Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4][5]Yes, in multiple measurable ways—particularly in the United States—political polarization is worse than it has been for much of the recent past (roughly the mid-20th century through the 1980s/1990s), though it is not unprecedented in American history and comparisons depend on the type of polarization and the time frame.[2]

Polarization is multi-dimensional: ideological/issue (disagreement on policy), affective (emotional dislike/animosity toward the other side), elite (politicians/parties), and mass (public). Data from sources like DW-NOMINATE (congressional voting), American National Election Studies (ANES), Pew Research, V-Dem, and recent academic studies show clear increases on several fronts.

Elite and Congressional Polarization

In Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with virtually no overlap between the least liberal Democrat and least conservative Republican in the House since the early 2000s (down from substantial overlap decades earlier). Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center, though the shift has been asymmetric—Republicans moved further right overall since the 1970s, while Democrats became somewhat more liberal.[1]

DW-NOMINATE scores (which scale roll-call votes on a liberal-conservative dimension) show polarization declining from the early 20th century into the mid-20th century (aided by conservative Southern Democrats), remaining relatively low until the mid-1970s, then rising steadily and sharply. Current levels approach highs last seen in the late 19th/early 20th century Gilded Age period in some analyses. Bipartisan cooperation and split-ticket voting have collapsed to historic lows.[1]

Mass Issue and Ideological Polarization

A 2026 Cambridge University study using ANES data (1988–2024) and clustering algorithms found that divisions on social and political issues rose 64% overall, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (flat in the 1990s/early 2000s). The left-wing cluster became substantially more progressive (about 31.5% more socially liberal), while the right moved only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Separation between clusters increased; sorting into partisan/ideological labels also rose. Polarization may have slightly leveled off after 2020 but remains far higher than pre-2008 levels.[2]

Other analyses confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more distant on fundamental issues over the past 30 years, with both moving from the center (at different rates). Partisan sorting by demographics (race, income, geography, education) has increased, even if some within-group heterogeneity persists.[6]

Affective Polarization and Social Hostility

Animosity toward the opposing party has surged. “Feeling thermometer” scores (warmth toward own vs. other party) show growing gaps, with negative partisanship (dislike of the out-party) rising notably after ~1980, accelerating after 1990/2008/2016 in many democracies, and especially pronounced in the US.[3]

Examples include large shares of partisans unwilling to have a child marry someone from the other party, and politics straining personal/family relationships more. V-Dem data on “political polarization” (society divided into hostile camps where differences undermine social relationships, e.g., reluctance to interact friendly across lines) show the US rising sharply since ~1990/2005, reaching “pernicious” levels (high hostility) around 2015 and remaining elevated—unique in duration among long-standing wealthy Western liberal democracies. Only brief spikes occurred in peers like France (1968) or Italy (1970s). Polarization has risen worldwide since 2005 in most regions, but the US stands out.[4]

Historical and Global Context

Caveats and Nuances

In short, compared to the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century that many remember as a baseline, yes—elite ideological distance, mass issue separation (especially post-2008), affective animosity, and social camp hostility are significantly worse. This makes governance harder (gridlock, eroded norms/trust) and is concerning for democratic health, even if the US has survived deeper crises before. Data consistently support elevated current levels relative to the recent past.