Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4][5]Yes, by most standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades—higher than at any point in the post-World War II era and, on some elite metrics, since the late 19th century—though it is not the most extreme in all of American history (e.g., the Civil War era).[6][7]

Polarization has multiple dimensions: ideological (differences in policy positions), affective (emotional dislike or hostility toward the other side), issue-based (gaps on specific topics), elite/congressional vs. mass public, and sorting (people aligning more consistently by party, ideology, geography, and demographics). Trends show clear increases across most of these since the 1970s–1990s, with acceleration after roughly 2008.

Congressional/Elite Polarization

Roll-call voting data (DW-NOMINATE scores) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically than at any time in the past 50+ years. The mid-20th-century era of frequent bipartisan coalitions (with conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northeastern Republicans) has vanished. Ideological overlap between the parties disappeared in the House around 2002 and the Senate around 2004; the gap has continued to widen. Both parties became more cohesive and moved away from the center, with Republicans shifting farther right on average.[1][1]

This elite polarization tracks with longer historical patterns visible in Voteview data, with high levels in the late 1800s (post-Reconstruction) before declining mid-century and rising again.

Mass Public Polarization

Affective Polarization (Emotional Hostility)

This has risen sharply. On “feeling thermometer” scales (0–100 warmth ratings), the gap between in-party and out-party ratings roughly doubled since the late 1970s/1980s. Out-party ratings fell from near-neutral (~48 in the late 1970s) to the mid-20s by the 2020s. Unfavorable views of the opposing party (seeing them as closed-minded, dishonest, immoral, etc.) have hit record highs. The U.S. showed the largest increase in affective polarization among a set of OECD countries over recent decades.[3][10][11]

Broader and Historical Context

V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) data rate U.S. societal polarization as reaching “pernicious” levels (where political differences poison social relationships) around 2015, after rising since the 1990s. The U.S. stands out among advanced Western democracies for the intensity and duration of this; peers rarely hit such levels (brief exceptions like France in 1968). It has been above world averages in recent decades after previously tracking lower.[5][5][12]

Historically, America has seen intense divisions before: the early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonian Republicans), Civil War and Reconstruction, late 19th-century conflicts, and the 1960s. Some historians argue today’s substantive divides are not worse than the Adams/Jefferson era or late 1960s in certain respects, and nothing matches the Civil War’s violence and secession. However, modern measures of elite cohesion, affective hostility, media environments, and national-level partisan sorting make current polarization feel (and often measure as) particularly pervasive and sustained in a stable two-party democracy.[6][13]

Nuances and Caveats

In short, relative to the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century and the living memory of most Americans, yes—it is worse on key metrics of both elite behavior and public attitudes. Absolute historical extremes exist, but the current combination of high elite polarization, rising mass hostility, and institutional gridlock is distinctive and concerning for democratic functioning. Trends can reverse (as they have in past U.S. eras), but recent patterns have been stubborn.