Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse now than it has been for much of the past several decades (particularly since the mid-20th century), though it is not unprecedented in American history and does not match the intensity of the Civil War era. Different forms of polarization—elite/congressional, issue-based among the public, and affective (emotional dislike of the other side)—have all risen substantially, with a notable surge after around 2008.[1]

Congressional (Elite) Polarization

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, according to Pew Research Center analyses of DW-NOMINATE scores (which place lawmakers on a liberal-conservative spectrum based on roll-call votes and allow cross-time comparisons). Both parties have grown more internally cohesive, with far fewer moderates (only about two dozen left in recent Congresses vs. over 160 in the early 1970s). There has been no ideological overlap between the least liberal Democrat and least conservative Republican in the House since 2002 (and shortly after in the Senate).[2]

Republicans have shifted more to the right on average in these measures, while Democrats have moved modestly left. Geographic and demographic realignments contribute: Southern conservatives largely left the Democratic Party, and parties sorted more by region, race/ethnicity, and urban/rural lines. Longer historical DW-NOMINATE data (from Voteview/Poole-Rosenthal) show high polarization in the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction/Gilded Age), a decline through the mid-20th century (with more bipartisan overlap, partly due to conservative Southern Democrats), and a steady rise since the 1970s–1980s back toward high levels.[3]

Public Issue Polarization

Among the public, disagreement over political and social issues has increased. A 2024–2025 University of Cambridge study (using American National Election Studies data from 1988–2024 and clustering algorithms on issue positions, rather than just party labels) found that divisions grew by about 64% overall since 1988. Nearly all of this increase occurred after 2008 (flat through the 1990s and early 2000s), peaking around 2020 with a slight leveling thereafter—though still far higher than earlier decades.[1]

The study attributes most of the shift to the left-leaning cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (about 31.5% more progressive on surveyed issues by 2024 vs. 1988), while the right-leaning cluster shifted only slightly more conservative (~2.8%). Issues like abortion, traditional values, health insurance, and race/discrimination showed notable widening. Partisan/ideological “sorting” also rose (people aligning their self-identification more closely with their issue positions). Other research confirms Democrats and Republicans have moved further apart on values, with less overlap.[4]

Pew data from earlier periods (e.g., 1994 onward) shows rising ideological consistency and diminishing overlap between partisans.[5]

Affective Polarization

Emotional hostility toward the opposing party has grown sharply. Feeling thermometer ratings (0–100 scale) for the out-party have dropped from near-neutral (~45–50) in the late 1970s/1980s to the mid-20s in recent years. Highly unfavorable views of the other party have more than doubled in some Pew tracking since the 1990s. This “us vs. them” animosity often exceeds pure issue disagreement and is linked to social sorting (parties aligning more with race, religion, education, geography).[6]

Historical Context and Caveats

America has experienced intense divisions before: the early republic (Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans), the 1850s lead-up to the Civil War (over slavery and sectionalism, culminating in secession and war), Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, and the 1960s–1970s (civil rights, Vietnam). The Civil War era remains unmatched in existential stakes and violence—nothing today equates to the slavery conflict that made lasting compromise impossible for one side. Some historians argue today’s divisions feel intense due to media amplification and close 50/50 parity but are not deeper on fundamentals than past eras.[7]

The U.S. is somewhat unusual: left and right clusters are roughly equal in size (unlike many countries with a dominant conservative majority or liberal tilt in developed nations), which can make divides feel more zero-sum. Global data from the Cambridge team found no clear worldwide rise in issue polarization in the same period.[1]

Drivers and Nuance

Common explanations include party realignment (especially post-civil rights), rising inequality, cultural/demographic change, elite cues, and media/technology shifts (cable news fragmentation, then social media/smartphones accelerating after ~2008). Polarization is asymmetric in some measures (e.g., leftward public social shift vs. rightward elite Republican movement) and stronger among the politically engaged. It has negative effects on governance, trust, and social cohesion, but some view it as a symptom of deeper conflicts over inclusion and rights rather than the root problem.[8]

In short, polarization is worse than in the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century and has intensified markedly in the 21st century (especially post-2008), making politics feel more tribal and zero-sum. It is high by modern historical standards for elites and affective attitudes, though issue gaps remain “fuzzy” rather than total tribal separation, and it falls short of the Civil War’s extremity. Trends can stabilize or reverse, as slight post-2020 leveling hints.