Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Short answer: Yes—in several important ways, especially inside Congress and in how partisans feel about one another. But Americans’ policy views have not uniformly moved to the extremes; much of the change is that each party is more internally consistent and “sorted.”

What’s clearly worse

•Congress is at or near modern-record polarization. Using DW‑NOMINATE scores from roll‑call votes, the distance between the parties has risen for decades and is now the highest since at least the end of Reconstruction (late 1800s).[1]

•Affective polarization (how much partisans dislike and distrust the other side) has climbed markedly since the late 20th century and remains high. A 2024 Science Advances study found partisan animosity stayed elevated before and after the 2022 midterms (i.e., it didn’t “cool off” post‑election). Cross‑national work also finds the U.S. among the countries with the largest increases in such animosity.[2]

•Public evaluations of both major parties are unusually negative in recent years, a pattern Pew has documented across multiple surveys.[3]

What’s more mixed

•Mass ideological polarization (people moving to consistently extreme policy positions) is debated. Many studies find more “sorting” (Democrats more uniformly liberal, Republicans more uniformly conservative) and more ideological consistency, but not a wholesale shift of the entire public to extremes. Others do find issue‑specific increases. Net: the public is more sorted and consistent by party, with sharper divides on some topics.[4]

•Scholars agree affective polarization has grown and has important consequences (e.g., lower trust, more tolerance for norm‑breaking), but the exact levels and trends can plateau or vary by measure across years. Reviews from 2019–2024 synthesize this evidence.[5]

Historical perspective

•Compared with most of the 20th century, today’s Congress is more polarized; relative to the 19th‑century crisis eras (e.g., the Civil War period), the comparison is less straightforward, but by modern legislative metrics we are near the top.[1]

Bottom line: Polarization is “worse” in Congress and in partisan feelings than it has been for decades, while the public’s concrete policy views show a mix of greater sorting and issue‑specific divides rather than across‑the‑board extremity. If you’d like, I can show a couple of simple charts that make these patterns clear.

Citations (5)

1voteview.comAcademic
Political Polarization
Backs: “Using DW‑NOMINATE scores from roll‑call votes, the distance between the parties has risen for decades and is now the highest since at least the end of Reconstruction (late 1800s).”
2pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.govAcademic
Persistent polarization: The unexpected durability of political animosity around US elections - PMC
Backs: “Cross‑national work also finds the U.S. among the countries with the largest increases in such animosity.”
3pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
Views of the Republican Party and Democratic Party | Pew Research Center
Backs: “Public evaluations of both major parties are unusually negative in recent years, a pattern Pew has documented across multiple surveys.”
4pewresearch.orgNonprofits and think tanks
Political Polarization in the American Public | Pew Research Center
Backs: “Net: the public is more sorted and consistent by party, with sharper divides on some topics.”
5doi.orgAcademic
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States | Annual Reviews
Backs: “Scholars agree affective polarization has grown and has important consequences (e.g., lower trust, more tolerance for norm‑breaking), but the exact levels and trends can plateau or vary by measure across years. Reviews from 2019–2024 synthesize this evidence.”