Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most standard modern measures—particularly in the United States—political polarization is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly since the mid-to-late 20th century), though it is not unprecedented when viewed against deeper American history like the Civil War era. Metrics covering ideological/issue positions, affective (emotional) dislike, elite/congressional behavior, and societal "us vs. them" hostility generally show increases, with acceleration in some cases after the 1990s or especially post-2008. Global trends are more mixed, with rises in many places but the U.S. standing out among long-standing wealthy democracies for intensity and duration.[1]

Key Dimensions and Evidence

Polarization is multi-faceted. Here is a breakdown of major types with supporting data:

•Issue/Ideological Polarization (public positions on policies): A 2026 University of Cambridge study (using American National Election Studies/ANES data from 1988–2024 and clustering algorithms) found that the "separation" between left- and right-leaning opinion clusters in the U.S. rose 64% overall. Nearly all of this occurred after 2008 (relatively flat from 1988–2008), driven primarily by the left-leaning cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (about 31.5% more progressive on measured issues by 2024), while the right-leaning cluster stayed largely stable (only ~2.8% more conservative). Gaps widened across issues like abortion, traditional values, health insurance, and race/discrimination. Clusters remained roughly equal in size and internally cohesive; sorting into party/ideological labels also increased. Polarization may have begun leveling off by 2024 but remains far higher than earlier decades. The same methods found no clear global rise in issue polarization across dozens of countries.[2]

Other analyses (e.g., of ANES and related data) confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more ideologically distant over the past ~30 years, with both moving from the center (at different rates) and greater consistency in views.[3]

•Affective Polarization (dislike/animosity toward the other side): ANES feeling thermometer data (ratings of parties/partisans from 0–100, where 50 is neutral) show a clear long-term rise. In-party ratings have stayed relatively stable and positive (often around 70). Out-party ratings have fallen sharply—from near-neutral (~45–50 in the late 1970s/1980s) to much colder levels (~20 or lower in recent years like 2020–2024). The gap (affective polarization) has roughly doubled in many series, from ~25 points historically to ~50+ recently, reaching record highs in the modern polling era. This reflects growing negative partisanship (dislike of the out-party as a stronger motivator than liking one’s own). Trends appear in multiple countries but are especially pronounced in the U.S.[4]

•Elite/Congressional Polarization: DW-NOMINATE scores (based on roll-call votes) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years. Both parties have become more internally cohesive (far fewer moderates: ~2 dozen today vs. 160+ in the early 1970s), with vanishing ideological overlap since the early 2000s. Democrats shifted modestly left; Republicans shifted more substantially right. Geographic/demographic realignments (e.g., Southern shift to Republicans; increasing diversity among Democrats) reinforced this. Roots go back decades to the post-civil rights realignment.[5]

•Broader Societal/Political Camp Polarization (V-Dem and similar): Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data measure the extent to which political differences create hostile camps that undermine social relationships (e.g., reluctance to interact across lines in family, work, or civic life). U.S. levels have risen consistently since around 1990, reaching "pernicious" (severe) levels around 2015 and remaining elevated—higher and more sustained than in other advanced Western democracies (only brief near-matches like France 1968 or Italy in the 1970s). Globally, polarization has risen in most regions since ~2005 (except Oceania), often linked to democratic stress, but the U.S. is exceptional among wealthy, long-consolidated democracies. Carnegie analyses note that of historical cases of pernicious polarization in democracies, many led to democratic downgrades.[1]

Additional indicators include: growing partisan gaps in presidential approval (largest in Gallup history in recent decades); declining shares of self-identified moderates; stronger alignment of ideology with party ID; and increased like-minded political discussion networks (though cross-cutting discussion volume has not necessarily fallen).[6]

Historical Context and Nuances

•Vs. recent past (post-WWII/1970s onward): Clear worsening on the above metrics. The mid-20th century had more bipartisan overlap, less sorted parties, and lower measured affective hostility in available data. Polarization built gradually (party sorting, Southern realignment, cultural issues) then accelerated.

•Vs. deeper history: Not necessarily "worse" than peaks like the Civil War (secession, mass violence, fundamental disputes over slavery/union), the 1790s (Federalist-Republican venom), or intense periods of the 1960s–early 1970s (riots, assassinations, Vietnam divides). Some historians note that earlier "less polarized" eras often rested on exclusions (e.g., limited suffrage or consensus on racial hierarchy). Today’s divides feel intense partly because of even party strength, media amplification, and nationalization of politics, but absolute violence/conflict levels remain far lower than historical extremes.[7]

•Drivers and caveats: Commonly cited factors include elite cues/party sorting, media fragmentation/social media, economic/cultural shifts, and events around 2008 (financial crisis, Obama election). Not everything is polarized—Americans still share many views, clusters are "fuzzy," and some cross-cutting ties persist. Perception can outpace reality due to media. Trends can plateau or reverse (as seen in some countries or recent U.S. issue data hints). Polarization correlates with risks to democratic norms/trust but is not destiny.[2]

In short, for the contemporary United States, yes—polarization across issue positions, emotional attitudes, and institutional behavior exceeds levels of the past several decades and is high by comparative standards for peer democracies. It feels acute because the camps are balanced and the hostility is personal/social, not just policy-based. Longer historical comparisons show America has endured (and overcome) deeper fractures, though current patterns raise legitimate concerns about governance, trust, and social cohesion. Data continue to evolve with new surveys and elections.

Citations (7)

1carnegieendowment.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/McCoy_et_al_-_Polarization_final_3.pdf
Backs: “Global trends are more mixed, with rises in many places but the U.S. standing out among long-standing wealthy democracies for intensity and duration.”
2cam.ac.ukAcademic
https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/political-division-united-states
Backs: “The same methods found no clear global rise in issue polarization across dozens of countries.”
3nature.comAcademic
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0
Backs: “Other analyses (e.g., of ANES and related data) confirm Democrats and Republicans have grown more ideologically distant over the past ~30 years, with both moving from the center (at different rates) and greater consistency in views.”
4economist.comNews and mediaquality 0.93
https://www.economist.com/interactive/essay/2024/10/31/when-politics-is-about-hating-the-other-side-democracy-suffers
Backs: “Trends appear in multiple countries but are especially pronounced in the U.S.”
5pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/
Backs: “Geographic/demographic realignments (e.g., Southern shift to Republicans; increasing diversity among Democrats) reinforced this. Roots go back decades to the post-civil rights realignment.”
6gallup.comCompanies
https://news.gallup.com/poll/655190/political-parties-historically-polarized-ideologically.aspx
Backs: “Additional indicators include: growing partisan gaps in presidential approval (largest in Gallup history in recent decades); declining shares of self-identified moderates; stronger alignment of ideology with party ID; and increased like-minded political discussion networks (though cross-cutting discussion volume has…”
7archive.isData and tools
https://archive.is/2026.07.05-104443/https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/05/politics/trump-july-4-america-250-civil-war-analysis
Backs: “Today’s divides feel intense partly because of even party strength, media amplification, and nationalization of politics, but absolute violence/conflict levels remain far lower than historical extremes.”