Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Is today more polarized than past eras? I'll compare historical patterns and current measures to put the divide in context.

Short answer: Yes, by most measurable modern standards - but not by every measure, and not compared to the most violent periods of American history.

1. What is measurably worse than in the recent past

Elite / Congressional polarization is at a 50+ year high - and near a 150-year high:

> Indeed, a Pew Research Center analysis finds that, on average, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years

The same analysis is often phrased as:

> American policymakers are more polarized today than any time since the end of the Civil War. After a period of bipartisanship following World War II, Republican and Democratic political elites, typically defined as legislators and other elected officials, diverged dramatically

How that shows up in Congress:

Other Pew reporting summarized the public perception as correct:

> Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years

In the 117th Congress from 2021 to 2023, there were about two dozen moderate Democrats and Republicans... For comparison, there were more than 160 moderates five decades earlier during the 92nd U.S. Congress from 1971-1972

Affective polarization - how much partisans dislike each other - has risen sharply:

> Affective polarization in the United States – the gap between individuals’ positive feelings toward their own political party and negative feelings toward the opposing party – has increased markedly in the past two decades

Using "feeling thermometer" surveys 0-100:

> In 1978, the average American rated the members of their own political party 27 points higher than members of the other major party. By 2016, Americans were rating their own party 45.9 points higher than the other party, on average

> In other words, negative feelings toward members of the other party compared to one's own party increased by an average of 4.8 points per decade

A cross-national study by Brown/Stanford economists found:

> Political polarization among Americans has grown rapidly in the last 40 years—more than in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia or Germany

> They found that in the U.S., affective polarization has increased more dramatically since the late 1970s than in the eight other countries they examined—the U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden

Researchers note polarization has also risen in Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland but to a lesser extent, while in the U.K., Australia, Germany, Norway and Sweden, polarization decreased

Another comparison notes current U.S. levels exceed those in comparable countries by large margins and resemble those recorded just before notorious historical disasters, with levels comparable to Weimar Germany or India at partition.

Causes discussed for the post-1970s rise include:

2. What is NOT necessarily worse

Mass ideological polarization vs. sorting:

Political scientists often distinguish polarization - the public moving to ideological extremes, with the middle hollowing into a U-shape - from sorting - people staying roughly where they were but aligning party choice with their existing ideology.

> In common parlance, polarization means that the middle of an opinion distribution decreases while the tails increase. Think of a bell-shaped curve morphing into a U shape. Nothing like that has happened in the American public, considered as a whole

Evidence for sorting:

> When we look at how citizens classify themselves ideologically, we find no change since the 1970s, with “moderate, middle-of-the-road” registering as the plurality position today, as it did then

> What has happened in the United States is not polarization, but sorting. Consistent with the historical norm in two-party systems, in the mid-20th century our parties were “big tents.”... Today, conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans are all but extinct

> Thus, increased issue partisanship is not due to higher ideological coherence; rather, as suggested by Fiorina, et. al. (2005) it mostly arose from parties being more polarized and therefore doing a better job at sorting individuals

Similarly:

> Rather most voters remain moderate on most issues

One Stanford analysis argues:

> The vast majority of Americans are going about their daily lives as they always have, largely disengaged from politics and certainly not girding for civil war

> Less than 10 percent attended any kind of meeting, rally or demonstration — for any candidate. Only 2 or 3 percent did any work for a campaign

This explains why affective polarization can rise even if ideological extremity does not roughly increase across the whole public.

Compared to the distant past:

> It has become commonplace to say that the United States in 2020 is more divided politically and culturally than at any other point in our national past. University of Virginia Civil War historian, Gary W. Gallagher, says that current divisions pale in comparison to those of the mid-19th century. Between Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860 and the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Confederate army at Appomattox in April 1865, the nation literally broke apart

Other historians note:

> for all the hype about the ruptures and partisan rancor in contemporary American society, the strife pales in comparison with much of the nation’s past. There have been long stretches of American history in which conflicts were far worse

3. Bottom line