Yes, by multiple rigorous measures—especially in the United States—political polarization is higher now than in recent decades and, on several key dimensions, worse than at most points in the post-WWII era (with some caveats for earlier historical periods). This is not just a media narrative; it is documented in voting data, survey research, congressional behavior, and social science metrics. Trends are clearest for the U.S.; other democracies show mixed or milder patterns.
Key Evidence from Data and Studies
•Elite/congressional polarization: U.S. Congress has become far more polarized. DW-NOMINATE scores (which track ideological voting) show the parties sorting into more homogeneous, distant camps since the 1970s–1980s. The ideological gap between the median Democrat and Republican in the House and Senate is now larger than at any point since the late 19th/early 20th century in many analyses. Bipartisan legislation and cross-party voting have declined sharply. Overlap between the parties in Congress essentially disappeared by the 2000s.
•Mass/public opinion and affective polarization: Pew Research and other longitudinal surveys show Americans’ partisan identities have strengthened, with larger gaps on issues (immigration, race, economics, culture/religion) and much higher “affective” polarization—dislike or distrust of the other side.
•In the 1990s, many Americans held mixed views; today, consistent liberals and conservatives dominate, and partisans increasingly view the other party as a threat to the nation’s well-being.
•Feeling thermometer scores (warmth toward own vs. opposing party) have widened dramatically since the 1980s. “Out-party hate” now often exceeds in-party love.
•Partisan sorting by geography, media diet, religion, and lifestyle has increased (“big sort”), amplifying echo chambers.
•Voting and elections: Straight-ticket voting, party-line presidential results by county/state, and correlation of presidential and congressional votes have risen. Split-ticket voting is near historic lows. Close national elections combined with geographic clustering produce high-stakes, zero-sum feelings. Primary electorates and activist bases pull parties further apart.
•Social and behavioral indicators: Intermarriage across party lines has declined; friendships, dating, and even family discussions are more strained by politics. Surveys show rising willingness to discriminate against opposing partisans in hiring or social settings. Media fragmentation (cable news, social media algorithms) correlates with these trends, though causation is debated. Trust in institutions is highly polarized by party.
Historical Context and Caveats
•Post-WWII baseline was unusually low: The mid-20th century featured broader bipartisan consensus (Cold War, New Deal residual, less sorted parties). Polarization then was milder than today on many metrics. The realignment after the Civil Rights era, Southern Strategy, and cultural shifts of the 1960s–80s started the modern rise.
•Earlier U.S. history was often worse or comparable in intensity: The Civil War era, Gilded Age, 1890s–1910s (populism, labor violence), and 1960s–70s (riots, assassinations, Vietnam) featured extreme polarization, violence, and institutional strain. Today’s levels of affective polarization and elite sorting are high relative to the late 20th century but do not (yet) match the physical violence or secessionist stakes of the 1860s. Some scholars argue current affective polarization is among the highest recorded in survey eras.
•Not uniform: Ideological polarization on specific issues varies (some economic issues show less divergence than cultural ones). Independents and moderates still exist but are less influential. Younger cohorts sometimes show different patterns. Internationally, many European multiparty systems have rising polarization on immigration/culture, but U.S.-style two-party affective intensity is distinctive. Some countries have seen depolarization at times.
Drivers (Not Just “Worse Vibes”)
Commonly cited factors backed by research include: partisan media and social media amplification; geographic and social sorting; elite incentives (primaries, fundraising, gerrymandering in some cases); declining shared experiences/institutions; rising inequality and cultural change; and the nationalization of politics. These interact—polarization is both cause and effect.
Bottom Line
Data from sources like Pew Research Center, American National Election Studies (ANES), DW-NOMINATE, and academic meta-analyses (e.g., work by Lilliana Mason, Shanto Iyengar, Nolan McCarty) consistently show U.S. polarization—particularly affective and elite—has intensified since the 1970s/80s and is at or near multi-decade highs. It is “worse than the recent past” by clear metrics, even if absolute historical peaks of conflict were higher in some earlier eras. This has real consequences for governance, social trust, and democratic norms, though it is not irreversible and varies by issue and country. For primary data, see Pew’s long-term polarization reports and ANES time series.