Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Whether political polarization is "worse than it’s been in the past" depends on which historical era you use as a benchmark, and whether you are measuring how people vote (legislative polarization), what they actually believe (ideological polarization), or how they feel about each other (affective polarization).

If we look specifically at the United States, political science and historical data offer a clear picture: polarization is worse today than at any point in the last 150 years, but it is not as severe as it was leading up to the American Civil War.

The current state of polarization can be understood through several key comparisons and metrics:

1. The Ultimate Benchmark: The Civil War (1860s)

By any objective measure, today’s polarization does not match the crisis of the mid-19th century. In the 1850s and 1860s, polarization was so profound and geographically concentrated that it shattered the nation’s political, social, and economic systems. It led to the secession of 11 states and a four-year Civil War that resulted in more than 600,000 deaths.

While contemporary political rhetoric is highly divisive and sporadic political violence occurs, the vast majority of Americans do not support armed conflict. Academic studies tracking public attitudes find that support for actual political violence or insurgency remains confined to a small fringe of the population.

2. The Congressional Benchmark: The Reconstruction and Gilded Age (Late 1800s)

If we look at how politicians vote in Congress, polarization is at its highest level since the late 1870s—the Reconstruction Era and the Gilded Age.

Political scientists use a system called NOMINATE scores to analyze roll-call voting records since the founding of the republic. This data shows that the ideological gap between Democrats and Republicans in Congress has been widening since the 1970s. Today, the ideological overlap between the two major parties in Congress has almost entirely disappeared. Moderates who cross party lines to vote with the opposition have become nearly extinct. In terms of legislative gridlock, Congress is as polarized as it has been in roughly 150 years.

3. The Myth of the "Consensus Era" (1950s–1970s)

When people complain that polarization is "worse than ever," they are usually comparing today to the mid-20th century. During the 1950s and 1960s, bipartisanship was common, and the political parties frequently overlapped.

However, historians point out that this "consensus era" was a historical anomaly. At the time, parties were not ideologically sorted. The Democratic Party contained both progressive Northern liberals and highly conservative Southern segregationists (the "Dixiecrats"). The Republican Party contained both conservative Westerners and moderate-to-liberal Northeasterners (such as "Rockefeller Republicans").

The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the subsequent realignment of Southern voters initiated a decades-long process of "sorting." Today, almost all liberals are Democrats and almost all conservatives are Republicans. While this makes the parties more ideologically distinct, it also makes compromise far more difficult.

4. Affective Polarization: How Much We Dislike Each Other

Where the modern era is truly unique—and potentially worse than past eras—is in affective polarization, which is the degree to which citizens actively dislike, distrust, and fear the opposing political party.

5. Perception vs. Reality: Are Americans Actually Divided?

While political elites (politicians, media personalities, and activists) are highly polarized, political scientists emphasize that ordinary Americans are often less divided than they seem. This is known as perceptual polarization.

Because the most extreme political voices receive the vast majority of media and social media attention, voters on both sides tend to assume that average members of the opposing party hold the most extreme, unyielding views of their leaders. In reality, the vast majority of the public still clusters closer to the political center on many policy issues. However, because of high affective polarization, people increasingly vote based on negative partisanship—voting against the party they fear and dislike, rather than for a positive policy agenda.

Summary