Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple measurable standards—especially since the mid-20th century—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for decades, and in some respects it approaches or exceeds post-Civil War highs. However, it is not unprecedented in American history, and the nature of today’s divisions differs from earlier peaks. Comparisons depend on the metric (elite vs. mass public, ideological/issue-based vs. affective/emotional, congressional voting vs. public opinion), the time frame, and whether one focuses on the U.S. or global trends.[1]

Congressional (Elite) Polarization

DW-NOMINATE scores (which map legislators’ voting records on a liberal-conservative dimension) show Democrats and Republicans in Congress farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, with virtually no overlap between the parties. Moderates have nearly vanished (roughly two dozen remain vs. over 160 in the early 1970s). Both parties have become more internally cohesive and moved away from the center, though Republicans have shifted further right on average while Democrats have moved somewhat left.[2]

This rise began in the 1970s after a mid-century low (when parties were more heterogeneous, including conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Republicans). Polarization has continued upward. Historically, congressional polarization was also very high in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Gilded Age/Progressive Era strong-party periods, around the 1890s–1910s), sometimes matching or exceeding recent levels in party-mean differences, with little overlap. It declined through much of the 20th century before rebounding. Pre-Civil War and Civil War eras featured extreme sectional divides (not fully captured the same way due to different party systems). Current levels are often described as a post-Reconstruction high or near-peak.[3]

Public Opinion and Issue Polarization

Surveys (e.g., American National Election Studies) show growing divisions on social, cultural, economic, and political issues. One recent analysis using clustering algorithms found a 64% increase in issue polarization from 1988 to 2024, with nearly all the rise occurring after 2008 (around the financial crisis, Obama’s election, and the spread of smartphones/social media). This was driven more by the left/liberal cluster becoming substantially more socially progressive (about 31.5% more liberal on surveyed issues) than by the right becoming more conservative (only ~2.8%). Gaps widened on topics like abortion, race/inequality, health insurance, and traditional values. Sorting (alignment of ideology with party ID) has also increased. Polarization may have begun leveling off somewhat in recent years but remains elevated.[1]

Pew Research has long documented widening partisan gaps on values and issues since the 1990s/early 2000s, with less ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans and more consistent liberals/conservatives. Partisan gaps on presidential approval are at or near record highs.[4]

Affective Polarization (Emotional Dislike)

This has risen sharply. Feeling thermometer ratings of the opposing party have grown much colder (from near-neutral decades ago to strongly negative), while in-party ratings stay relatively warm. Negative stereotypes have intensified: large majorities now view the other side as more immoral, dishonest, or closed-minded than other Americans, with big increases since the 2010s or earlier. Willingness to have a child marry someone from the other party has plummeted. These trends date back decades but accelerated recently and stand out internationally—the U.S. has seen one of the largest increases among Western democracies and is often noted as the only wealthy Western democracy with persistently high “pernicious” polarization.[5]

Historical and Comparative Context

America has no golden age of unity. Intense divisions occurred in the early republic (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians), the lead-up to and during the Civil War (by far the most extreme, involving secession and mass violence over slavery and related issues), Reconstruction, the late 19th century, and the 1960s (civil rights, Vietnam, cultural upheaval). Some historians argue today’s substantive divides are not as deep as those eras or even the late 1960s, while others say current polarization is the most dangerous since the Civil War precisely because it aligns so cleanly along national party lines, is highly nationalized, and permeates daily life, media, and institutions with less room for cross-cutting cleavages.[6]

Today’s version is distinctive due to:

Latent value divides (e.g., moral/religious) may have been relatively stable longer-term, with rising partisan polarization reflecting better sorting into parties rather than entirely new disagreements. The U.S. is unusual in having roughly equal-sized left and right clusters, which can intensify the sense of deadlock compared to countries with larger majorities on one side. Globally, “us vs. them” polarization has risen in many places since the mid-2000s, but the U.S. stands out among liberal democracies.[7]

Caveats

In short, relative to the relatively depolarized mid-20th century and the recent past, yes—it is worse on elite cohesion/distance, public issue sorting/gaps (especially post-2008), and emotional animosity. Absolute historical highs are harder to declare (Civil War was worse in consequences), but current levels are among the highest in modern U.S. history and distinctive in their party-aligned, media-fueled, and identity-infused character. Data come primarily from sources like Voteview/DW-NOMINATE, Pew, ANES, and academic studies using clustering or feeling thermometers.