Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes — by most measures, political polarization in the U.S. is worse now than it has been in decades, though the picture is more nuanced depending on what kind of "polarization" you mean.

Affective polarization (how much partisans dislike each other) is at historic highs

This is the clearest and most consistent finding in the research. Using "feeling thermometer" surveys that ask Americans to rate their own party versus the opposing party:

Newer data from 2026 shows this trend continuing: the share of Republicans who view Democrats as "very unfavorable" has risen from 17% in 1994 to 62% in 2024, and the mirror image for Democrats is nearly identical. A 2026 analysis also notes 63% of Americans see the opposing party as a "threat to democracy", and that affective polarization has roughly doubled since the mid-1990s.

Presidential approval numbers tell a similar story of a long-term trend: George W. Bush and Bill Clinton each averaged approval ratings from the opposite party of 23% and 27%, respectively — the first presidents in modern history under 30%. Barack Obama averaged 13% among Republicans, the first under 20%. Trump has averaged under 8% among Democrats, which would make him the first president under 10% approval from the opposing party.

The U.S. stands out globally

This isn't just an American perception — comparative research finds the U.S. is polarizing faster than peer democracies. Political polarization among Americans has grown more rapidly in the last 40 years than in Canada, the UK, Australia or Germany. A separate 12-country OECD study found the US experienced the largest increase in affective polarization among all countries studied, and that the trend line rises most steeply for the US, while it actually trends downward in Japan, Australia, Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Germany.

Ideological polarization is more contested

Here the research is murkier. Scholars debate whether Americans' actual policy views have become more extreme, or whether people have simply "sorted" into the party that matches views they already held. One 2025 study found that income and especially racial groups have aligned into parties, but their ideological distance has not increased over time. Another recent paper notes Democrats and Republicans have grown more polarized ideologically over the past 30 years, while partisan sorting has declined since 2010 — a somewhat counterintuitive mix. Meanwhile, Pew-sourced historical data shows the proportion of individuals expressing consistently conservative or liberal opinions increased from 10% in 1994 to 21% in 2014, with ideological overlap between partisans declining sharply.

Among political elites (members of Congress), the shift has been asymmetric: polarization among U.S. legislators has primarily been driven by a rightward shift among Republicans in Congress.

Geographic and civic sorting is also intensifying

Beyond feelings and voting, Americans increasingly live, work, and socialize in politically homogeneous bubbles. Recent analysis notes the share of Americans in "landslide counties" grew from 39% in 1992 to 57% in 2024, limiting cross-partisan exposure.

The paradox: issues vs. identity

Interestingly, polling suggests Americans may be more divided on identity/affect than on actual policy. Recent polling found broad bipartisan agreement on several concrete issues — 79% support Medicare drug negotiation, 76% support pre-existing conditions protections, and 70% support marijuana decriminalization — across party lines. This suggests that much of today's "polarization" is less about substantive disagreement and more about mutual distrust, hostility, and tribal identity.

Bottom line

If you define polarization as how much Americans dislike, distrust, and view the opposing side as a threat, the evidence strongly supports that it is worse than at almost any point in the modern survey era (going back to the late 1970s), and the U.S. is a global outlier in this respect. If you define it as disagreement over specific policies, the story is more mixed — some studies show rising ideological distance, others find more stability than the rhetoric suggests, with "sorting" into parties playing as large a role as actual opinion change.