Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades (and in some elite metrics, worse than at any point since the late 19th century), though it does not match the extreme societal rupture of the Civil War era.[1][2]

The question is most often discussed in a U.S. context (where data is richest), though similar concerns appear in other democracies. Polarization is multi-dimensional: ideological/issue-based (gaps in policy views), affective (emotional dislike of the other side), elite (among politicians), partisan sorting (consistency of views with party identity), and geographic/social sorting. Evidence shows increases across most of these since the mid-to-late 20th century, with acceleration in recent decades.

Elite/Congressional Polarization

This is among the clearest trends. DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative scale based on roll-call votes, comparable over time) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50+ years.[2][2]

•Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center since the early 1970s, with Republicans shifting more sharply rightward and Democrats more modestly leftward (asymmetric polarization).

•Ideological overlap between the parties has vanished: There has been none in the House since around 2002 and in the Senate since around 2004. Moderates have largely disappeared (from 160+ in the early 1970s to roughly two dozen recently).

•Levels are often described as higher than at any time since Reconstruction/the late 1800s (post-Civil War Gilded Age), when polarization was also intense. The mid-20th century (roughly 1930s–1960s/70s) was a relative low point with more bipartisan overlap (e.g., conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans).[1][3]

Geographic and demographic shifts in the parties (e.g., Southern realignment) have reinforced this.

Mass Public: Issue and Ideological Polarization

Public opinion data shows growing divides, though the mass public remains less polarized than elites, and many Americans hold mixed or moderate views.

•A Cambridge University analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) found divisions on social/political issues increased ~64% overall, with nearly all the rise occurring after 2008 (linked to the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the rise of smartphones/social media). It has possibly begun leveling off more recently but remains far higher than prior decades. The left became substantially more socially liberal (~31.5% shift), while the right shifted only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Sorting into clearer left/right clusters also increased.[4][4][4]

•Pew Research and other studies document widening partisan gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, race, and immigration. The share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled from the 1990s to the 2010s, and ideological consistency aligns more strongly with party ID.[5][6]

•Other research confirms Democrats and Republicans have grown more distant on fundamental issues over ~30 years, with parties moving from the center (at different rates). Some multidimensional analyses note increases driven more by general disagreement than pure “dimensional collapse.”[7]

Partisan sorting (aligning demographics, identities, and issue positions more tightly with parties) has risen, making politics more identity-driven.

Affective Polarization (Dislike of the Other Side)

This has risen sharply and is often what people “feel” most acutely.

•Feeling thermometer ratings (0–100 warmth scale) for the opposing party have dropped dramatically. In the late 1970s, average out-party ratings were near neutral (~48); by the 2010s–2020s they fell to the mid-20s or lower (with self-administered surveys showing even colder views). In-party warmth has stayed relatively high or risen.[8]

•Unfavorable and “very unfavorable” views of the other party have soared since the 1990s. Many now see the other side as a threat to the country’s well-being, and agreement on basic facts has eroded.[9]

•This tracks with rising perceptions of political violence as a problem and declining trust in institutions (Congress, presidency, media, Supreme Court), which has become highly partisan. Some analyses note that while high partisanship itself is not brand new, the collapse in institutional confidence is more recent.[10][10]

Historical Context and Caveats

•Not unprecedented overall: The U.S. has seen intense divisions before—most extremely around the Civil War (slavery, secession, and hundreds of thousands dead), Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, and periods like the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam). Congressional polarization metrics today rival or exceed late-19th-century levels in some respects, but societal violence, institutional breakdown, and existential stakes (e.g., slavery) were far higher then. Claims that “we’ve never been more divided” often overlook this.[11][12][13]

•Mid-20th-century bipartisanship was somewhat anomalous (post-New Deal coalitions).

•Public polarization can feel worse due to media, social media (which many globally now blame for increasing division), geographic sorting (people living among like-minded others), and elite cues. Divisions remain “fuzzy” rather than total tribal opposition on every issue.[4][14]

•Asymmetry debates: Some evidence points to greater movement on the right among elites and on the left among the public on social issues.

•The U.S. is an outlier among wealthy democracies in the persistence and height of “pernicious” polarization in recent decades (V-Dem and comparative data). Other countries have high polarization at times but often not as sustained.[15]

•Recent data (post-2020 or so) shows possible stabilization or slight dips in some issue polarization measures, though affective divides and perceptions remain high. Local communities have sometimes been more insulated than national politics, though that may be changing.[16]

Drivers and Broader Picture

Commonly cited factors include partisan media and social media echo chambers, demographic/cultural changes and sorting, elite incentives (primary systems, fundraising), economic inequality and regional divides, and the collapse of cross-cutting identities. Polarization contributes to gridlock, declining trust, and challenges to democratic norms, but it is also sometimes framed as a symptom of deeper conflicts over rights, identity, and belonging.[17]

In short, for the modern era (post-WWII or post-1970s), yes—polarization is worse on key metrics of elite behavior, issue gaps, and mutual antipathy. Compared to the full sweep of U.S. history, it is severe but not uniquely so in intensity of conflict. Trends are well-documented by sources like Pew, ANES, Voteview/DW-NOMINATE, and academic studies, though measurement details (e.g., which issues, self-ID vs. clustering) matter.

Citations (17)

1scienceinsights.orgLow provenance
https://scienceinsights.org/how-political-polarization-has-changed-over-time/
Backs: “Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades (and in some elite metrics, worse than at any point since the late 19th century), though it does not match the extreme societal rupture of the Civil War era.”
2pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades (and in some elite metrics, worse than at any point since the late 19th century), though it does not match the extreme societal rupture of the Civil War era.”
3usc.eduAcademic
https://today.usc.edu/political-polarization-at-its-worst-since-the-civil-war-2/
Backs: “The mid-20th century (roughly 1930s–1960s/70s) was a relative low point with more bipartisan overlap (e.g., conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans).”
4cam.ac.ukAcademic
https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “The left became substantially more socially liberal (~31.5% shift), while the right shifted only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Sorting into clearer left/right clusters also increased.”
5pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/2024/09/13/how-us-public-opinion-has-changed-in-20-years-of-our-surveys/
Backs: “The share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled from the 1990s to the 2010s, and ideological consistency aligns more strongly with party ID.”
6pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
Backs: “The share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative views roughly doubled from the 1990s to the 2010s, and ideological consistency aligns more strongly with party ID.”
7nature.comAcademic
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0
Backs: “Some multidimensional analyses note increases driven more by general disagreement than pure “dimensional collapse.””
8goodauthority.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://goodauthority.org/news/americans-views-of-the-opposite-party-have-declined-even-further/
Backs: “In the late 1970s, average out-party ratings were near neutral (~48); by the 2010s–2020s they fell to the mid-20s or lower (with self-administered surveys showing even colder views). In-party warmth has stayed relatively high or risen.”
9pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/packages/political-polarization/
Backs: “Many now see the other side as a threat to the country’s well-being, and agreement on basic facts has eroded.”
10brookings.eduNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/extraordinary-or-not-so-extraordinary-times/
Backs: “Some analyses note that while high partisanship itself is not brand new, the collapse in institutional confidence is more recent.”
11archive.isData and tools
https://archive.is/2026.07.05-104443/https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Claims that “we’ve never been more divided” often overlook this.”
12cfr.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.cfr.org/article/why-today-not-1850s
Backs: “Claims that “we’ve never been more divided” often overlook this.”
13yahoo.comNews and mediaquality 0.69
https://www.yahoo.com/news/think-us-more-polarized-ever-222352324.html
Backs: “Claims that “we’ve never been more divided” often overlook this.”
14pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/chart/growing-shares-across-countries-say-the-internet-and-social-media-have-made-people-more-divided/
Backs: “Divisions remain “fuzzy” rather than total tribal opposition on every issue.”
15carnegieendowment.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/McCoy_et_al_-_Polarization_final_3.pdf
Backs: “Other countries have high polarization at times but often not as sustained.”
16carnegie.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://carnegie.org/article/polarization-in-america-how-polarized-are-we/
Backs: “Local communities have sometimes been more insulated than national politics, though that may be changing.”
17journalofdemocracy.orgAcademic
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/polarization-is-not-the-problem/
Backs: “Polarization contributes to gridlock, declining trust, and challenges to democratic norms, but it is also sometimes framed as a symptom of deeper conflicts over rights, identity, and belonging.”