Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States—the country with the most detailed long-term data—is worse than it has been for most of the post-World War II era (roughly the last 50–70 years), with a particularly sharp rise since around 2008. It is not, however, unprecedented in American history; deeper or differently structured divisions existed during the Civil War era and in other periods of intense conflict (e.g., the early republic or parts of the late 19th/early 20th centuries). Comparisons to the 1960s are mixed. Internationally, the U.S. stands out among long-standing Western democracies for its elevated levels.[1]

Polarization is multidimensional: it includes ideological/issue divides (differences in policy views), affective polarization (emotional dislike of the other side), elite/congressional behavior, and social/geographic sorting. Trends vary somewhat by measure but generally point upward in recent decades.

Congressional and Elite Polarization

Lawmakers’ voting records (via DW-NOMINATE scores) show Democrats and Republicans farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years. Both parties have grown more cohesive (far fewer moderates), with little to no ideological overlap since the early 2000s. Democrats have shifted somewhat leftward on average; Republicans have moved more substantially rightward.[2]

This has roots in longer-term changes, including the post-1960s realignment of Southern conservatives from the Democratic to Republican Party, demographic shifts in the parties’ bases, and the decline of cross-party coalitions common in the mid-20th century. Geographic sorting of voters has reinforced this. Polarization in Congress correlates strongly with within-state partisan geographic sorting, which roughly quintupled in some measures between the 1970s and 2010s.[3]

Public Opinion and Issue Polarization

A 2026 Cambridge University study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) and clustering algorithms found that divisions on social and political issues rose about 64% since 1988, with nearly all the increase occurring after 2008 (a period that included the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the rise of smartphones/social media). It largely flatlined in the 1990s–early 2000s before surging, then possibly leveling off somewhat during the Biden years while remaining elevated.[1]

Much of the shift came from the left/liberal cluster becoming substantially more socially progressive (e.g., ~31.5% more liberal on surveyed issues by 2024 vs. 1988), while the right moved only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Sorting also increased: people more consistently align their issue positions with party/ideological labels. Other analyses confirm growing partisan gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, and immigration, with fewer Americans holding mixed liberal-conservative views.[4]

Some research finds parties moving away from the center (asymmetric rates), while demographic groups (e.g., by race or income) have aligned more with parties without always increasing their own internal ideological distances.[5]

Affective Polarization (Dislike of the Other Side)

This has risen substantially. ANES “feeling thermometer” ratings (0–100 scale) of the opposing party dropped from near-neutral levels (~48 in the late 1970s for in-person interviews) to much colder ones (~26–31 by the 2010s–2020s). Self-completed surveys show even lower ratings. In-party warmth has been relatively stable or declined less.[6]

Cross-national studies of OECD countries show the U.S. experienced the largest increase in affective polarization over recent decades. Partisans increasingly view the other side as a threat, immoral, or closed-minded. This tracks with rising “us vs. them” dynamics that spill into social relationships.[7]

Historical Comparisons

V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) data show U.S. political polarization (how much differences create hostile social camps) rising since the 1990s/2000s, reaching “pernicious” levels around 2015 and standing out among wealthy Western democracies (most peers have not sustained such highs; rare historical spikes include France 1968 or Italy’s “Years of Lead”). The U.S. was below world averages until the early 2000s before climbing.[10]

International Context and Caveats

Many countries have seen rising concerns about division (often linked to social media/internet), but trends are not uniform—some have depolarized or have unequal left/right sizes that reduce intensity. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, amplifying the sense of deadlock.[11]

Not all measures show endless increase (some recent flattening), and polarization can be asymmetric or more about sorting than pure extremism on every issue. It is often a symptom of deeper conflicts over identity, rights, economics, and belonging rather than the root cause. Local communities can be more resilient than national politics suggest. Data is richest for the U.S.; other countries vary widely.

In short, for the modern democratic era most Americans have experienced, polarization—especially affective dislike, partisan sorting, and elite divides—is worse than the recent past and has intensified notably since the late 2000s. It has historical precedents of greater severity, however, and outcomes depend on institutions, leadership, and whether divides remain manageable.