Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by many key metrics—especially since the late 20th century—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been in recent decades, though it is not unprecedented in American history when viewed over the longer term (e.g., the Civil War era). Polarization takes multiple forms (ideological/issue-based differences, affective/emotional animosity toward the other side, elite/congressional vs. mass public, and partisan sorting), and trends vary somewhat by measure. Data consistently show increases in recent decades, driven by factors like partisan sorting, elite cues, media fragmentation (including social media), demographic realignments, and events around 2008 onward.[1]

Recent Trends (Past 30–50 Years)

Pew data also show growing shares with unfavorable views of both parties and widening gaps in presidential approval and other attitudes. Partisan identity increasingly overlaps with other social identities (race, religion, geography, education), amplifying divides.[4]

Some nuances: One line of research finds “latent” value-based clusters (e.g., moral/religious) relatively stable long-term, with rising partisan polarization reflecting better sorting of people into parties that match their values rather than entirely new value splits. Issue polarization may have leveled somewhat after 2020 in the Cambridge data, but remains elevated. Democratic voters have shown some increased heterogeneity post-2010 in certain multidimensional analyses.[5]

Longer Historical Context

America has experienced intense divisions before:

Today’s polarization rivals or exceeds post-WWII or mid-20th-century levels on many metrics and feels particularly intense due to: equal-sized left/right coalitions (unusual globally per the Cambridge study); nationalized, media-saturated politics with fragmented information environments; geographic sorting (red/blue states/districts with diverging policies); and declining trust in institutions. Political violence has risen from low baselines but remains far below 1960s–70s or Civil War levels. The U.S. stands out among wealthy Western democracies for “pernicious” polarization levels in some comparative data (rising since ~1990s/2005).[8]

Drivers and Caveats

Common explanations include elite-driven sorting and cues, realignment after the civil rights era and culture wars (gradual on issues like abortion/LGBTQ rights since the late 1970s), economic/cultural changes, media (cable news, internet, social media amplifying extremes and animosity post-~2008), and demographic shifts. Some asymmetry exists depending on the measure/period (e.g., public leftward shift on social issues vs. Republican elite rightward move; varying affective changes). Polarization is not purely “both sides equally” or inevitable—it can ebb (e.g., slight recent leveling in some issue data)—and public opinion on many issues has overall liberalized even as divides widen.

In short, relative to the living memory of most Americans and the post-1960s/1970s era, yes—polarization (especially affective and partisan) is worse, contributing to gridlock, eroded norms, and heightened tensions. It is not the worst in U.S. history, and underlying societal resilience has allowed navigation of past crises. Trends are well-documented by sources like Pew, ANES, academic studies (Cambridge, Nature Human Behaviour, etc.), but measurement depends on definitions, and causation is multifaceted. Global polarization has also risen in many places, though patterns differ.