study found issue divisions up 64% since 1988, mostly after 2008.
- https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “Ideological overlap between the parties has essentially vanished since the early 2000s (no remaining moderate “crossover” members in the House after ~2002 or Senate after ~2004).”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Congressional Democrats and Republicans are farther apart than in past 50 years; ideological overlap vanished since early 2000s.
- https://scienceinsights.org/how-political-polarization-has-changed-over-time/
Backs: “This elite polarization has roots in the 1970s but accelerated later.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Moderates have disappeared, sorting reinforced polarization, and bipartisan cosponsorship declined; elite polarization has roots in 1970s.
- https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization
Backs: “Voteview data tracking party mean differences confirm rising partisan polarization over long periods, with high levels in the late 1800s that later declined before rising again in recent decades.”
evidence, article, neutral. Claim: Voteview shows high polarization in late 1800s, later decline, then rise again in recent decades.
- https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rsos/article/13/2/251428/479919/A-new-measure-of-issue-polarization-using-k-means
Backs: “Separation between left- and right-leaning clusters grew from 0.22 to 0.36 scale points, peaking around 2020 before a possible slight leveling.”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: Cluster separation grew from 0.22 to 0.36 scale points, peaking around 2020.
- https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/1-partisan-divides-over-political-values-widen/
Backs: “Ideological consistency has grown: the share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled, and median partisans now sit further apart with far less overlap (e.g., median Republican more conservative than ~95%+ of Democrats).”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Pew shows widening partisan gaps on political values since the 1990s.
- https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
Backs: “Ideological consistency has grown: the share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled, and median partisans now sit further apart with far less overlap (e.g., median Republican more conservative than ~95%+ of Democrats).”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: Share of consistently ideological Americans doubled; median partisans sit further apart with less overlap.
- https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/us-democrat-republican-partisan-polarization/629925/
Backs: “People increasingly view the other side as a threat to the country’s well-being, are reluctant about interparty marriage, and see opponents as lacking basic shared facts or values.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: Affective polarization has risen sharply, is higher in the US than other wealthy democracies, and is driven by media and elites.
- https://doi.org/gfv79s
Backs: “People increasingly view the other side as a threat to the country’s well-being, are reluctant about interparty marriage, and see opponents as lacking basic shared facts or values.”
evidence, reference entry, points to yes. Claim: Feeling thermometer gaps and dislike of the other party have grown since the 1980s/1990s.
- https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Congressional polarization today rivals or exceeds post-Civil War levels in some metrics but occurs in a very different (non-slavery, non-sectional war) context.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Historians argue today's divisions do not match the Civil War era in stakes or violence.
- https://www.cfr.org/article/why-today-not-1850s
Backs: “Congressional polarization today rivals or exceeds post-Civil War levels in some metrics but occurs in a very different (non-slavery, non-sectional war) context.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Today's divisions differ from the 1850s, with historical precedents for deep division.
- https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0
Backs: “Globally, polarization has risen in places but the US stands out among stable democracies for its intensity and balanced camps.”
evidence, article, neutral. Claim: Globally polarization has risen in places, but the US stands out among stable democracies for intensity and balanced camps.