Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
No, the US is not fully prepared for another pandemic or widespread health crisis, though it has made meaningful improvements in some areas since COVID-19. Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), bipartisan commissions, public health organizations, and experts consistently highlight progress in stockpiles, surveillance, and coordination structures alongside persistent gaps in funding, leadership implementation, state-level readiness, supply chains, and political/institutional continuity.[1][2]
Improvements Since COVID-19
The US has strengthened certain capabilities:
These build on lessons from COVID-19’s over 1 million US deaths and earlier warnings (the US ranked highly prepared on paper in 2019 Global Health Security Index but performed poorly).[8]
Persistent and Recurring Gaps
Multiple independent reviews find the nation remains vulnerable:
Recent Developments and Risks (Post-2024)
Political transitions have introduced new uncertainties. The OPPR, created to provide permanent White House coordination, was significantly understaffed or sidelined after 2025 (reports of it operating with minimal or no full staff at times, leadership turnover). There have been concerns over cuts or shifts away from certain pandemic R&D, emerging infectious disease programs, and biodefense priorities at agencies like NIAID/NIH, alongside ongoing H5N1 monitoring and other outbreaks (e.g., measles). Experts warn this erodes hard-won capacity and leaves gaps against natural or engineered threats.[13][14]
Global efforts (e.g., WHO pandemic agreement progress, Pandemic Fund) continue with US involvement historically, but domestic readiness is foundational.[15]
Bottom Line and Path Forward
The US is better equipped in tools and stockpiles than in early 2020 and has institutional lessons documented, but systemic weaknesses in sustained funding, full implementation of reforms, seamless multi-level coordination, public trust, and resilient supply chains/healthcare capacity mean it is not adequately prepared for a severe, widespread crisis (especially one more lethal/transmissible than COVID or involving novel agents). Concurrent disasters (climate, cyber) compound risks.[16][17]
Experts and reports urge: stable multi-year funding for public health/PHEP/HPP/SNS/PHEMCE; stronger HHS/White House leadership and after-action learning; national strategies for testing/countermeasures; workforce investments; equity-focused planning; accelerated MCM development/stockpiling; and consistent political prioritization beyond crises. Without these, the pattern of “forget and underinvest” after emergencies risks repeating. Preparedness is achievable with sustained action but currently incomplete.[18]
This assessment draws from nonpartisan GAO audits, bipartisan commissions, TFAH state scorecards, official roadmaps, and expert analyses current through available 2025–2026 reporting. Situations evolve with new threats (e.g., H5N1 mutations), funding, and policy.
Citations (18)
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), bipartisan commissions, public health organizations, and experts consistently highlight progress in stockpiles, surveillance, and coordination structures alongside persistent gaps in funding, leadership implementation, state-level readiness, supply chains,…”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), bipartisan commissions, public health organizations, and experts consistently highlight progress in stockpiles, surveillance, and coordination structures alongside persistent gaps in funding, leadership implementation, state-level readiness, supply chains,…”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “It maintains antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, PPE, ventilators, and more for rapid deployment.”
- https://www.aspr.gov/readiness-response/medical-countermeasures-biodefense/sns/emergency-response/response-history
Backs: “It maintains antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, PPE, ventilators, and more for rapid deployment.”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “CDC has advanced forecasting and lab partnerships (“warm bases”).”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response
Backs: “The Biden administration’s roadmap highlighted massive vaccination/testing/treatment scale-up during COVID and left playbooks for successors.”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/
Backs: “More states in nurse licensure compacts for surge staffing; accreditation gains in public health/emergency management; some advances in diagnostics and therapeutics pipelines.”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “These build on lessons from COVID-19’s over 1 million US deaths and earlier warnings (the US ranked highly prepared on paper in 2019 Global Health Security Index but performed poorly).”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106276
Backs: “Funding and manufacturing risks for countermeasures persist.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106980
Backs: “Funding and manufacturing risks for countermeasures persist.”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Blueprint-for-Biodefense-2024_final_.pdf
Backs: “Fragmented efforts and on-again/off-again investment fail to match the threat; full implementation of prior recommendations (including an “Apollo Program”-scale effort) could prevent pandemics, but apathy risks worse outcomes than COVID.”
- https://center-forward.org/basic/pandemic-preparedness-strengthening-the-u-s-response-framework-2/
Backs: “PAHPA reauthorization and sustained public health funding remain critical but incomplete.”
- https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/17/health/pandemic-preparedness-office-trump-bird-flu
Backs: “Experts warn this erodes hard-won capacity and leaves gaps against natural or engineered threats.”
- https://www.science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic
Backs: “Experts warn this erodes hard-won capacity and leaves gaps against natural or engineered threats.”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/11/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report-demonstrating-the-impact-of-united-states-leadership-and-investments/
Backs: “Global efforts (e.g., WHO pandemic agreement progress, Pandemic Fund) continue with US involvement historically, but domestic readiness is foundational.”
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “The US is better equipped in tools and stockpiles than in early 2020 and has institutional lessons documented, but systemic weaknesses in sustained funding, full implementation of reforms, seamless multi-level coordination, public trust, and resilient supply chains/healthcare capacity mean it is not adequately…”
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CMR-HS5_100-00193235/pdf/CMR-HS5_100-00193235.pdf
Backs: “The US is better equipped in tools and stockpiles than in early 2020 and has institutional lessons documented, but systemic weaknesses in sustained funding, full implementation of reforms, seamless multi-level coordination, public trust, and resilient supply chains/healthcare capacity mean it is not adequately…”
- https://www.bmj.com/content/384/bmj.q332
Backs: “Preparedness is achievable with sustained action but currently incomplete.”