Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Multiple lines of evidence indicate that U.S. political polarization today is indeed worse than at virtually any point in recent historical memory—though the picture is nuanced depending on what exactly you're measuring.

Affective polarization (how much partisans dislike each other) is at historic highs

This is perhaps the clearest and most dramatic trend. Researchers have tracked "feeling thermometer" ratings for decades: using a "feeling thermometer" to rate attitudes on a scale from 0 to 100, researchers found that in 1978, the average American rated members of their own political party 27 points higher than members of the other major party, but by 2016 that gap had grown to 45.9 points.

The trend has only intensified since then. Presidential approval ratings show the same pattern: in the spring before Truman's 1948 run, two-thirds of Democrats and half of Republicans approved of him, but by Nixon the partisan approval gap had grown to 47 points, and by Obama's time it had expanded to 72 points. Recent data shows this gap at 80 points in Trump approval along party lines, the highest recorded in the modern polling era, compared to 70 points for Obama and 60 points for Clinton.

The U.S. is an outlier globally

Comparative research across democracies finds America's trajectory is unusual. Studying long-term trends in affective polarization across nine countries, researchers found that affective polarization increased more dramatically in the U.S. since the late 1970s than in the U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden. More recent analysis confirms this: the state of U.S. affective polarization has been described as "political sectarianism," and researchers argue that U.S. affective polarization is exceptional, having suffered the largest increase over the last 40 years among OECD countries.

Ideological polarization and sorting have also grown

Beyond just feelings, actual ideological positions have diverged: today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican — a level of separation that essentially didn't exist decades ago. The share of Americans holding consistently extreme views has also doubled: the proportion of individuals expressing consistently conservative or liberal opinions increased from 10% in 1994 to 21% in 2014, while ideological overlap between political partisans significantly declined over the same period.

Geographic sorting has intensified too — Americans increasingly live among the politically like-minded, with the share of Americans in "landslide counties" growing from 39% in 1992 to 57% in 2024, limiting cross-partisan exposure.

Hostility and perceived threat have reached alarming levels

Recent surveys capture just how personal this has become: 80% of partisans believe the other party "poses a threat that if not stopped will destroy America as we know it," 77% of voters believe Americans who strongly support the other side are "a clear and present danger" to America, and 45% think members of the opposing party are "downright evil." A 2026 data brief similarly found that since 2013, the share of Americans who say talking politics with people they disagree with is stressful or frustrating has risen from about 45% to more than 60%, with similar increases among Democrats and Republicans. Pessimism about bridging divides has also grown: since 2017, majorities of the public have expressed doubt that Americans with different political views can come together, with pessimism reaching nearly 70% in 2025.

Satisfaction with government itself has hit new lows along partisan lines. A 2026 Gallup-based analysis found Democrats' satisfaction with the system of government at a historic low for either party—a mere 12%, compared with 24% of independents and 52% of Republicans—the first time in 25 years any party dipped below 20% satisfaction.

An important nuance: issue polarization vs. affective polarization

Interestingly, polarization isn't uniform across every dimension. While Americans increasingly despise the other side, they often still agree on specific policies. One 2026 analysis noted: issue polling consistently shows broad agreement that cuts across partisan lines on many specific policies—79% support Medicare drug price negotiation, 76% support protecting pre-existing conditions coverage, 74% support the PACT Act for veterans, 70% support marijuana decriminalization, and 64% support background checks for gun purchases. This suggests the "paradox" of modern polarization: Americans disagree less on substance than you'd think, but distrust and dislike each other more than ever based on tribal identity.

Bottom line

By nearly every measure researchers track — feelings toward the opposing party, belief that the other side is a threat to democracy or "immoral," ideological sorting, and willingness to compromise — current data suggests polarization is indeed worse than in recent historical memory, and the U.S. stands out globally in how fast and far this has progressed over the last four decades. The one caveat is that this is driven more by affective polarization (tribal animosity) than by genuine disagreement on policy substance, where cross-partisan consensus often still exists.