Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4]Yes, in key measurable ways—especially elite/party polarization, public issue divides, and affective (emotional) polarization—U.S. political polarization is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly post-1970s or since the late 1980s), and it stands out as unusually high and persistent among wealthy Western democracies. It is not worse than the Civil War era in terms of violence, secession, or existential stakes, and the 1960s featured more widespread unrest, but today’s polarization is nationalized along party lines, amplified by media and sorting, and accompanied by eroded institutional trust in ways that make it particularly dysfunctional.[5]

Elite and Congressional Polarization

Congressional parties are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, according to DW-NOMINATE scores (which scale legislators based on roll-call votes for cross-time comparability). There is essentially no ideological overlap between the least liberal Democrats and least conservative Republicans in the House since around 2002 (and Senate shortly after); decades ago, there were dozens to over 100 moderates overlapping. Both parties have moved from the center (Republicans more so on average in many analyses), becoming more internally cohesive. Polarization has roots going back to the 1970s (e.g., realignment of Southern conservatives) but has accelerated. It is at post-Reconstruction highs in these metrics.[1]

Public Opinion and Issue Polarization

Geographic, demographic, educational, and cultural sorting has reinforced this: parties increasingly represent distinct coalitions (e.g., by education, race/ethnicity, urban/rural).

Affective Polarization (Dislike and Distrust of the Other Side)

This has risen substantially since the 1980s/1990s. ANES feeling thermometer data show the gap between warmth toward one’s own party and coldness toward the other has roughly doubled (from the low 20s to 40–50+ points), driven mostly by rising out-party animus rather than greater in-party love. Disapproval of a child marrying someone from the other party jumped from ~4–5% in 1960 to 50–60%+ more recently. Partisans increasingly view the other side as a threat, hypocritical, or closed-minded, and this exceeds animus toward many other social groups in some measures. The U.S. has seen one of the largest increases among established democracies.[8]

Broader Societal and Institutional Measures

V-Dem data (expert-coded) on societal polarization into hostile camps show the U.S. rising sharply since ~1990/2005 to “pernicious” levels (near the top of a 0–4 scale, e.g., ~3.5–3.8+) by the mid-2010s onward—unique in duration and intensity among long-standing wealthy Western democracies (most peers stay much lower; rare historical spikes like France 1968 were brief). The world average has risen modestly, but the U.S. stands out. Confidence in institutions (presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, media) has eroded, becoming more partisan, even as partisanship itself on approval/satisfaction has been elevated for decades.[9]

Historical Comparisons

Today’s version is distinctive for its clean party-line sorting, 24/7 media/social media amplification, negative partisanship (politics as “anti” the other side), and perception of elections as existential—making governance more gridlocked even without the violence of past peaks. Some analysts call it the most dangerous since the Civil War due to the partisan nature; others note it is not unprecedented in intensity of feeling but is uniquely sustained in a modern democracy.[11]

Nuances and Global Context

Polarization is multi-dimensional (ideological, affective, issue-based, elite vs. mass). Mass public views remain less extreme than elites or activists in some absolute senses, and there is still a large (if shrinking) moderate/center. Causes debated include realignment, inequality, cable news/social media (echo chambers, outrage incentives), elite cues, demographic change, and events like 2008 (financial crisis + Obama + smartphones/social media). It is not purely symmetric. Globally, affective/“us vs. them” polarization has risen in many places since ~2005, but the U.S. is an outlier in scale among peers.[12]

In short: Relative to the late 20th century and early 2000s, yes—measurably and significantly worse on core metrics, with real consequences for trust, governance, and social relations. Relative to the full sweep of U.S. history, it is high but not the absolute peak of division or violence. Trends can reverse (as they have in other countries or U.S. eras), but recent patterns show persistence.