Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Is Political Polarization Worse Than It's Been in the Past?

The answer depends on how you measure it and what time frame you're comparing to—but by most modern metrics, yes, especially in the U.S., current polarization is at or near historic highs for the post-WWII era, even if it may not exceed the most extreme historical periods like the Civil War era.

Congressional/Elite Polarization: Clearly at Modern Highs

By objective measures of how lawmakers vote, polarization has been rising steadily for decades. A Pew Research Center analysis finds that, on average, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years. This isn't a recent spike—it's a long-term trend: both parties have grown more ideologically cohesive. There are now only about two dozen moderate Democrats and Republicans left on Capitol Hill, versus more than 160 in 1971-72. Both parties have moved further away from the ideological center since the early 1970s.

Similarly, following a period of a much more balanced Congress during the middle of the 20th century, ideological distance between the parties began to grow during the 1970s to the extent that Congress is now more polarized than at any time since the late 1870s Reconstruction Era.

Important Caveat: Not Necessarily the Most Extreme in History

Some political scientists urge caution about "worst ever" framing. Some political scientists have pointed out that viewed within the context of data from the last two centuries, today's levels of polarization are not such an alarming anomaly compared to those occurring during the time of slavery and similar points along the historical continuum. But this information can still tell us a lot about our current state of affairs.

There's also debate about what kind of polarization is increasing. Political scientist Frances Lee argues that doesn't mean politicians are farther apart on policy issues than in the past—while some measurements suggest more division, what they actually show is simply that the voting behavior of politicians has become more predictable. Unlike the bipartisan support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, today's politicians tend to vote strictly with their party on divisive topics.

Affective Polarization (How Much People Dislike the Other Side): Sharply Rising

This is where the data is most striking. Americans don't just disagree on policy more—they increasingly dislike and distrust people from the other party on a personal level. On affective measures, polarization is at historic highs: the share of Republicans who view Democrats as "very unfavorable" has risen from 17% in 1994 to 62% in 2024, and the mirror image for Democrats is nearly identical.

Recent polling reinforces this: Pew Research Center polling reveals a sharp rise in partisan hostility: in 2022, 72% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats viewed the opposing party as more immoral than other Americans—up dramatically from 47% and 35% in 2016. Notably, Americans increasingly see the country as more divided than at any time since the Civil War.

As of the current political moment, partisan gaps in views of leadership are also historically wide—one analysis notes an 80-point partisan gap in Trump approval (90% R / 8-10% D) — highest recorded in modern polling era; compares to 70pt for Obama, 60pt for Clinton.

Interesting Wrinkle: Policy vs. Identity Polarization

One of the more counterintuitive findings is that Americans agree more on actual policy than the rhetoric suggests. Issue polarization tells a different story: 79% support Medicare drug negotiation, 76% pre-existing conditions protections, 70% marijuana decriminalization — across party lines. The real divide is described as a gap between affective polarization (how much Americans dislike and distrust the other party) and issue polarization (how much Americans actually disagree on policy)—meaning people may hate the "other side" more than they actually disagree with them on substance.

Contributing Factors

Researchers point to geographic and social sorting as accelerants: geographic sorting is accelerating: the share of Americans in "landslide counties" grew from 39% (1992) to 57% (2024), limiting cross-partisan exposure. Media and information environments also play a role, as politically motivated leaders, charged rhetoric and a difficult-to-parse digital information environment make it easy for people to blame everything they're experiencing on the other side.

Bottom Line

If you're asking about the modern era (last 50-150 years), the evidence strongly supports that both elite/congressional polarization and mass public affective polarization (dislike/distrust of the other side) are at or near historic highs. If you're asking about all of American history, some scholars caution that periods like the Civil War era or Reconstruction may have been more extreme by certain measures—though direct comparison is difficult given how differently "polarization" showed up then versus now.