Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Leans yes

To answer whether political polarization is worse today than in the past, it helps to look at American history.

The short answer is no, it is not worse than the absolute peak of American division—the Civil War era—which culminated in secession and a war that killed hundreds of thousands of Americans.

However, by almost every empirical metric, political polarization is worse today than at any point since the Reconstruction and Gilded Age eras of the late 19th century. It is also vastly more intense than it was during the mid-20th century, which many people remember as an era of bipartisan cooperation.

A breakdown of how today's polarization compares to the past involves examining several distinct eras and types of political division:

1. The Ultimate Peak: The Civil War (1850s–1860s)

The division of the 1850s was both structurally and ideologically absolute. The nation split over existential, deeply moral issues—chiefly slavery and federal sovereignty.

•The Division: This polarization was regional and institutional, eventually shattering the national party systems. Compromise became impossible because both sides viewed the other's positions as an existential threat to their way of life.

•The Outcome: The polarization resulted in armed conflict, the collapse of democratic governance in half the country, and more than 600,000 deaths. Today’s political gridlock and hostility, while severe, have not yet reached this level of systemic breakdown.

2. High Historic Benchmarks: The Gilded Age (1870s–1890s)

Following Reconstruction, the U.S. entered another era of intense polarization.

•The Division: Driven by rapid industrialization, massive wealth inequality, and debates over monetary policy and labor, the parties became highly hostile.

•The Outcome: This era was defined by "constitutional hardball" and fierce partisan fighting in Congress. However, unlike the Civil War, the Gilded Age divisions did not threaten to dissolve the Union, and the parties eventually depolarized in the early 20th century as the country unified around progressive reforms and, later, world wars.

3. The Mid-20th Century "Anomaly" (1940s–1970s)

When people complain that polarization is "worse than it used to be," they are usually comparing today to the mid-20th century. However, political scientists view this period of low polarization as a historical anomaly.

•The Setup: During this time, the Democratic and Republican parties were not ideologically sorted. The Democratic Party contained both highly conservative Southern Democrats and highly liberal Northern Democrats. The Republican Party had conservative Midwesterners and liberal Northeasterners.

•The Result: This lack of sorting forced cross-party coalitions to get anything done, creating an era of high bipartisanship and legislative productivity. However, this "civility" had a dark side: it was largely maintained by keeping civil rights and racial justice off the national legislative agenda to keep Southern Democrats in the coalition.

4. Why Today's Polarization Feels Uniquely Dangerous

While not as bloody as the 1860s, modern polarization has several distinct features that make it feel—and in some ways act—worse than past eras:

•Complete Ideological "Sorting": Since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and the Reagan era of the 1980s, the parties have completely sorted. Conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans have virtually vanished. Today, roll-call voting data (measured by political scientists using "NOMINATE" scores) shows that the ideological gap between the average Democrat and Republican in Congress is wider than at any point since the 1870s.

•"Affective" Polarization (Hostility): Scholars separate ideological polarization (disagreeing on policy) from affective polarization (how much you actively dislike and fear the other side). Affective polarization has skyrocketed. Pew Research data shows that the share of Democrats and Republicans who view the opposing party not just as wrong, but as "immoral" and a threat to the nation's well-being, has doubled over the last few decades.

•Identity Alignment: In the past, a person might have been a conservative, a churchgoer, a union member, and a Democrat all at once (overlapping identities). Today, social, geographic, racial, religious, and educational identities have almost completely aligned with partisan identities. If you know someone's level of education, where they live (rural vs. urban), and their religious habits, you can predict their political party with high accuracy. When party identity becomes tied to personal identity, political compromise feels like a betrayal of who you are.

•Asymmetrical Shifts: Modern polarization is not entirely symmetrical. Congressional data shows that Republican elites have moved further to the right over the past four decades than Democrats have moved to the left. Conversely, public polling shows that the American electorate has seen major shifts on social issues largely driven by left-leaning voters becoming significantly more socially liberal since 2008, while right-leaning voters' social views have remained relatively stable.

Is This Happening Everywhere?

No. While polarization is a global challenge, comparative studies show the U.S. is an outlier. A landmark study by Brown University found that while affective polarization has risen moderately in countries like Canada and Switzerland, it actually decreased over the late 20th and early 21st centuries in countries like the U.K., Germany, and Sweden. The U.S. has experienced a faster and more severe increase in partisan hostility than any other comparable Western democracy.

Summary

If "worse" means physical violence and the collapse of the state, then polarization was worse during the Civil War. But if "worse" means the highest levels of systemic gridlock, partisan sorting, and mutual social animosity in modern history, then yes: political polarization is worse today than it has been in roughly 150 years.

Citations (8)

1brookings.eduNonprofits and think tanks
brookings.edu
Backs: “The short answer is no, it is not worse than the absolute peak of American division—the Civil War era—which culminated in secession and a war that killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. However, by almost every empirical metric, political polarization is worse today than at any point since the Reconstruction and…”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Polarization today is not worse than the Civil War era, which ended in secession and a war killing hundreds of thousands.
2democracyproject.orgNonprofits and think tanks
democracyproject.org
Backs: “The short answer is no, it is not worse than the absolute peak of American division—the Civil War era—which culminated in secession and a war that killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. However, by almost every empirical metric, political polarization is worse today than at any point since the Reconstruction and…”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Polarization today is not worse than the Civil War era, which ended in secession and a war killing hundreds of thousands.
3usc.eduAcademic
usc.edu
Backs: “However, by almost every empirical metric, political polarization is worse today than at any point since the Reconstruction and Gilded Age eras of the late 19th century. It is also vastly more intense than it was during the mid-20th century, which many people remember as an era of bipartisan cooperation.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: By almost every empirical metric, polarization is worse today than at any point since Reconstruction and the Gilded Age.
4oup.comAcademic
oup.com
Backs: “High Historic Benchmarks: The Gilded Age (1870s–1890s). Following Reconstruction, the U.S. entered another era of intense polarization. The Division: Driven by rapid industrialization, massive wealth inequality, and debates over monetary policy and labor, the parties became highly hostile.”
background, article, neutral. Claim: After Reconstruction, the Gilded Age was another era of intense polarization.
5brown.eduAcademic
brown.edu
Backs: “The Setup: During this time, the Democratic and Republican parties were not ideologically sorted. The Democratic Party contained both highly conservative Southern Democrats and highly liberal Northern Democrats.”
evidence, article, points to yes. Claim: In the mid-20th century parties were not ideologically sorted, so polarization was lower than today.
6wikipedia.orgEncyclopedias and referencequality 0.83
wikipedia.org
Backs: “The Setup: During this time, the Democratic and Republican parties were not ideologically sorted. The Democratic Party contained both highly conservative Southern Democrats and highly liberal Northern Democrats.”
background, reference entry, points to yes. Claim: In the mid-20th century parties were not ideologically sorted, so polarization was lower than today.
7syr.eduAcademic
syr.edu
Backs: “Pew Research data shows that the share of Democrats and Republicans who view the opposing party not just as wrong, but as "immoral" and a threat to the nation's well-being, has doubled over the last few decades. Identity Alignment: In the past, a person might have been a conservative, a churchgoer, a union member, and…”
statistic, article, points to yes. Claim: Share of partisans viewing the opposing party as immoral and a threat to the nation has doubled over recent decades.
8cam.ac.ukAcademic
cam.ac.uk
Backs: “Conversely, public polling shows that the American electorate has seen major shifts on social issues largely driven by left-leaning voters becoming significantly more socially liberal since 2008, while right-leaning voters' social views have remained relatively stable. Is This Happening Everywhere?”
evidence, article, neutral. Claim: Public polling shows left-leaning voters became more socially liberal since 2008 while right-leaning voters' social views stayed stable.