Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most measurable standards, political polarization in the United States is worse now than it has been for much of the past century—though it is not unprecedented in American history, and comparisons depend on the metric (elite vs. mass, affective vs. issue-based, etc.). Global trends are more mixed.[1]

Congressional/Elite Polarization

This is one of the clearest cases. Using DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative scale based on roll-call votes):

•Democrats and Republicans in Congress are farther apart ideologically today than at any point in the past 50 years. There is essentially no ideological overlap between the parties in the House (none since the early 2000s), compared to substantial overlap in the mid-20th century when conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans existed.[2]

•Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center (Republicans more so in some analyses). Party unity votes are at or near record highs.[3]

•Polarization was high around the turn of the 20th century (Gilded Age/Progressive Era, peaking ~1890–1910) and declined in the mid-20th century (especially post-WWII “bipartisan” era with the Conservative Coalition). It began rising again from the 1970s–1980s and has continued upward, now exceeding mid-20th-century lows and rivaling or surpassing late-19th/early-20th-century peaks in some measures. The current gap is often described as the widest in modern (post-Reconstruction) history on standard metrics.[4]

Geographic sorting (people living in more politically homogeneous areas) has also increased dramatically, correlating strongly with congressional polarization.[4]

Public/Mass Polarization

•Issue polarization: A 2026 Cambridge University study using machine learning on American National Election Studies data (1988–2024) found divisions on social/political issues rose 64% overall, with nearly all the increase after 2008. The left/progressive cluster became ~31.5% more socially liberal; the right/conservative cluster shifted only ~2.8% more conservative. Polarization was relatively flat from the late 1980s to 2008. It may have begun leveling off recently but remains far higher than pre-2008 levels. This appears more pronounced in the US than globally.[1]

•Affective polarization (dislike/hatred of the other side): This has risen sharply. Feelings toward the opposing party have cooled dramatically since the 1980s–1990s (negative partisanship). Pew and other data show large majorities viewing the other side as a threat to the country, unwilling to marry across parties, etc. Gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, and immigration have widened substantially over the past 1–2 decades.[5]

•Partisan identity has strengthened, with fewer true independents and more sorting of ideology with party. However, some research finds “latent” value clusters (e.g., on moral/religious issues) have been stable longer-term, while partisan alignment with those clusters has increased.[6]

Pew Research consistently documents growing partisan divides on policy and facts, with little common ground.[7]

Historical Context and Caveats

•America has experienced intense divisions before: the Civil War era (far worse, with actual violence and secession), the 1790s–1800s (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians, with extreme rhetoric), the 1850s–1860s, Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval), etc. There was no golden age of perfect unity.[8]

•Today’s polarization is distinctive in its even partisan balance (roughly 50/50), nationalization of culture-war issues, media/social media amplification, geographic/cultural sorting, and “pernicious” levels that threaten democratic norms (according to some cross-national studies). The US stands out among wealthy Western democracies for the depth and persistence of this.[9]

•Drivers often cited include: realignment of the parties (Southern realignment post-civil rights), rising inequality, cable news and social media (incentives for outrage/culture-war content), demographic changes, and elite cues. The 2008 inflection (financial crisis, Obama election, smartphone/social media rise) is frequently noted.[10]

•Not everything is polarized: There can still be majority agreement on some issues, and local communities sometimes feel more insulated (though recent surveys show polarization increasingly affecting them).[11]

Internationally

Negative partisanship and culture-war style polarization have risen in other Western countries (partly via similar media dynamics), but the US is often an outlier in intensity and the even split of camps. Some studies find no clear global rise in issue polarization of the US magnitude.[5]

In summary: Compared to the relatively depolarized mid-20th century, yes—polarization (especially elite and affective) is significantly worse. Compared to the late 19th/early 20th century or Civil War era, it is comparable or different in character (more cultural/identity-based and media-driven today, less purely sectional/economic in some ways). The post-2008 surge in public issue divides and ongoing congressional trends make the current period feel particularly acute. Data comes primarily from DW-NOMINATE/Voteview, Pew Research, ANES analyses, and academic studies; trends can shift, and “worse” involves both measurable distance and perceived toxicity.

Citations (11)

1cam.ac.ukAcademic
https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “Yes, by most measurable standards, political polarization in the United States is worse now than it has been for much of the past century—though it is not unprecedented in American history, and comparisons depend on the metric (elite vs. mass, affective vs. issue-based, etc.). Global trends are more mixed.”
2pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “There is essentially no ideological overlap between the parties in the House (none since the early 2000s), compared to substantial overlap in the mid-20th century when conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans existed.”
3substack.comBlogs and newsletters
https://kylesaunders.substack.com/p/watch-congress-evolve-in-two-and
Backs: “Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center (Republicans more so in some analyses). Party unity votes are at or near record highs.”
4scienceinsights.orgLow provenance
https://scienceinsights.org/how-political-polarization-has-changed-over-time/
Backs: “The current gap is often described as the widest in modern (post-Reconstruction) history on standard metrics.”
5economist.comNews and mediaquality 0.93
https://www.economist.com/interactive/essay/2024/10/31/when-politics-is-about-hating-the-other-side-democracy-suffers
Backs: “Gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, and immigration have widened substantially over the past 1–2 decades.”
6stanford.eduAcademic
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/polarization-united-states-reconsidered
Backs: “However, some research finds “latent” value clusters (e.g., on moral/religious issues) have been stable longer-term, while partisan alignment with those clusters has increased.”
7pew.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pew.org/en/trust/archive/winter-2025/how-us-public-opinion-has-changed-in-20-years-of-pew-research-center-surveys
Backs: “Pew Research consistently documents growing partisan divides on policy and facts, with little common ground.”
8cnn.comNews and mediaquality 0.66
https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Jeffersonians, with extreme rhetoric), the 1850s–1860s, Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval), etc. There was no golden age of perfect unity.”
9theatlantic.comNews and mediaquality 0.80
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/us-democrat-republican-partisan-polarization/629925/
Backs: “The US stands out among wealthy Western democracies for the depth and persistence of this.”
10ft.comNews and mediaquality 0.93
https://www.ft.com/content/50603d73-49fe-4d2d-b9e9-5cfe39be0353
Backs: “The 2008 inflection (financial crisis, Obama election, smartphone/social media rise) is frequently noted.”
11carnegie.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://carnegie.org/article/polarization-in-america-how-polarized-are-we/
Backs: “There can still be majority agreement on some issues, and local communities sometimes feel more insulated (though recent surveys show polarization increasingly affecting them).”