Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?
[1][2]Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is higher now than it has been for much of the past several decades (particularly since the mid-20th century), though the U.S. has experienced intense divisions in earlier eras like the Civil War or Gilded Age/late 19th century. Polarization is multifaceted—encompassing elite/congressional ideological differences, mass public issue/ideological disagreement, partisan sorting, and affective polarization (emotional dislike of the opposing side)—and trends vary somewhat by type and timeframe.[2]
Congressional/Elite Polarization
In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any point in the past 50 years, according to Pew Research Center analyses of DW-NOMINATE scores (which place lawmakers on a liberal-conservative scale based on roll-call votes, comparable over time). Both parties have become more internally cohesive, with far fewer moderates (only about two dozen left vs. over 160 in the early 1970s). Ideological overlap between the parties has vanished: there has been none in the House since around 2002 and in the Senate since 2004.[2][2]
This elite polarization contributes to gridlock and has roots in party realignments (e.g., Southern realignment after civil rights).
Mass Public Issue and Ideological Polarization
Among the public, issue polarization (disagreement on policy positions) has risen substantially. A 2025/2026 University of Cambridge study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) and machine-learning clustering found that separation between left- and right-leaning opinion clusters increased by 64% overall since 1988—almost entirely after 2008 (flat before then, rising through ~2020, with a slight recent leveling). Clusters remained roughly equal in size and internally cohesive; the main change was greater distance between them.[1][5]
Pew data from earlier periods (e.g., 1994–2017) similarly show rising ideological consistency and stronger alignment with partisanship, especially among the politically engaged.[8]
Affective Polarization
Emotional dislike of the opposing party has risen markedly over decades. Feeling thermometer ratings (warmth toward parties) show out-party ratings dropping substantially (e.g., from near-neutral ~48 in the late 1970s to much colder levels like the mid-20s recently), while in-party feelings stayed relatively stable or declined less. This trend is well-documented in ANES and other surveys and has continued or intensified in recent years. The U.S. stands out for the size of this increase among OECD countries.[9][10][11]
Historical and Broader Context
Nuances and caveats: Not all measures show uniform “extremism”—clusters haven’t always become less cohesive internally, and some “polarization” reflects better sorting of preexisting views rather than everyone moving to extremes. Perceptions of the other side’s extremism often exceed reality (“perception gap”). Recent data hint at possible leveling in issue separation post-2020, though levels remain elevated and affective trends continue. Polarization feels especially intense due to equal camp sizes, nationalized media, and identity fusion with partisanship. It correlates with (but is distinct from) rising concerns about democratic norms or political violence in some surveys, though support for violence remains minority views and has fluctuated.[1][16]
In short, for the modern era most people remember or compare against, yes—polarization is worse across key dimensions of elite ideology, public issues, sorting, and especially affect. It built gradually from the 1970s (elites) with a sharper mass issue spike after 2008, amid broader societal changes. Historical parallels exist, but the current combination of factors makes it particularly salient.
Citations (16)
- https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “[[1]](https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states)”
- https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “[[2]](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/)”
- https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization
Backs: “Longer-term Voteview/DW-NOMINATE data (from the late 19th century onward) show polarization was high in the late 1800s (party mean differences around 0.7–0.8 in the House around 1879–1880s), declined through the early-to-mid 20th century (reaching lows amid post-WWII bipartisanship), stabilized somewhat, then rose…”
- https://legacy.voteview.com/pdf/Carl_Albert_Extensions_essay_2005.pdf
Backs: “Longer-term Voteview/DW-NOMINATE data (from the late 19th century onward) show polarization was high in the late 1800s (party mean differences around 0.7–0.8 in the House around 1879–1880s), declined through the early-to-mid 20th century (reaching lows amid post-WWII bipartisanship), stabilized somewhat, then rose…”
- https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rsos/article/13/2/251428/479919/A-new-measure-of-issue-polarization-using-k-means
Backs: “leveling). Clusters remained roughly equal in size and internally cohesive; the main change was greater distance between them.”
- https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12545191/
Backs: “Partisan/ideological sorting has also increased: people with left-leaning views are more likely to identify as Democrats/liberals (and vice versa), making parties more homogeneous even if individual attitudes don’t always extremize dramatically. Other analyses confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more distant…”
- https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0
Backs: “Other analyses confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more distant ideologically over ~30 years, with both moving from the center (at different rates).”
- https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/feature/political-polarization-1994-2017/
Backs: “Other analyses confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more distant ideologically over ~30 years, with both moving from the center (at different rates). Pew data from earlier periods (e.g., 1994–2017) similarly show rising ideological consistency and stronger alignment with partisanship, especially among the…”
- https://goodauthority.org/news/americans-views-of-the-opposite-party-have-declined-even-further/
Backs: “Feeling thermometer ratings (warmth toward parties) show out-party ratings dropping substantially (e.g., from near-neutral ~48 in the late 1970s to much colder levels like the mid-20s recently), while in-party feelings stayed relatively stable or declined less. This trend is well-documented in ANES and other surveys…”
- https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-022-09784-4
Backs: “This trend is well-documented in ANES and other surveys and has continued or intensified in recent years. The U.S. stands out for the size of this increase among OECD countries.”
- https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/cross-polar.pdf
Backs: “This trend is well-documented in ANES and other surveys and has continued or intensified in recent years. The U.S. stands out for the size of this increas”
- https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Current levels of elite polarization are high by post-1870s standards but the context differs (e.g., no slavery crisis; modern media/social media amplify divides; roughly equal-sized left/right camps in the U.S., unlike many countries with unbalanced majorities).”
- https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-today-1890s
Backs: “Current levels of elite polarization are high by post-1870s standards but the context differs (e.g., no slavery crisis; modern media/social media amplify divides; roughly equal-sized left/right camps in the U.S., unlike many countries with unbalanced majorities).”
- https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/05/reducing-pernicious-polarization-a-comparative-historical-analysis-of-depolarization?lang=en
Backs: “Global: Polarization (including “pernicious” forms) has risen in many regions since ~2005 per V-Dem and other data, but the U.S. is an outlier among long-standing advanced democracies for the sharpness of its rise. The Cambridge study found no clear global increase in issue polarization of the same type.”
- https://www.psypost.org/american-issue-polarization-surged-after-2008-as-the-left-moved-further-left/
Backs: “Polarization (including “pernicious” forms) has risen in many regions since ~2005 per V-Dem and other data, but the U.S. is an outlier among long-standing advanced democracies for the sharpness of its rise. The Cambridge study found no clear global i”
- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/opinion/common-ground-polarization-red-blue-america.html
Backs: “It correlates with (but is distinct from) rising concerns about democratic norms or political violence in some surveys, though support for violence remains minority views and has fluctuated.”