Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Based on the research, yes — in the United States especially, most measures indicate political polarization is significantly worse than in past decades, though the picture is more nuanced than a simple "worse than ever" narrative.

Affective polarization (how people feel about the other party) has risen sharply

This is the most well-documented trend. In 1978, the average American rated members of their own political party 27 points higher than members of the other major party. By 2016, that gap had grown to 45.9 points — an increase of about 4.8 points per decade. Pew's long-running research confirms this: in 1994, just 17% of Republicans and 16% of Democrats had "very unfavorable" views of the opposing party; by the 2010s that had more than doubled to 43% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats.

More recent data shows this trend continuing. Pew polling found that in 2022, 72% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats viewed the opposing party as more immoral than other Americans—up dramatically from 47% and 35% in 2016. Americans increasingly see the country as more divided than at any time since the Civil War.

The US stands out globally

Notably, this isn't a universal global trend — it's particularly acute in America. Political polarization among Americans has grown rapidly in the last 40 years — more than in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia or Germany. In fact, while polarization also rose in Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland over the same period (though less dramatically), it actually decreased in the UK, Australia, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.

The timing of the surge

Research suggests the sharpest increase is relatively recent. A Cambridge study found that almost all the rise in US polarization over political issues since the late 1980s occurred from 2008 onwards, with polarization having nearly flatlined during the 1990s and 2000s before divisions steadily rose starting in 2008. Interestingly, this same research found the shift is asymmetric: the US left was 31.5% more socially liberal in 2024 compared to 1988, while the US right was only 2.8% more conservative.

Party "sorting" — the tendency to align party identity with ideology — has also intensified. "Sorting" has jumped significantly since the late 1980s; by 2024, 20% more people in the left-wing cluster identified as Democrats, and 51% more called themselves liberals, compared to 1988. Gallup data corroborates this: while Americans' overall ideology held steady in 2024, the shares of Republicans identifying as conservative and Democrats as liberal reached new highs.

An important caveat: feelings vs. actual policy differences

Not all polarization is equal, and some experts push back on the "worse than ever" framing when it comes to substantive policy. Political scientist Frances Lee argues that that doesn't mean politicians are farther apart on policy issues than in the past. She points out that what many measurements actually show is that politicians' voting behavior has become more predictable and strictly partisan — unlike, for example, the bipartisan support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act — rather than proof that underlying policy gaps have widened.

Similarly, some researchers note a perception gap: polarization in the US can feel much worse than it actually is, since groups have moved apart on issues but people often overestimate how divided things are.

Bottom line

By nearly every measure of affective polarization (dislike, distrust, and moral condemnation of the opposing party), the US is more divided than at almost any point in the last century, with the trend accelerating notably since 2008. However, whether actual policy positions have diverged as much is more contested — much of what looks like extreme division may reflect stricter party-line voting and sorting rather than genuinely wider ideological gaps on issues themselves. The US is also somewhat of an outlier globally; several other established democracies have seen polarization stay flat or even decline over the same period.