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Grok 4.5Oct 6, 2026x-ai/grok-4.5-20260708

Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?

No, not fully—though capacities improved in key areas after COVID-19, significant gaps remain in funding, coordination, workforce, equity, trust, and sustained political commitment, with recent policy shifts appearing to reverse some gains.[1]

The US ranked first on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index (score around 83.5 in recent assessments) due to strong laboratory systems, surveillance potential, medical countermeasure development capacity, and biosafety/biosecurity frameworks.[2] However, as COVID-19 demonstrated (and experts repeatedly note), high capacity scores do not guarantee effective performance amid real-world challenges like politicization, fragmented federal-state systems, supply chain issues, and public distrust.[3]

Post-COVID Improvements

Under the Biden administration, notable progress included:

•Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) restocking: Dramatically increased PPE and equipment (e.g., ~70 times the N95 respirators, 34 times the gloves, 50 times the isolation gowns, and 10 times the ventilators compared to pre-pandemic levels). This supported responses to COVID remnants, H5N1, and other threats.[4]
•Surveillance and data systems: Electronic case reporting expanded from fewer than 200 healthcare facilities pre-COVID to over 45,000–48,000 by 2024; improved syndromic surveillance and wastewater monitoring.[5]
•Coordination structures: Creation of the permanent White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR) in 2023 to lead/coordinate biological threat responses. A National Biodefense Strategy and related roadmaps aimed at faster vaccine/therapeutic development (e.g., 100-day goals).[4]
•Investments and countermeasures: Billions in global health security, BARDA/Project BioShield advances, mRNA platform expansion, and rapid vaccine/therapeutic programs. Domestic manufacturing and “warm base” lab partnerships were bolstered.[6]
•WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE, 2024): Confirmed high capacities in many of 19 technical areas (prevention, detection, response), with the US volunteering for transparency. It praised contributions to global health security while recommending further alignment of frameworks, stronger state/local/tribal/territorial (SLTT) capabilities, workforce monitoring, sustained funding (addressing fragmentation), trust-building/community engagement, equity, and solidarity.[7]

The Biden administration’s roadmaps highlighted reduced COVID deaths/hospitalizations via vaccination (270+ million people with at least one dose) and free tests, framing these as transformative for future readiness.[8]

Persistent and Emerging Gaps

Multiple independent assessments highlight unfinished business:

•GAO oversight: Hundreds of COVID-related recommendations (428 to agencies + 24 for Congress as of early 2024); ~220 remained open. Lessons emphasize better advance planning/roles, partner collaboration, clear communications, data sharing, program integrity, leveraging infrastructure, and flexibilities (e.g., telehealth). High-risk areas include HHS leadership/coordination of emergencies.[9]
•State-level readiness (TFAH Ready or Not 2025): Only 21 states + DC in the high-performance tier; 16 middle; 13 low (based on indicators like nurse licensure compact, accreditation, funding stability, water safety, paid time off access, flu vaccination ~47% vs. 70% goal, lab surge capacity, patient safety, and new avoidable mortality metric). 14 states cut public health funding in FY 2024 (linked to COVID fund cliffs and federal reductions). Disparities in avoidable mortality (preventable/treatable deaths) are stark by region and race/ethnicity. Recommendations stress stable CDC/PHEP funding, PAHPA reauthorization, immunization/AMR programs, equity, MCM stockpiling/development, healthcare surge, and climate/extreme weather prep.[10]
•Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (National Blueprint, May 2024): Biological threats are real and growing (natural, accidental, deliberate). Calls for immediate action on leadership, intelligence/attribution/deterrence, S&T, preparedness, detection/surveillance, and response/recovery. Notes some prior recommendations adopted but emphasizes more is needed.[11]
•Other critiques: Healthcare system surge capacity, supply chain resilience, public health workforce shortages/burnout/attrition, inequities (disproportionate impacts on vulnerable groups), misinformation/low trust, and fragmented authorities. H5N1 (bird flu in cattle/poultry with sporadic human cases) exposed ongoing coordination and testing issues. Experts note a historical pattern of post-outbreak cuts (after H1N1, Ebola, Zika).[3]

PAHPA (core authorization for preparedness) has faced funding shortfalls vs. needs (e.g., PHEMCE estimates large gaps for countermeasures) and requires reauthorization/extensions.[12]

Recent Developments and Setbacks (2025 onward)

Policy shifts under the second Trump administration have raised alarms among many public health experts:

•Withdrawal from WHO; reduced engagement with global instruments (IHR amendments, pandemic agreement negotiations); rejection of a UN political declaration on pandemic preparedness (citing ideological concerns).[13]
•Cuts/scuttling of >$1 billion in pandemic R&D (including mRNA vaccine projects totaling hundreds of millions, priority pathogen programs at NIAID/BARDA, surveillance initiatives). Focus shifted away from some biodefense/pandemic prep elements.[14]
•OPPR largely emptied (staff left or resigned); minimally restaffed later (one lead + limited support). Critics say this undercuts cross-agency coordination.[15]
•Broader impacts on global health security funding, USAID elements, and CDC/NIH priorities, alongside domestic outbreaks (e.g., record measles, others) testing response capacity. ASPR continues operational work (deployments, MCM approvals, SNS distributions for H5N1/Ebola/mpox/etc.), and some domestic manufacturing pushes continue.[16]

Experts describe these as damaging to detection, rapid countermeasure development (especially flexible platforms like mRNA for Disease X or flu), and international early warning—leaving gaps that other countries partially fill but that are hard to rebuild quickly.[14]

Bottom Line

The US is better positioned than in early 2020 in stockpiles, some surveillance/data systems, MCM pipelines (pre-cuts), and institutional knowledge. It retains world-leading scientific and manufacturing potential. However, it is not fully prepared for another major pandemic or widespread crisis due to:

•Fragile/uneven sustained funding and workforce.
•Coordination and SLTT gaps.
•Equity, trust, and communication challenges.
•Incomplete implementation of lessons (many open recommendations).
•Recent reversals in R&D, global cooperation, and dedicated leadership structures.

Preparedness is a continuous process requiring bipartisan, multi-level investment far beyond crisis mode—experts estimate billions annually as a fraction of pandemic costs (COVID caused trillions in losses). Without addressing the “poverty of implementation,” political polarization, and underinvestment patterns, performance in a future event (e.g., severe flu, novel pathogen, or biothreat) risks repeating or worsening COVID shortcomings. Ongoing monitoring of H5N1, mpox, measles, and other threats provides real-world tests.[1]

Citations (16)

  1. 1bmj.comAcademic
    https://www.bmj.com/content/384/bmj.q332

    Backs: “No, not fully—though capacities improved in key areas after COVID-19, significant gaps remain in funding, coordination, workforce, equity, trust, and sustained political commitment, with recent policy shifts appearing to reverse some gains.”

  2. 2ghsindex.orgData and tools
    https://ghsindex.org/country/united-states/

    Backs: “The US ranked first on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index (score around 83.5 in recent assessments) due to strong laboratory systems, surveillance potential, medical countermeasure development capacity, and biosafety/biosecurity frameworks.”

  3. 3nejm.orgAcademic
    https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427

    Backs: “The US ranked first on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index (score around 83.5 in recent assessments) due to strong laboratory systems, surveillance potential, medical countermeasure development capacity, and biosafety/biosecurity frameworks.However, as COVID-19 demonstrated (and experts repeatedly note), high…”

  4. 4archives.govGovernment
    https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/

    Backs: “This supported responses to COVID remnants, H5N1, and other threats.”

  5. 5cdc.govGovernment
    https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm

    Backs: “Electronic case reporting expanded from fewer than 200 healthcare facilities pre-COVID to over 45,000–48,000 by 2024; improved syndromic surveillance and wastewater monitoring.”

  6. 6ucsb.eduAcademic
    https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report

    Backs: “Domestic manufacturing and “warm base” lab partnerships were bolstered.”

  7. 7who.intGovernment
    https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240105409

    Backs: “It praised contributions to global health security while recommending further alignment of frameworks, stronger state/local/tribal/territorial (SLTT) capabilities, workforce monitoring, sustained funding (addressing fragmentation), trust-building/community engagement, equity, and solidarity.”

  8. 8ucsb.eduAcademic
    https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response

    Backs: “The Biden administration’s roadmaps highlighted reduced COVID deaths/hospitalizations via vaccination (270+ million people with at least one dose) and free tests, framing these as transformative for future readiness.”

  9. 9gao.govGovernment
    https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175

    Backs: “High-risk areas include HHS leadership/coordination of emergencies.”

  10. 10tfah.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/

    Backs: “Recommendations stress stable CDC/PHEP funding, PAHPA reauthorization, immunization/AMR programs, equity, MCM stockpiling/development, healthcare surge, and climate/extreme weather prep.”

  11. 11biodefensecommission.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/

    Backs: “Notes some prior recommendations adopted but emphasizes more is needed.”

  12. 12center-forward.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://center-forward.org/basic/pandemic-preparedness-strengthening-the-u-s-response-framework-2/

    Backs: “PAHPA (core authorization for preparedness) has faced funding shortfalls vs. needs (e.g., PHEMCE estimates large gaps for countermeasures) and requires reauthorization/extensions.”

  13. 13nytimes.comNews and mediaquality 0.86
    https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/25/us/politics/us-rejects-un-declaration-on-preparing-for-pandemics.html

    Backs: “Withdrawal from WHO; reduced engagement with global instruments (IHR amendments, pandemic agreement negotiations); rejection of a UN political declaration on pandemic preparedness (citing ideological concerns).”

  14. 14science.orgAcademic
    https://www.science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic

    Backs: “Focus shifted away from some biodefense/pandemic prep elements.”

  15. 15notus.orgNot yet classified
    https://www.notus.org/health-science/white-house-pandemic-preparedness

    Backs: “OPPR largely emptied (staff left or resigned); minimally restaffed later (one lead + limited support). Critics say this undercuts cross-agency coordination.”

  16. 16aspr.govGovernment
    https://www.aspr.gov/

    Backs: “ASPR continues operational work (deployments, MCM approvals, SNS distributions for H5N1/Ebola/mpox/etc.), and some domestic manufacturing pushes continue.”