Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
The WHO JEE and Biden White House report describe strong US capacities and progress, while the Biodefense Commission, GAO and former CDC officials conclude the US is unprepared or less prepared than before.
No, the US is not fully prepared for another pandemic or widespread health crisis, though it has made incremental improvements in some areas since COVID-19. Assessments from bipartisan commissions, government watchdogs, former officials, and international evaluations consistently highlight persistent gaps in leadership, sustained funding, workforce, surveillance consistency, supply chains, and public trust, compounded by recent staffing and budget reductions.[1]
Progress Since COVID-19
The Biden-Harris administration (through early 2025) implemented reforms based on COVID lessons:
CDC testimony and frameworks (e.g., Public Health Response Readiness) emphasized modernized data, lab partnerships (“warm bases”), modeling, and all-hazards planning.[3]
Persistent and Growing Gaps
Experts emphasize a “panic and neglect” cycle: temporary COVID surge funding expired without converting gains into durable infrastructure.[5]
Recent Developments (2025–2026)
Policy shifts under the current administration have reversed or stalled many gains, according to former CDC officials, experts, and reports:
Bottom Line
The US has stronger stockpiles, better digital surveillance tools, and more institutional knowledge than in early 2020, and high-end technical capacities scored well in the 2024 JEE. However, it lacks the sustained funding, unified leadership, robust and stable workforce, resilient supply chains, equitable local infrastructure, and public trust needed for a rapid, effective, large-scale response. A severe respiratory pandemic, novel pathogen, or engineered threat could again overwhelm systems, especially with concurrent disasters or eroded global cooperation.
Preparedness is a continuous process requiring bipartisan commitment beyond crisis moments. Without reversing recent erosions and fully implementing recommendations (e.g., from the Biodefense Commission), the risk of high mortality, economic damage, and societal disruption remains elevated. Ongoing threats like H5N1 underscore the urgency.
Citations (12)
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “Assessments from bipartisan commissions, government watchdogs, former officials, and international evaluations consistently highlight persistent gaps in leadership, sustained funding, workforce, surveillance consistency, supply chains, and public trust, compounded by recent staffing and budget reductions.”
evidence, official document, points to no. Claim: Bipartisan commission found the nation dangerously vulnerable and unprepared, with persistent gaps in leadership, funding and workforce, and fragmented responsibility.
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “It has supported responses to H5N1, mpox, and others by distributing PPE, antivirals (e.g., oseltamivir), vaccines, and therapeutics.”
statistic, official document, points to yes. Claim: Strategic National Stockpile restocked with ~70x more N95s and other supplies; permanent pandemic preparedness office (OPPR) created.
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “Wastewater surveillance and other tools improved early detection.”
statistic, official document, points to yes. Claim: Electronic case reporting grew from under 200 facilities to over 45,000; most hospital EDs provide syndromic data; CDC readiness frameworks.
- https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/380155/9789240105409-eng.pdf?sequence=1sask
Backs: “Strengths included labs, surveillance, immunization, and emergency management, with recommendations focused on financing sustainability, state/local/tribal/territorial (SLTT) alignment, workforce, community trust/risk communication, and equity.”
evidence, official document, points to yes. Claim: WHO Joint External Evaluation in 2024 scored the US relatively highly across IHR core capacities, with recommendations on financing and workforce.
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105891
Backs: “Experts emphasize a “panic and neglect” cycle: temporary COVID surge funding expired without converting gains into durable infrastructure.”
evidence, official document, points to no. Claim: Panic and neglect cycle: temporary COVID funding expired without creating durable infrastructure.
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “Hospital/surge capacity, supply chain resilience (especially domestic manufacturing), and state/local variation remain issues. Public health workforce attrition and burnout continue.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Hundreds of COVID recommendations unimplemented; surge capacity, supply chain, state variation and workforce attrition remain issues.
- https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/smallpox/national-academies-report-says-us-not-ready-intentional-accidental-smallpox-outbreak
Backs: “H5N1 (bird flu in cattle/poultry) exposed testing/coordination gaps between agriculture and health sectors, plus trust issues.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: National Academies found the US not ready for a smallpox outbreak; H5N1 exposed testing and coordination gaps.
- https://www.tfah.org/report-details/funding-2024/
Backs: “Global efforts (e.g., Pandemic Fund, WHO agreements) face US engagement fluctuations.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Chronic underfunding of core public health and other structural challenges hinder response.
- https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/22/cdc-cuts-disease-outbreaks-cyclospora-hantavirus-measles
Backs: “Programs for parasites (e.g., cyclospora lab downsized), neglected tropical diseases, wastewater surveillance (proposed deep cuts), and others gutted or left as “zombie” programs (funded but unstaffed).”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Major CDC staffing cuts and gutted or unstaffed programs reduce outbreak response capacity.
- https://globalbiodefense.com/2026/04/07/white-house-fy2027-budget-would-cut-cdc-funding-by-40-eliminate-dozens-of-public-health-programs/
Backs: “Deep cuts to CDC (~40% in one FY2027 request), Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) grants, Hospital Preparedness Program elimination in some plans, BARDA/mRNA R&D wind-downs or reductions, and biodefense/pandemic focus at NIH/NIAID.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Budget proposals would cut CDC funding by about 40% and eliminate preparedness programs.
- https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/states-and-medical-societies-are-stepping-up-to-fill-the-cdcs-data-void/
Backs: “USAID dissolution/reorganization disrupted global health security partnerships and outbreak support. Reduced WHO engagement.”
evidence, article, points to no. Claim: Dozens of CDC databases paused or offline; USAID dissolution disrupted global health security partnerships.
- https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/world/2026/05/30/ebola-shows-world-unprepared-for-pandemic-former-cdc-head-tom-frieden/90334655007/
Backs: “SNS sustainment continues but faces budget pressures; new initiatives exist for pharma APIs/supply chains, but overall capacity is strained.”
attribution, article, points to no. Claim: Former CDC leaders like Tom Frieden say the US is less prepared than before COVID, with defenses down.