Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States (the most studied case) is worse than in recent decades and in some respects higher than at any point in the modern polling era—though comparisons to the 19th century or earlier are harder and more mixed.
Key Evidence from Data and Research
Political scientists distinguish several related concepts:
•Ideological polarization: Growing distance between the policy positions of the parties/elites and (to a lesser extent) the public.
•Affective polarization: Growing dislike, distrust, or animosity toward the opposing party/side.
•Partisan sorting: People aligning their ideology, identity, media, geography, and social lives more tightly with one party.
•Asymmetric vs. symmetric: Some evidence of greater movement on the right in certain periods; other measures show both sides polarizing.
Trends since the mid-20th century (strongest data):
•Elite/party polarization has risen sharply. Congressional voting (DW-NOMINATE scores) shows the parties farther apart ideologically than at any time since the late 19th/early 20th century, with the gap widening steadily since the 1970s after a mid-century low. Overlap between the parties in Congress has essentially disappeared.
•Public affective polarization has increased markedly. Pew Research and others document that the share of Americans with highly negative views of the opposing party has roughly doubled since the 1990s. “Feeling thermometer” scores (warmth toward own party vs. coldness toward the other) show a widening gap; many now rate the other party below 30–40 on a 0–100 scale.
•Partisan animosity and social distance: Surveys show rising unwillingness to marry, be friends with, or live near supporters of the other party; increased perceptions that the other side is a threat to the country; and higher rates of viewing opposing partisans as immoral or unintelligent. This accelerated after the 2000s and especially post-2016.
•Media and information environments: Fragmentation into partisan outlets, social media algorithms, and selective exposure amplify differences. Trust in institutions has become highly polarized by party.
•Geographic and social sorting: Americans increasingly live in politically homogeneous areas and social circles, reducing cross-cutting ties that once moderated views.
Pew, ANES (American National Election Studies), Gallup, and academic meta-analyses (e.g., work by Iyengar, Mason, Fiorina, Abramowitz, and others) consistently show these rises from the 1970s–1990s baseline through the 2010s–2020s. The 1950s–1960s are often cited as a low point of polarization (despite other conflicts), with parties more ideologically mixed.
Longer historical comparisons:
•Late 19th / early 20th century: Elite polarization (Congress) was very high during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era—comparable to or exceeding today’s levels on some roll-call measures. There were intense partisan media, contested elections, and violence (e.g., around Reconstruction, labor conflicts). However, mass affective data is sparse; suffrage, media, and party systems differed.
•Civil War era: Far more extreme—literal secession and war—representing a catastrophic breakdown rather than “normal” polarization.
•Pre-modern periods: Harder to quantify; factions, religious/political conflicts, and elite rivalries were often intense, but national mass politics as we know it didn’t exist.
•Cross-nationally, many established democracies have seen rising polarization in recent decades (e.g., Europe on cultural/immigration issues), though the U.S. stands out for its two-party system, presidentialism, and media environment. Some countries remain less polarized.
Caveats and Counterpoints
•Not uniform: On many specific policy issues, the public remains more moderate or cross-pressured than elites/activists/media. “Polarization” is often stronger among the politically engaged than the average voter. Some scholars (e.g., Fiorina) have argued that ordinary Americans are less polarized than “party sorting” or elite cues make it appear, though affective data has weakened this view over time.
•Measurement: Self-reported ideology can understate change due to shifting meanings of “liberal/conservative.” Behavioral measures (donations, voting, residential choices) and implicit bias studies often show clearer increases.
•Causes (debated): Party realignment (civil rights, culture wars), economic inequality, demographic change, primary systems, gerrymandering (limited effect), cable/internet media, and elite incentives all play roles. It is not solely “one side’s fault.”
•Global/historical context: Democratic backsliding risks rise with extreme polarization, but polarization itself has cycles. The U.S. has survived high-polarization periods before.
•Recent data (2020s): Polarization remains elevated; some metrics plateaued or fluctuated with events (elections, COVID, Jan. 6, etc.), but the long-term upward trend from mid-century holds. International comparisons vary.
Bottom Line
Relative to the post-WWII era (the period with the best continuous data), yes—political polarization is worse. Elite ideological distance and mass affective hostility are at or near modern highs. Compared to the full sweep of U.S. history, today’s levels are high but not unprecedented in elite terms, and they occur in a very different technological and institutional context that can amplify effects.