Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by most standard measures of the modern era (roughly the last 50–100 years), political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been in recent decades, though it is not comparable to the Civil War era in scale of conflict or existential stakes. It has risen sharply since the late 20th century (especially after ~2008 in some metrics), affects elites and the public, and includes both ideological/issue divides and affective (emotional/dislike) polarization. Comparisons further back are harder due to data limitations and different contexts.[1]

Congressional/Elite Polarization

Partisan divides in Congress are at or near historic highs for the post-World War II period. DW-NOMINATE scores (which place lawmakers on a liberal-conservative spectrum based on roll-call votes) show Democrats and Republicans farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with virtually no overlap between the least liberal Democrat and least conservative Republican in the House since the early 2000s.[2]

Public/Mass Polarization (Issues and Ideology)

Issue-based polarization among the public has increased substantially since the late 1980s. A University of Cambridge analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data (1988–2024) using clustering found a 64% rise in separation between opinion clusters on social/political issues, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (flat in the 1990s/early 2000s). It leveled off slightly after 2020 but remains far higher than earlier decades. This was driven more by the left becoming more socially liberal (~31.5% shift) than the right becoming more conservative (~2.8%).[1]

Pew Research data show:

Affective Polarization (Dislike and Animus)

This has risen markedly. ANES “feeling thermometer” scores show warmth toward one’s own party relatively stable, while views of the opposing party have cooled sharply (from near-neutral ~48 in the late 1970s to the mid-20s by the 2020s).[6]

Pew and other surveys document rising negative stereotypes: large majorities in both parties view the other as more immoral, dishonest, closed-minded, etc., with increases over the past decade. Cross-national studies find the U.S. experienced the largest rise in affective polarization among several OECD countries over recent decades.[7]

V-Dem data classify U.S. polarization as reaching “pernicious” levels (high “us vs. them” hostility risking democratic norms) since around 2015—the only wealthy Western democracy with persistently high levels in recent years (peers like France or Italy briefly approached it in earlier crises). Polarization has also risen globally since ~2005, but the U.S. stands out among long-standing democracies.[8]

Historical Context and Caveats

In short, measurable polarization—congressional ideology, public issue divides, and especially mutual dislike—is worse than in the recent past and high by modern democratic standards. It poses risks to governance, trust, and social cohesion, but the U.S. has weathered deep divisions before without collapse. Trends are data-driven rather than inevitable.