Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
No, the US is not fully prepared for another pandemic or widespread health crisis, though it has made meaningful progress in some technical and logistical areas since COVID-19. Expert assessments from bipartisan commissions, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Trust for America’s Health (TFAH), and others consistently highlight remaining vulnerabilities, uneven state-level readiness, funding instability, coordination challenges, and recent backsliding risks. Biological threats (natural, accidental, or deliberate) are viewed as real and growing.[1]
Progress Since COVID-19
Post-COVID investments and reforms strengthened certain capabilities:
These improvements mean the US is better equipped in some detection, manufacturing flexibility, and initial response tools than in early 2020. The 2019 Global Health Security Index had ranked the US highly on paper, but real-world COVID performance exposed gaps that have been partially addressed.[7]
Persistent and Emerging Gaps
Despite progress, major shortfalls persist:
The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense’s 2024 National Blueprint for Biodefense (updating its earlier work) stated the nation “remains dangerously vulnerable,” with the biological threat real and growing. It issued 36 recommendations and 185 action items across leadership (e.g., stronger White House role via National Security Advisor), intelligence/deterrence, science/technology, preparedness, detection/surveillance, and response/recovery/mitigation. It warned of losing post-COVID gains without sustained “on all the time” focus rather than crisis-only responses, and noted that fuller earlier implementation could have lessened COVID’s toll.[1]
GAO’s ongoing COVID oversight stresses implementing open recommendations for better future emergency planning, collaboration, data, integrity controls, and leveraging infrastructure.[6]
Recent Context and Outlook
In 2025–2026, the system faced concurrent stresses (severe flu, measles surges, H5N1 surveillance, extreme weather) alongside federal staffing/funding disruptions and policy shifts (e.g., impacts on mRNA/platform R&D, OPPR staffing fluctuations, GHS strategy changes). ASPR continues MCM work and responses, but experts (including former officials) warn of dismantled progress and reduced readiness.[10]
Bottom line: Technical tools and stockpiles are stronger in places, and lessons exist on paper, but systemic issues—chronic underfunding relative to needs, workforce gaps, uneven implementation, political/coordination frictions, and eroding international ties—mean the US would likely face significant challenges (delays, inequities, excess morbidity/mortality, economic hits) in another major pandemic or multi-hazard crisis. Preparedness is a continuous process requiring stable multi-year funding, clear leadership, modernized infrastructure, equity focus, sustained R&D, and bipartisan commitment. Full implementation of existing recommendations (Commission, GAO, TFAH, National Academies) would substantially close gaps. Threats like novel pathogens, climate-amplified events, or engineered agents make delay costly.
Citations (10)
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Biological threats (natural, accidental, or deliberate) are viewed as real and growing.”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “Dramatic expansion of electronic case reporting (from under 200 facilities pre-pandemic to over 45,000–48,000 by 2024) and syndromic surveillance covering most hospital EDs. These enable faster detection.”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “ASPR has distributed PPE and countermeasures for threats like H5N1 and mpox.”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response
Backs: “BARDA advanced medical countermeasures (MCMs), with transitions into the SNS and FDA approvals.”
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report
Backs: “PAHPA (Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act) frameworks and PHEMCE support readiness, though with funding shortfalls.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “GAO identified lessons in planning, collaboration, communications, data sharing, and flexibilities.”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “The 2019 Global Health Security Index had ranked the US highly on paper, but real-world COVID performance exposed gaps that have been partially addressed.”
- https://www.tfah.org/article/new-report-measures-states-preparedness-for-public-health-emergencies-including-infectious-disease-outbreaks-and-extreme-weather-events/
Backs: “Recent federal workforce reductions, grant terminations (e.g., billions in ELC/COVID-era support), and instability have strained labs, surveillance, and response capacity amid concurrent threats like severe flu seasons, measles outbreaks (highest since 1991 in some recent data), and H5N1.”
- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/25/us/politics/us-rejects-un-declaration-on-preparing-for-pandemics.html
Backs: “Withdrawal from WHO (under the second Trump administration), reduced emphasis on certain global health security funding/contributions, and rejection of a 2026 UN political declaration on pandemic preparedness have raised concerns about weakened global surveillance/cooperation—critical since threats do not respect…”
- https://www.science.org/content/article/trump-administration-dismantling-efforts-fight-next-pandemic
Backs: “ASPR continues MCM work and responses, but experts (including former officials) warn of dismantled progress and reduced readiness.”