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Grok 4.5Oct 6, 2026x-ai/grok-4.5-20260708

Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4]Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades (roughly since the mid-to-late 20th century) and reaches levels comparable to some historical highs outside of the Civil War era, though the nature of the divisions differs and it is not equivalent to periods of actual civil conflict or mass violence.[1]

Polarization is multidimensional: ideological/issue-based (differences in policy views), affective (emotional dislike or animosity toward the other side), elite/congressional (voting and behavior of politicians), and related factors like geographic/social sorting. Trends are clearest and best-documented for the US; data elsewhere is more mixed, with the US often standing out among wealthy democracies.[5]

Recent Trends (Last 40–50 Years)

•Issue polarization: A 2026 University of Cambridge study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data and clustering algorithms found that divisions on social and political issues rose about 64% from 1988 to 2024. Nearly all the increase occurred after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the rise of smartphones/social media). It was driven mainly by the left becoming more socially liberal (about 31.5% shift), while the right moved only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Polarization was relatively flat in the 1990s–early 2000s, surged thereafter, and may have begun leveling off recently—but remains far higher than prior decades. Clusters stayed roughly equal in size (unusual globally), with increased “sorting” into consistent left/right packages of views.[1]
•Affective polarization: Feeling thermometer scores (0–100 warmth ratings) show a large rise in the gap between feelings toward one’s own party and the opposing party. In the late 1970s, the average gap was roughly 20–30 points; it has risen to around 50+ points in recent years (with out-party ratings dropping sharply into “cold” territory, often below 30). Highly negative views of the other party have more than doubled since the 1990s in Pew data. Reluctance toward cross-party marriage, viewing the other side as a threat to the nation’s well-being, and similar indicators have also increased substantially. The US has shown the largest rise among OECD countries studied over recent decades.[6]
•Congressional/elite polarization: DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes) show Democrats and Republicans farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with virtually no overlapping moderates (down from over 160 in the early 1970s to about two dozen). Both parties have moved from the center (Republicans more so in many analyses), and bipartisan collaboration has declined. Levels approach or match highs not seen since the late 19th century (post-Reconstruction). Polarization was lower in the mid-20th century.[3]
•Other indicators: Partisan geographic sorting has increased markedly (e.g., counties/precincts more homogeneous). Demographic sorting into parties has grown (race, education, urban/rural). Media fragmentation and social media amplify divides. Some studies note asymmetric elements (e.g., greater affective shifts among one side in certain periods, or elite Republican movement rightward alongside public leftward issue shifts).

Pew Research and others consistently document growing partisan gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, race, and immigration, with fewer Americans holding mixed liberal-conservative views.[7]

Longer Historical Context

The US has experienced intense polarization before:

•Early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, ~1790s–1820s).
•Civil War and Reconstruction era (highest intensity, involving secession, war, and aftermath; congressional measures peaked then).
•Late 19th/early 20th century peaks, followed by declines into the mid-20th century “Era of Good Feelings”-style periods of lower division or one-party dominance in places.
•1960s: High social conflict (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval, assassinations, riots, bombings), though party ideological sorting was lower than today.[8]

Current levels rival intense past periods in elite voting cohesion and public animosity metrics for a stable democracy, and the US is an outlier among wealthy Western democracies for “pernicious” polarization that has persisted and risen (V-Dem and related data). However, it lacks the scale of organized violence, paramilitary activity, or institutional breakdown of the Civil War or even parts of the 1960s–70s. Divisions today are more nationalized, identity/culture-war oriented, and amplified by media/algorithms rather than purely sectional (North-South). Some historians argue substantive divides are not as deep as in the Adams/Jefferson years or late 1960s, while others see today’s as uniquely corrosive due to mutual perceptions of existential threat and declining shared facts/institutions.[8]

Caveats and Broader Picture

•Polarization is not uniform or inevitable; it has ebbed and flowed historically and can level off or reverse (as some recent data hints). It is partly a response to real changes (demographics, economics, culture) and elite incentives.
•Debates exist over asymmetry (which side moved more, or whether one is more “anti-democratic”), measurement (self-ID vs. issues; public vs. elites), and whether affective hatred is the core problem vs. a symptom of deeper conflicts over belonging/rights.
•Globally, affective/negative partisanship has risen in some places but not universally; American-style cultural polarization appears to be spreading in parts of the West via media dynamics.[9]
•Many Americans across parties dislike the division and expect it to worsen, yet cross-cutting identities and issue fuzziness still exist.

In short, for the modern post-WWII US (and especially vs. the relatively less polarized mid-20th century or even the 1980s–2000s), yes—it is worse across key metrics of division, animosity, and elite behavior. It feels intense because the two sides are roughly equal in size, media ecosystems are siloed, and politics has become more central to identity. Historical parallels exist but are imperfect; the current era is a high point for peacetime democratic polarization in several quantitative senses.

Citations (9)

  1. 1cam.ac.ukAcademic
    https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states

    Backs: “[[1]](https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states)”

  2. 2stanford.eduAcademic
    https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/cross-polar.pdf

    Backs: “[[2]](https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/cross-polar.pdf)”

  3. 3pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/

    Backs: “[[3]](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/)”

  4. 4carnegieendowment.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://carnegieendowment.org/files/McCoy_et_al_-_Polarization_final_3.pdf

    Backs: “[[4]](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/McCoy_et_al_-_Polarization_final_3.pdf)”

  5. 5mit.eduAcademic
    https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/106/2/557/109262/Cross-Country-Trends-in-Affective-Polarization

    Backs: “Trends are clearest and best-documented for the US; data elsewhere is more mixed, with the US often standing out among wealthy democracies.”

  6. 6substack.comBlogs and newsletters
    https://newsamaritans.substack.com/p/feeling-thermometers-a-national-cooling

    Backs: “The US has shown the largest rise among OECD countries studied over recent decades.”

  7. 7pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
    https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/10/23/in-polarized-era-fewer-americans-hold-a-mix-of-conservative-and-liberal-views/

    Backs: “Pew Research and others consistently document growing partisan gaps on issues like climate, guns, abortion, race, and immigration, with fewer Americans holding mixed liberal-conservative views.”

  8. 8cnn.comNews and mediaquality 0.66
    https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis

    Backs: “High social conflict (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval, assassinations, riots, bombings), though party ideological sorting was lower than today.”

  9. 9ft.comNews and mediaquality 0.93
    https://www.ft.com/content/50603d73-49fe-4d2d-b9e9-5cfe39be0353

    Backs: “American-style cultural polarization appears to be spreading in parts of the West via media dynamics.”