Is the US prepared to deal with another pandemic or widespread health crisis?
The US is better prepared than before COVID-19 in several key areas but remains incompletely ready for another major pandemic or widespread health crisis, with significant gaps in sustained funding, coordination, workforce, and systemic resilience that experts warn leave the nation vulnerable.[1][2]
Progress stems from lessons learned and investments during and after the COVID-19 response (which caused over 1 million US deaths). However, bipartisan commissions, GAO reports, and independent analyses consistently highlight unfinished business, temporary gains that risk eroding, and structural issues. The Global Health Security (GHS) Index has ranked the US first among 195 countries (e.g., ~75.9–83.5 overall in recent editions), reflecting strong paper capacities in detection, prevention, and health systems, but this did not prevent a poor COVID outcome due to factors like public trust, equity, politics, and implementation failures—and no country scores in the highest preparedness tier.[3][4]
Key Improvements
CDC testimony and administration reports emphasize these as building response-ready core capabilities in labs, workforce surge, and analytics.[6]
Persistent Gaps and Challenges
Overall Assessment
The US has stronger stockpiles, better real-time data/surveillance, improved MCM development pathways, and dedicated structures than in early 2020, enabling a potentially faster and more effective initial response to many threats (as seen in mpox or H5N1 support). It ranks highly on capacity metrics. However, it is not fully prepared for a severe novel pandemic or multi-hazard crisis: gains are fragile without sustained funding and political will; coordination remains imperfect; local readiness varies; and non-technical factors (trust, equity, polarization) could again undermine technical strengths. A “worse than COVID” event remains a realistic risk without fuller implementation of reforms.[16]
Preparedness is an ongoing process, not a destination. Sustained bipartisan investment, clearer authorities, permanent infrastructure/workforce support, domestic supply chain resilience, and addressing social determinants would close remaining gaps. Recent responses show capability, but experts across the spectrum urge treating biodefense as a continuous national security priority rather than a post-crisis afterthought.
Citations (16)
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/report-the-biden-harris-administration-roadmap-for-pandemic-preparedness-and-response/
Backs: “The US is better prepared than before COVID-19 in several key areas but remains incompletely ready for another major pandemic or widespread health crisis, with significant gaps in sustained funding, coordination, workforce, and systemic resilience that experts warn leave the nation vulnerable.”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/the-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/
Backs: “The US is better prepared than before COVID-19 in several key areas but remains incompletely ready for another major pandemic or widespread health crisis, with significant gaps in sustained funding, coordination, workforce, and systemic resilience that experts warn leave the nation vulnerable.”
- https://ghsindex.org/country/united-states/
Backs: “The Global Health Security (GHS) Index has ranked the US first among 195 countries (e.g., ~75.9–83.5 overall in recent editions), reflecting strong paper capacities in detection, prevention, and health systems, but this did not prevent a poor COVID outcome due to factors like public trust, equity, politics, and…”
- https://sites.uci.edu/energyobserver/2021/12/09/the-global-health-security-index-2021-for-pandemic-and-flu-preparedness/
Backs: “The Global Health Security (GHS) Index has ranked the US first among 195 countries (e.g., ~75.9–83.5 overall in recent editions), reflecting strong paper capacities in detection, prevention, and health systems, but this did not prevent a poor COVID outcome due to factors like public trust, equity, politics, and…”
- https://www.aspr.gov/readiness-response/medical-countermeasures-biodefense/sns/stockpile-products/inventory-overview
Backs: “It has supported responses to H5N1, mpox, and others, with ongoing sustainment for antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, PPE, and more.”
- https://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/2024/t20241114.htm
Backs: “CDC has advanced data platforms (e.g., One CDC Data Platform, Respiratory Illnesses Data Channel), forecasting/modeling via the Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, and wastewater/other novel sources.”
- https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/11/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-global-health-security-annual-report-demonstrating-the-impact-of-united-states-leadership-and-investments/
Backs: “The Biden administration’s end-of-term roadmap documented these as a foundation for future responses.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105891
Backs: “PAHPA reauthorization and other authorities have faced delays or shortfalls.”
- https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/covid-19/new-gao-report-details-challenges-sustained-investment-emergency-readiness
Backs: “PAHPA reauthorization and other authorities have faced delays or shortfalls.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105733
Backs: “Many interagency exercises and plans exist, but monitoring of results, prioritization, and SLTT (state/local/tribal/territorial) alignment lag. Jurisdictional turf issues and ambiguities persist.”
- https://www.stimson.org/2024/prepare-for-the-next-biothreat-now/
Backs: “HHS has open priority recommendations in emergency preparedness.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107175
Backs: “HHS has open priority recommendations in emergency preparedness.”
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107588
Backs: “HHS has open priority recommendations in emergency preparedness.”
- https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2406427
Backs: “Critiques of early H5N1 (avian flu in cattle) handling noted potential failure to fully apply COVID lessons.”
- https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/380155/9789240105409-eng.pdf?sequence=1sask
Backs: “Critiques of early H5N1 (avian flu in cattle) handling noted potential failure to fully apply COVID lessons.”
- https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Blueprint-for-Biodefense-2024_final_.pdf
Backs: “Other analyses (Stimson, NEJM perspectives, GAO) echo that progress has slowed as attention wanes, and root causes (inequities, coordination, trust) run deep.”