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Grok 4.5Oct 13, 2026x-ai/grok-4.5-20260708

Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple standard measures—especially in the United States—political polarization is worse than it has been for much of the past several decades (roughly since the mid-20th century post-WWII consensus), and it has reached highs not seen in living memory for peacetime politics. However, it is not entirely unprecedented in U.S. history (e.g., Civil War era or late 19th century), violence and social upheaval were often greater in periods like the 1960s–1970s, and trends are not uniform worldwide or across all dimensions.[1]

Polarization has two main forms: ideological (diverging policy/issue positions) and affective (emotional dislike/distrust of the other side). Both have risen, with elite (congressional) polarization particularly clear and mass (public) trends showing sorting, consistency, and animosity.

Congressional/Elite Polarization

DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with essentially no ideological overlap between the parties in the House since the early 2000s (and Senate shortly after). Moderates have nearly vanished (dozens today vs. 160+ in the early 1970s).[2]

•Both parties moved from the center since the early 1970s, but the shift has been asymmetric: Republicans moved substantially farther right on average; Democrats more modestly left. Geographic/demographic realignments (e.g., Southern conservatives shifting Republican; more diverse Democrats) reinforced this.[2]
•Levels are high by historical standards of the modern two-party era and approach or match peaks from the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction/Gilded Age), though lower than the most extreme Civil War-era divides in some comparisons. Bipartisan coalitions common in the mid-20th century have largely disappeared.[3]

Voteview data and related analyses confirm rising party mean differences and declining moderates/overlap over recent decades.[4]

Mass Ideological Polarization and Sorting

Public opinion has polarized less extremely than elites in some views, but gaps have widened substantially:

•A University of Cambridge analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found divisions on social/political issues rose ~64% overall, with almost all the increase after 2008 (financial crisis, Obama election, smartphone/social media rise). It was largely flat in the 1990s–2000s. The left/cluster became ~31.5% more socially liberal; the right only ~2.8% more conservative. Sorting (aligning labels with views) also rose sharply. Polarization may have leveled somewhat recently but remains far higher than pre-2008.[5]
•Pew Research shows growing ideological consistency: the share with consistently liberal or conservative views doubled (to ~21% by mid-2010s); median partisans now barely overlap (e.g., median Republican more conservative than 94–97% of Democrats in recent data, vs. far more overlap in 1994). Partisan gaps on values, guns, climate, abortion, etc., have widened dramatically.[6]
•Partisan geographic sorting has increased (more homogeneous counties/precincts), and parties have realigned demographically (education, race, religion, urban/rural).

Some research finds Democrats becoming more heterogeneous post-2010 on certain dimensions, and latent value clusters (e.g., moral/religious) more stable than partisan alignment suggests, but overall partisan ideological distance has grown.[7]

Affective Polarization

This has risen especially sharply in the U.S. and stands out internationally:

•ANES feeling thermometers show stable (or slightly declining) in-party warmth but sharp drops in out-party ratings (e.g., from near-neutral ~48 in the late 1970s to the mid-20s by the 2020s). The gap (affective polarization) roughly doubled in recent decades.[8]
•“Very unfavorable” views of the other party have more than doubled since the 1990s/early 2000s and hit record highs. Willingness to have a child marry across party lines has risen dramatically from near-zero decades ago.[9]
•Cross-national studies (e.g., Boxell, Gentzkow, Shapiro) find the U.S. had the largest increase in affective polarization among a dozen OECD countries over ~four decades; some countries rose modestly, others fell. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters.[10]

Social media and internet use are widely perceived as worsening divisions (rising shares say this in many countries, high and stable in the U.S.).[11]

Historical Context and Caveats

•Worse than recent past: Clearly higher than the mid-20th century bipartisan era, 1990s, or early 2000s on elite votes, mass consistency/sorting, and affective measures. 2008 marks a notable inflection for mass issue divides.[5]
•Not worse than “ever”: Civil War (secession, massive death toll, slavery as existential issue) and Reconstruction/Gilded Age featured extreme elite polarization, violence, and sectionalism. The 1960s–1970s had intense cultural/racial conflict, riots, assassinations, Vietnam protests, and higher political violence in some metrics—even if partisan sorting was lower. Some historians argue today’s stakes or intensity do not match those periods, though partisan animosity and institutional gridlock feel acute.[1]
•Asymmetry and drivers: Elite shift more Republican-rightward; some mass social issue shifts more leftward. Causes include party realignment (especially South), primaries rewarding extremes, media fragmentation/social media, geographic sorting, declining cross-cutting identities, and elite cues. Polarization can be a symptom of deeper identity/belonging conflicts.[12]
•Limits: Not all issues or people are equally polarized (engaged partisans drive much of it; many hold mixed views). Public often overestimates divides. Some recent data hint at leveling. Violence support exists but is not majority and has fluctuated; actual political violence remains far below 1960s peaks or Civil War. Trends vary globally (e.g., some countries show declines or stability in affective polarization).[13]

In short, U.S. political polarization—particularly partisan sorting, elite voting cohesion, and mutual dislike—is worse than in the relatively recent past and high by modern democratic standards, contributing to gridlock, eroded norms, and social tension. It echoes earlier American high-polarization eras but occurs in a different media, demographic, and institutional context. Whether it worsens, stabilizes, or reverses depends on leadership, institutions, and events.

Citations (13)

  1. 1nytimes.comNews and mediaquality 0.86
    https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/07/31/opinion/political-violence-history-division.html

    Backs: “However, it is not entirely unprecedented in U.S. history (e.g., Civil War era or late 19th century), violence and social upheaval were often greater in periods like the 1960s–1970s, and trends are not uniform worldwide or across all dimensions.”

  2. 2pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/

    Backs: “Moderates have nearly vanished (dozens today vs. 160+ in the early 1970s).”

  3. 3scienceinsights.orgLow provenance
    https://scienceinsights.org/how-political-polarization-has-changed-over-time/

    Backs: “Bipartisan coalitions common in the mid-20th century have largely disappeared.”

  4. 4voteview.comAcademic
    https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization

    Backs: “Voteview data and related analyses confirm rising party mean differences and declining moderates/overlap over recent decades.”

  5. 5cam.ac.ukAcademic
    https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states

    Backs: “Polarization may have leveled somewhat recently but remains far higher than pre-2008.”

  6. 6pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/1-partisan-divides-over-political-values-widen/

    Backs: “Partisan gaps on values, guns, climate, abortion, etc., have widened dramatically.”

  7. 7nature.comAcademic
    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0

    Backs: “Some research finds Democrats becoming more heterogeneous post-2010 on certain dimensions, and latent value clusters (e.g., moral/religious) more stable than partisan alignment suggests, but overall partisan ideological distance has grown.”

  8. 8goodauthority.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://goodauthority.org/news/americans-views-of-the-opposite-party-have-declined-even-further/

    Backs: “The gap (affective polarization) roughly doubled in recent decades.”

  9. 9doi.orgAcademic
    https://dx.doi.org/10.1146%2Fannurev-polisci-051117-073034

    Backs: “Willingness to have a child marry across party lines has risen dramatically from near-zero decades ago.”

  10. 10stanford.eduAcademic
    https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/cross-polar.pdf

    Backs: “The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters.”

  11. 11pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/chart/growing-shares-across-countries-say-the-internet-and-social-media-have-made-people-more-divided/

    Backs: “Social media and internet use are widely perceived as worsening divisions (rising shares say this in many countries, high and stable in the U.S.).”

  12. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/polarization-is-not-the-problem/

    Backs: “Polarization can be a symptom of deeper identity/belonging conflicts.”

  13. 13newsroom.co.nzNot yet classified
    https://newsroom.co.nz/2026/10/09/nzers-are-less-politically-divided-than-they-think/

    Backs: “Trends vary globally (e.g., some countries show declines or stability in affective polarization).”