Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

I need more details on historical comparisons, especially pre-1980s, congressional polarization (DW-NOMINATE), affective polarization trends, and whether it's worse than Civil War era or 1960s. Also, global context.

Browse some key pages for more depth.[1][2][3]Yes, in key measurable ways—particularly over the past several decades in the United States—political polarization is worse (higher) than it was in the mid-to-late 20th century, though it is not unprecedented across all of U.S. history, and trends are not uniform globally or across all dimensions of polarization.[1]

Polarization is multi-faceted. It includes ideological/issue polarization (divergence in policy views), affective polarization (emotional dislike or hostility toward the out-party), elite/congressional polarization (voting and positioning of politicians), and partisan sorting (alignment of ideology, identity, and demographics with parties). Evidence comes primarily from U.S. data (e.g., American National Election Studies/ANES, DW-NOMINATE scores for Congress), as the question often centers there; global patterns differ.

Recent Trends in the U.S. (Especially Post-1970s/1980s and Post-2008)

These trends contribute to perceptions of intense division, gridlock, distrust, and (in some data) rising openness to political violence among subsets of partisans. Media fragmentation, social media, nationalization of politics, and identity-based sorting amplify them.

Longer Historical Perspective

Polarization is not new or uniquely extreme across all U.S. history. Congressional measures show high levels in the late 19th/early 20th centuries (Gilded Age/Progressive Era) and earlier party systems (e.g., Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans ~1790–1820; Civil War/Reconstruction era ~1860–1930 peaks), sometimes comparable to or exceeding recent levels before declining. The relatively low-polarization mid-20th century (roughly 1930s–1970s, featuring cross-cutting Southern Democrats) was more the historical exception than the rule; polarization has often been the norm, tied to class, economic, regional, or cultural conflicts.[6]

Comparisons to specific eras:

Current features that feel distinct include the role of 24/7 partisan media/social media, stronger social/identity sorting (race, religion, geography, education aligning tightly with parties), and balanced partisan strength making neither side dominant.

Global Context

Issue polarization does not show a clear worldwide rise (per the Cambridge analysis of 57 countries). Affective polarization trends vary: the U.S. is an outlier for its sharp increase; some Western democracies saw rises, others declines or stability. Many countries have unbalanced left-right opinion clusters (e.g., large conservative majorities in developing nations).[4]

Caveats and Nuances

In short, relative to the post-WWII low-polarization baseline many remember or idealize, yes—polarization (especially affective and sorted partisan) is substantially worse in the U.S. today. Relative to the full sweep of American history, it is high and concerning but fits patterns that have risen and fallen before, sometimes with more catastrophic results. Trends can reverse through institutional, cultural, or political shifts, as they have historically.